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Preface 
This study is the result of a research project carried out at the German 
Development Institute (DIE) from 2003 to 2004 as part of the DIE Post-
Graduate Training Course. Field research was conducted from February to 
April 2004. The report was written jointly by all members of the research 
team. 
The project was carried out in close cooperation with the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(IISS). Its director, Valentin Bogatyrev, supported the project from its 
early stages. Gulasel Abylova, senior researcher, provided invaluable 
assistance for the design of the project and the success of our field studies. 
Her commitment to our common cause was a constant source of motiva-
tion, and her hospitality opened the richness of Kyrgyzstan’s culture for 
our Westerners’ eyes. 
We gratefully acknowledge the generous support received from many 
other colleagues at IISS as well as from officials and experts at govern-
mental and non-governmental institutions, businesspeople, civil society 
activists and other interlocutors. They all shared their valuable time and 
knowledge with us. Of particular use were the comments offered by par-
ticipants at two workshops organised in February and April 2004, respec-
tively, at the IISS in Bishkek, where the research design and some pre-
liminary results were discussed. Their constructive criticism as well as 
their support for the project were crucial for us in  defining the direction of 
our research.  
We are especially grateful to the many people of Nooken raion, Jalalabat 
oblast, and Issyk-Ata raion, Chui oblast, who helped to sharpen our view 
for the local perspective on decentralisation. Their enthusiasm gives rea-
son to hope that “more power to the locales” is more than just an academic 
phrase. 
In Bonn, our colleagues at the DIE offered useful comments and criticism 
at presentations given in February and May 2004. Special thanks are due 
to Stephan Klingebiel, who followed the progress of the project from its 
very outset, as well as to Kathrin Berensmann, Jörg Faust and Imme 
Scholz. 
In March 2005, when all major work for this study had already been com-
pleted, a popular uprising, triggered by an unfair parliamentary election 
and known as the “Tulip Revolution,” forced Kyrgyzstan’s president 
Askar Akayev out of office. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a former prime minister 
turned chief oppositionist, took over as acting president and was con-
firmed in this office in a relatively fair presidential election less than four 
months later. Akayev’s ouster stimulated expectations that Kyrgyzstan’s 
political system might reverse its accelerating path towards undemocratic 
rule and that democracy might receive a second chance. More recent news 
indicates that less may have changed than one would have wished. The 
tensions between the north and the south of the country re-emerged as 
clearly as ever during the spring 2005 events and have since then contin-
ued to play an important role in politics. The new leadership has invested 
considerable efforts in re-establishing a strong grip over the country’s 
public administration and security forces. No major changes have been 
announced with respect to the vertical structure of state administration and 
the introduction of a more effective system of local self-government– with 
one notable exception: In August 2005, President Bakiev told a meeting of 
government officials that by 2007 the oblast level of state administration 
would be eliminated. This decision puts an end to a discussion that had 
been going on in Kyrgyzstan for several years and that some experts had 
regarded as crucial if decentralisation was to make progress. As this report 
shows, however, while eliminating the oblasti may be a reasonable deci-
sion, it is by no means a panacea for Kyrgyzstan’s difficult decentralisa-
tion process. Thus, despite the recent political events in Kyrgyzstan, the 
findings reported in this study are still relevant for policy-makers and 
foreign donors concerned with decentralisation in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
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Summary 
The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) provides a good example for a study 
of the problems and opportunities often encountered in decentralisation. 
For more than ten years, decentralisation and local government reform 
have been important elements of Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to improve state 
governance. In the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, 
such as the Kyrgyz Republic, decentralisation is closely linked to re-
forms of the overall government and administrative system, since the old 
central apparatus crumbled over a decade ago as a consequence of the 
demise of the Soviet Union. Several international donor agencies have 
established programmes to support the Kyrgyz decentralisation process. 
Nonetheless, local governments appear to be very limited in their ability 
to meet the high expectations associated with decentralisation and the 
introduction of local self-government. 
While there is wide-spread agreement among experts about the diagnosis 
as such, so far little research has been done on the exact reasons for this 
situation and their effects on the Kyrgyz Republic’s development poten-
tial. To address this question, this study, based on empirical research 
carried out from February to April 2004, analyses one particular aspect 
of decentralisation in the Kyrgyz Republic, namely its impact on popular 
participation in the design and implementation of local economic devel-
opment policies. Proceeding from this analysis, the study derives con-
clusions and recommendations for the Kyrgyz government and other 
official bodies, local NGOs and international donors. 
Decentralisation, local economic development and participation 
The study rests on three normative assumptions derived from theoretical 
considerations:  
1. Ideally, decentralisation increases opportunities for, and eventually 
leads to more, popular participation in local political decision-
making.  
2. Effective decentralisation enables local governments to devise 
public policies in the area of local economic development that are 
in line with both local circumstances and needs.  
Jörn Grävingholt et al. 
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3. Broader participation that involves large parts of the population has a 
positive impact on the design and implementation of local economic 
development policies 
Decentralisation reforms aim at enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of local administrations in public service provision by bringing decision-
making processes and responsibilities as close to the people as possible. 
Decentralisation can generally be understood as “[...] the process by which 
authority, responsibility, power, resources and accountability are trans-
ferred from the central levels of government to sub-national levels [...] 
Conceptually, decentralisation relates to the role of, and the relationship 
between, central and sub-national institutions, whether they are public, 
private or civic.” The sub-national entities provide a number of basic pub-
lic services and exercise basic administrative functions. One of the main 
pillars of decentralisation is local self-government. According to the Euro-
pean Charter of Local Self-Government, “local self-government denotes 
the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to 
regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own 
responsibility and in the interest of the local population. This right shall be 
exercised by [democratically elected representative bodies] entitled, within 
national economic policy, to adequate financial resources of their own, of 
which they may dispose freely within the framework of their power.” 
Subsidiarity, an underlying principle of decentralisation, implies that tasks 
should only be performed by higher-level authorities if lower levels of 
government are unable to do so properly. 
It has become customary to distinguish four categories of decentralisation, 
namely political, administrative, fiscal, and market decentralisation. Since 
decentralisation efforts are strongly linked to a country’s size, population, 
history, political culture, geographic and ethnic diversity, the categories 
may appear in different forms and combinations within countries, and 
even within sectors. In Kyrgyzstan, only the first three categories play an 
important role. A balanced interrelationship between the political, admin-
istrative and fiscal dimensions is a crucial prerequisite for successful de-
centralisation. 
Successful decentralisation mainly aims at four closely interrelated effects: 
enhanced citizen participation and representation of different interest 
groups at the local level; more efficient and effective provision of public 
services to the local population; clear-cut accountability of local authori-
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
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ties matched by corresponding competences and resources and leading to a 
more transparent public administration; and mobilisation of local devel-
opment potential through increased local responsibility. 
However, numerous risks can jeopardise the positive effects intended with 
the promotion of decentralisation. Participation may be jeopardised when 
clientelist structures, local elites or corrupt practices hinder equal partici-
pation by all stakeholders. Ethnic divisions and even autonomy move-
ments can be perpetuated by decentralisation efforts if the needs of minori-
ties are not equally represented. Service provision at the local level can 
even become more inefficient if administration staff at the local level is 
poorly qualified or spending by local authorities is not restrained. Differ-
ent costs of service provision despite similar tax revenue bases can result 
in unequal development opportunities for regions or individual groups of 
people within regions. Lack of fiscal discipline at sub-national levels of 
government can threaten macro-economic stability. 
If decentralisation is to achieve beneficial impacts, it requires 
• Effective state capacity to co-ordinate between different levels of 
government, regulate local government action and oversee local au-
thorities so that all groups of citizens benefit from political reform 
• Empowered, committed and competent local governments 
• Engaged, informed and organised citizens and civil societies to collect 
and articulate the views of the community, exert effective control over 
administration and political decision-makers through formalised par-
ticipation mechanisms and avoid risks such as decentralisation of cor-
ruption and increased local clientelism 
One important area, or policy field, in which decentralised governance is 
supposed to make itself felt is local economic development. Local eco-
nomic development is the process by which public, business and non-
governmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions 
for economic growth and generation of employment. Private enterprises 
generally depend on favourable local business conditions to achieve pros-
perity. Local governments have, therefore, the essential role to create a 
favourable environment for business development and job creation. 
Local governments and communities basically have to decide what pro-
grams and projects they want to adopt to achieve their local economic 
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development visions, goals and objectives. The options available vary and 
may be as relatively simple as providing a variety of services for local 
businesses or as complex as attracting foreign direct investment. They 
include encouraging new enterprises by providing advice, information and 
resources such as micro-financing schemes or the establishment of busi-
ness networks; investment in local technical infrastructure (hard infrastruc-
ture); establishment of facilities and institutions designed to improve the 
social and commercial environment for businesses (soft infrastructure); or 
support for sector and business cluster development. 
Successful decentralisation requires some degree of local citizen participa-
tion as one of its preconditions. At the same time, however, the process of 
decentralisation is also supposed to create new and sustainable opportuni-
ties for more such participation. The relationship between decentralisation 
and participation is a mutually reinforcing one. 
Participatory development denotes a process in which people are actively 
and significantly involved in all decisions affecting their lives. Participa-
tory mechanisms vary along a continuum: from more far-reaching citizen 
or stakeholder influence on and control over decisions to more conven-
tional conceptions under which government agencies essentially retain 
decision-making power and control with respect to key functions. Partici-
pation can take several forms. Information provided to citizens by gov-
ernment agencies is the weakest but most basic form of participation. In 
consultation, citizens’ views are sought on specific issues defined by gov-
ernment bodies. Citizens then provide feedback to government and formu-
late their own interests. In a co-operative process, these interests are not 
only heard but also taken into account by decision-makers. Active partici-
pation, finally, is based on partnership: citizens actively engage in the 
policy-making process. They propose policy options and shape the policy 
dialogue. 
Participation can significantly enhance the quality of public management 
and public service delivery. Regular elections and participatory practices 
enhance the compliance of political office holders with the needs of the 
electorate and strengthen the latter’s acceptance of political authority. 
However, participation in public sector management is also faced with 
constraints. The positive and negative impacts of participation depend on 
who participates in what procedures or institutions. Participatory forums 
can be misused for an ex post legitimisation of existing power structures. 
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
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Furthermore, the provision of participatory mechanisms depends on the 
will and determination of governments and the ruling elite. Participation 
therefore must be institutionalised. Ad hoc, issue-driven participation, by 
contrast, may enable specific lobby groups to push their own interests at 
the expense of the larger community. 
As a consequence, one primary focus of participation is empowerment: 
disadvantaged groups such as the poor, women, youth, ethnic or religious 
minority groups find it difficult to have their interests represented in deci-
sion-making. Participation can give these groups a voice. But participation 
also goes beyond empowerment: it is supposed to include all stakeholders 
in the policy process. Politicians, on the one hand, can reduce information 
costs if citizens are able to directly bring their needs to bear in the process 
of policy formulation. On the other hand, participation enables citizens to 
develop their own initiatives. Existing local potential can in this way be 
used to contribute to more innovative and responsive policy-making. 
Local economic development can be said to represent a partnership be-
tween local government, businesses and community interests. One crucial 
step in establishing channels of co-operation between the three sectors is 
identification of stakeholders who should participate in local economic 
development strategy formulation and implementation. Stakeholders in-
clude grassroots beneficiaries as well as decision-makers at all levels of 
government that are concerned with planning and decision-making, exe-
cuting and evaluating particular policies or projects in a direct or indirect 
way. 
However, the outcome of participatory approaches to local economic de-
velopment depends very much on the commitment and political will of the 
various stakeholders to act in the interest of public welfare. Although local 
economic development policy outcomes primarily concern the private 
sector, partial interests, power relations and competing concepts are in 
play here just as much as they are in any other policy field. 
Decentralisation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was among the first 
countries to take steps towards building a democratic society and imple-
menting public administration reform. Having inherited a centralised po-
litical and economic system from the socialist era, decentralisation ranked 
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high on the agenda from the very beginning of the new sovereign state. 
Nonetheless, despite repeated efforts to strengthen decentralisation and to 
bring power to the lower levels of the administrative system, there have 
remained numerous obstacles to decentralisation and its objectives. Many 
of the preconditions of decentralisation are not adequately given. The 
substantive political decentralisation that has already been carried out has 
not gone hand in hand with real administrative and, most importantly, 
fiscal decentralisation. Lack of regulations and clear functional distinc-
tions between the different administrative levels constrains local govern-
ments’ room for manoeuvre. This immobilisation of local self-government 
bodies is further deepened by a lack of financial autonomy and a lack of 
capable human resources. Clientelist structures as well as hierarchy-driven 
mindsets of citizens and representatives that can be ascribed to the Soviet 
legacy add to a generally somewhat gloomy picture of decentralisation and 
local self-government in Kyrgyzstan. 
Structural legacies from Soviet times can be observed in the formal politi-
cal structure of many successor states: the terms for and demarcations of 
administrative units at the sub-national level (oblasti, raiony, oblast-
subordinate cities, raion-subordinate towns) have been inherited by most 
post-soviet countries. In the Kyrgyz Republic, an additional layer of aiyl 
okmotu was introduced in 1996. The regional division of the country was 
also restructured after independence, with the creation of more oblasti than 
the country had before. 
In the highly centralised Soviet system the competencies of bodies at dif-
ferent layers were extremely limited. In the independent Kyrgyz state, 
more authority was given to the different levels. But above all, the hierar-
chy of administrative layers used to play a crucial role in inter-
governmental financial transfers: Funds were passed through oblast and 
raion state administrations down to local communities, leading to signifi-
cant financial dependence of the aiyl okmotu on the upper levels. 
At the different levels of administration, two types of sub-national admin-
istrative bodies exist: bodies of local state administration and bodies of 
local self-government. Local state administration bodies exist at the oblast 
and raion levels. They receive and execute instructions from the national 
level and are headed by appointed governors (oblast) and akims (raion). 
Both oblast and raion state administrations have locally elected councils 
(keneshi) that formally have the right to confirm governors and akims 
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
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nominated by the president. In fact, however, these councils have little 
oversight over policy-making or control over the respective state admini-
strations.  
In contrast to local state administrations, bodies of local self-government 
are legally independent of the central government. Bodies of local self-
government include administrations and councils (keneshi) at the third tier 
of government – i.e. aiyl okmotu and raion-subordinate cities. They are 
accountable to the population of their respective jurisdiction. Formally, 
oblast and raion councils are also considered bodies of local self-
government. Due to their weak position, however, it is only the third tier 
of government that comes close to what is understood internationally to be 
local self-government. 
One further body at the local level of the Kyrgyz administrative system 
demands special attention: the so-called kurultai (people’s assembly) that 
can take place at various territorial levels. Here, interested citizens can 
meet members of the respective kenesh and administration representatives. 
Issues of local importance are discussed and possible recommendations 
developed here. Kurultai are held at least once a year. According to the 
relevant legislation, these assemblies are a possibility for participants to 
actively take part in and influence policy- and decision-making. In cases 
involving severe problems, the community or the kenesh can convene 
assemblies with the respective administrations. Furthermore, these assem-
blies serve as consultative meetings where the administrations present 
their ideas and development strategies for the future. 
Beside these institutional arrangements, most reform efforts concerning 
decentralisation in the past decade have failed to combine delegation of 
functions with adequate financial resources at the lower levels of Kyr-
gyzstan’s administrative system. Therefore, a significant gap exists be-
tween the functions that local governments have to fulfil and the financial 
means needed to fund these tasks. Ineffective and unpredictable budget 
allocations significantly limit the ability to establish budgets, the main 
strategic instrument for planning, implementation and monitoring of pub-
lic programs at the local level.  
The problem of inadequate budget formulation processes and of insuffi-
cient transparency in the inter-governmental finance system was addressed 
by government in the “Law on Financial and Economic Basis of Local 
Self-Government,” effective since January 2004. This law clarifies the 
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fiscal relations between the state and local self-governments and estab-
lishes some degree of financial autonomy for the latter. It also clarifies, to 
some extent, arrangements for local taxes. But most importantly, the law 
limits the ability of raion state administrations to interfere in the fiscal 
affairs of local governments. 
Prior to enactment of the law, fiscal bodies at all levels of government 
were part of a rigidly hierarchical structure that was dominated by the 
Ministry of Finance. Thus, significant political resistance to decentralisa-
tion can be found within this ministry, which fears losing oversight over 
local expenditures. The clarification of the fiscal relationship between the 
state and local self-governments provided by the new law is a major step 
forward, although the extent to which this new law will contribute to a 
more strategic and open budget policy formulation is a matter that remains 
to be seen in future budget cycles.  
Generally, local budget revenues consist of own-source taxes and non-tax 
revenues on the one hand and of taxes and revenues allocated at the na-
tional levels as well as transfers and grants on the other. According to the 
new law, revenues in surplus of expenditures will now remain within the 
local budget, whereas previously they had to be handed back to upper 
levels or resulted in lower financial allocations. Ideally, this should pro-
vide local governments with incentives to manage resources more effi-
ciently and to effectively collect taxes and other funds. 
Two aspects make local budgets an important issue for the topic under 
discussion in this study: firstly, they are supposed to be elaborated with the 
participation of bodies of local self-government, namely the keneshi. Draft 
budgets are also discussed in kurultai meetings. Secondly, the size of the 
budget determines the approach to and extent of locally provided public 
services, including measures for local economic development. In sum, the 
Kyrgyz decentralisation process has made progress in several fields but a 
balanced and sustainable new division of labour, competences and re-
sources has yet to be found. A number of problems are related to the very 
design of the reform. Even more important, however, is the insufficient 
implementation of existing legislation due to unwillingness on the part of 
some actors and a lack of confidence on the part of others. Four clusters of 
problems are most salient in this regard: 
Lack of functional assignments. There is no clear distinction between the 
functions at oblast and at raion level. Duplications of functions are com-
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
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mon. Keneshi and local administrations are not truly independent of state 
authorities, and their actual decision-making competencies are very lim-
ited. Existing regulations concerning the delegation and delimitation of 
competencies have not been satisfactorily implemented. Furthermore, 
nepotism and corruption pose an additional obstacle to transparent and 
democratic structures. 
Lack of finance at the local level. Grants and transfers to lower levels are 
insufficient to pay even the salaries of local administrative staff. At the 
same time, own-source revenues of local self-government at aiyl okmotu 
level are often of such minor importance for local budgets that they do not 
even suffice to close the gap between tasks assigned by the central gov-
ernment and the actual funds transferred for the purpose. Thus, bodies of 
local self-government have no financial autonomy. This situation limits 
the ability of the aiyl okmotu to decide on and implement their own poli-
cies and makes them wholly dependent on transfers from the upper levels. 
Although grants and transfers will be calculated according to transparent 
formulae in the near future, the problem now is that funds are passed top-
down through all layers of administration. This implies the possibility that 
not all funds actually reach the bottom layer on time or in their full 
amounts. In addition, even officials in responsible positions at raion or 
aiyl okmotu level are not always aware of existing budget formation 
procedures.  
Limited capacities at local level. At the aiyl okmotu level and also at raion and 
oblast level, staff is not adequately qualified to fulfil all the tasks connected to 
local self-government. The national decentralisation strategy provides for 
delegation of numerous functions to the local levels. Yet, far too few training 
measures for local government staff are actually available. In addition, many 
aiyl okmotu focus on trainings on how to apply for donor projects. This does 
not contribute to capacity building for administrative tasks. 
Disproportionate power of local state administration. The central gov-
ernment has not managed to effectively reform local state administration 
since the stakeholders in the authorities are very influential in their respec-
tive regions and districts. In particular, there is strong resistance within the 
local state administrations to hand down power and to accept the possible 
elimination of either the oblast or the raion level. Often, tasks are trans-
ferred to the aiyl okmotu level arbitrarily or according to informal rules, 
and not in keeping with the principles of subsidiarity. The keneshi at raion 
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and oblast level are close to insignificant because they have no means to 
control the administrations or to make them accountable. Even though 
keneshi are influential at aiyl okmotu level, the corresponding administra-
tions have hardly any means to implement locally elaborated development 
plans due to their lack of finance. Thus, even though keneshi take part in 
decision-making, they only have limited influence on policies. Besides, 
from the Soviet period, people are acquainted with top-down decision-
making processes that they could not influence. Many people still have the 
expectation that decisions will be taken elsewhere, and they do not feel 
responsible for taking part in the making of public decisions. 
Both the Kyrgyz government and international donors have made efforts 
to improve the decentralisation process. Whereas the government plans to 
develop new legal frameworks, some international donors are focusing on 
assisting the bodies of local self-government in coping with their new 
responsibilities. 
Policies and measures for local economic development in the Kyrgyz  
Republic 
In analysing policies and measures for local economic development in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, it turns out that the weak position of aiyl okmotu in the 
ongoing decentralisation process has significant impact. The aiyl okmotu 
has very limited possibilities to actively design and implement public 
policies in the field of local economic development. The raion administra-
tion, by contrast, is much more involved in the promotion of local eco-
nomic development. At this level, more financial resources are available 
and staff is better educated and trained. The raion administration holds the 
key capacities needed to promote local economic development, and this is 
therefore the level to which people turn when they have problems concern-
ing their businesses.  
Yet, participation is mainly possible at aiyl okmotu level and not at raion 
level. An appointed raion administration as the key decision-maker in 
local economic development is clearly at odds with the political goal of 
decentralisation: bringing relevant decisions closer to the people, strength-
ening downward accountability of local decision-makers to a local con-
stituency and encouraging policies that reflect the needs of the local popu-
lation.  
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
German Development Institue 11 
In addition, at both levels, aiyl okmotu and raion, policies are not designed 
strategically and comprehensively. Instead, single and issue-driven meas-
ures dominate the administrations’ engagement in local economic devel-
opment. Even with such an approach, however, more could be done by 
local administrations by way of removing all kinds of obstacles posed to 
business activities. 
Participation in local economic development in the Kyrgyz Republic 
Participation of large parts of the population in decision-making is in gen-
eral not very widespread in Kyrgyzstan. However, the decentralisation 
process has created different channels which are supposed to enable peo-
ple to influence the work of local authorities in different ways. These for-
mal channels are local elections, local councils (keneshi), people’s assem-
blies (kurultai), and condominium associations. Furthermore, official 
meetings between administration and businesspeople also serve as a chan-
nel of participation. 
In principle, the formal channels of participation created through the de-
centralisation process have great potential. However, none of them works 
as intended. Only very few stakeholders are familiar with the exact func-
tions of these channels according to the law. Consequently, the channels 
function arbitrarily and not always to the benefit of citizens. Another im-
portant factor that keeps people from actively using the formal channels of 
participation is the extremely limited scope of responsibilities and policy-
making possibilities of administrations at aiyl okmotu level, for which 
most of the participatory channels have been created. As long as participa-
tion is confined to issues of minor relevance, it does not even make much 
sense to improve the channels which enable this kind of participation. 
Instead, such an approach would tend to confirm and strengthen people’s 
sceptical attitudes towards decentralisation. 
The minor importance of formal channels of participation gives leeway to 
all kinds of informal communication. If people are unable to take part in 
decision-making or to voice their opinions in any formal way, they look 
for alternatives to influence decisions in their favour. In the case of Kyr-
gyzstan, having the right personal contacts and paying bribes are the most 
common approaches. 
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Obviously, informal channels such as personal contacts and bribery violate 
the basic principles of democratic participation: equal access, transparency 
and openness to everyone. At the same time, these informal channels rein-
force general dissatisfaction with the system. Problems that are solved 
through these informal channels are individual in nature and the process of 
finding solutions is issue-driven. This practice undermines strategic pol-
icy-making, in which participation would make sense, and gives rise to a 
vicious circle in which people tend to resign instead of making the greatest 
possible use of the formal instruments available to them. 
This problematic situation has been recognised by the donor community, 
and some measures have been developed to improve the possibilities for 
citizen participation based on equal access. Some of the donors active in 
decentralisation policies have combined their investment in local devel-
opment with the creation of new channels of participation such as Local 
Investment Councils and Public Hearings. However, there is a danger in 
these tools that parallel structures are being created that may weaken 
rather than strengthen existing formal channels of participation by under-
mining the authority of elected self-governments.  
While a deficient decentralisation process that leaves formal channels of 
local participation without meaningful authority is a major factor account-
ing for inadequate popular participation, the situation is exacerbated by a 
second factor that can tentatively be termed “unfavourable attitudes.” 
Many stakeholders hold attitudes that are not favourable to active partici-
pation in local political decision-making. Among both the population and 
administration representatives an obedient, though rather critical, attitude 
towards authority and hierarchy tends to combine with a sceptical attitude 
towards institutions of democracy. Such attitudes display characteristics 
that can be linked to the authoritarian legacy of the Soviet Union, which 
continues to influence society and institutions in today’s Kyrgyzstan. High 
expectations with regard to what official authorities should ideally do 
contrast with widespread dissatisfaction with their performance and a 
generally pessimistic view of what authorities will likely do. Popular per-
ception of authority as legitimate rests much more on tradition and transfer 
of power from above than on performance and accountability to the peo-
ple. Officials in administrations and local councils mirror these attitudes 
with their own paternalistic mind-sets. 
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Nonetheless, in contrast to the overwhelming attitude of obedience and 
scepticism on the one hand and paternalism on the other, some reports 
indicate that citizens in Kyrgyzstan are starting to get more and more in-
volved in matters of local significance and that engagement in local affairs 
has notably increased compared to Soviet times. The impact of positive 
examples, however, is likely to remain rather limited as long as bodies of 
local self-government continue to be as powerless as this study has found 
them to be. Over the long term, attitudes respond to new circumstances 
and reward positive experiences. But in the absence of such positive ex-
periences, pre-democratic legacies in Kyrgyzstan are likely to prevail. 
Recommendations 
With a view to improving the process of decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan, 
increasing the potential of local economic development and strengthening 
popular participation, the Kyrgyz government, other official bodies, local 
NGOs and international donors should consider the following recommen-
dations: 
1. Local self-government bodies need meaningful budget revenues that 
provide them with financial resources which they can use at their own 
discretion. Full implementation of the new legislation on the financial 
and economic basis of local self-government would be a first impor-
tant step in this direction. Donor agencies could contribute substan-
tially to resolving this issue by providing legal advice and support for 
information campaigns as well as other measures. 
2. Administrative practice needs to move away from the notion of 
“every level of government does everything.” Local self-government 
bodies need their own guaranteed sphere of competencies and ade-
quate administrative resources to deal with them. Only then can they 
begin to define their own sustainable strategies and act according to 
their own priorities. One first step could be the establishment of an 
administrative court system. For a strict delineation of powers to work 
in practice, local self-government bodies need to be able to turn to a 
court when they have disputes over competencies with a body of local 
state administration.  
3. All levels of government as well as international donors should invest 
in capacity building for local administrative staff. One important part 
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of such trainings should include guidance on the delivery of public 
services, particularly on how to devise policies of local economic de-
velopment. For its part, government should create incentives to induce 
administrative staff to take part in such training measures. 
4. Both local self-government bodies and local state administration 
should pay more attention to local economic development measures 
that incur little or no cost. Above all, this means removing obstacles 
to business activities, making administrative procedures more trans-
parent and combating corruption. 
5. NGOs and donor agencies that attempt to strengthen popular partici-
pation should systematically involve and support formal institutions 
such as keneshi and kurultai, and in this way help to boost their repu-
tation as important channels of participation. It is essential to avoid 
creating parallel structures that circumvent the official channels be-
cause such structures weaken formal institutions. 
6. Local governments as well as NGOs should invest more effort in 
informing the population about possibilities to participate in local de-
cision-making and training local activists in making use of these in-
struments. 
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1 Introduction 
Decentralisation is arguably the most prominent of the strategies for 
better governance that international aid agencies propose, regularly and 
with great confidence, to newly democratising and developing countries. 
Indeed, the simple message underlying the concept of decentralisation 
appeals immediately and has the ring almost of a truism: Bring decision-
making on public policies as close to the people as possible, and the 
result will be an increase in effectiveness and efficiency of the process as 
well as a higher degree of legitimacy and accountability for the outcome.  
However, examples of decentralising countries in many parts of the world 
demonstrate that “decentralisation is obviously not a ‘development pana-
cea’.”1 Often, it fails to yield the expected results. In some cases, its out-
comes are even harmful. Apparently, the reform processes associated with 
the implementation of decentralisation strategies are themselves beset with 
risks and pitfalls. Accordingly, in recent years a whole body of scholarly 
literature has raised doubts as to the usefulness of decentralisation for 
promotion of development and poverty reduction.2 
Yet rather than discarding decentralisation as such, the challenge lies in 
improvement of the concept and its prudent, case-specific implementation. 
In the long run, there is little reason to assume that a centralised state that 
is not willing to share responsibilities and power with elected and account-
able bodies of local government will be more conducive to sustainable 
development than a decentralised one that is able to engage its people in 
the pursuit of their local affairs. In centralised states, short-term gains in 
effectiveness and operational capability are usually followed by long-term 
losses in adaptability, control capacity and information feedback. But just 
as the centralised “developmental state” is predicated on a set of highly 
demanding preconditions (which more often than not are unattainable), in 
order to succeed, decentralised government requires that certain conditions 
be met. The most important of these conditions is a thorough prior analysis 
of political and administrative circumstances in a given country. Another 
factor of crucial importance is the need to monitor problems and obstacles 
that obstruct the intended effects of decentralisation. 
                                                          
1 SLSA (2003, 94). 
2 Cf. Coly / Breckner (2004, 3). 
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One region where at the beginning of the 1990s decentralisation became 
an obvious requirement of government reform is the area of the former 
Soviet Union. Highly centralised in political terms but formally endowed 
with a rich set of administrative and representative structures from the top 
down to numerous local levels, many Soviet successor states turned to 
decentralisation as one of their first reform projects after independence. 
More than a decade later, in many of these countries decentralisation still 
ranks high on the political agenda. While some success has been achieved, 
many of the problems that decentralisation was intended to help overcome 
– such as inefficient planning, insufficient public service delivery, an un-
accountable bureaucracy etc. – are often still in evidence. In some cases, 
new problems have emerged, or old ones, such as corruption, have wors-
ened. Far from having been completed, decentralisation has become a 
constant battle cry of political rhetoric and a permanent problem as far as 
implementation is concerned. This is particularly true for most of the suc-
cessor states on the southern rim of the former Soviet Union, i.e. in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus. 
The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) provides a good example for a study 
of the problems and opportunities involved in decentralisation. For more 
than ten years, decentralisation and reform of local government have been 
important elements of Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to improve state governance. 
While the country is not particularly large in terms of territory and popula-
tion, its geography and regional fragmentation provide a good case for 
decentralisation: High mountains separate different parts of the country 
from one another, and in some areas there are sizable pockets of minority 
populations (mainly Uzbeks). Several international donor agencies have 
established programmes to support the Kyrgyz decentralisation process. 
Repeated efforts have been made by the government to implement existing 
legislation on the ground and adapt the legal and institutional framework 
wherever necessary. Nonetheless, local governments appear to be very 
limited in their ability to meet the high expectations associated with decen-
tralisation and the introduction of local self-government.  
While there is wide-spread agreement among experts about the diagnosis 
as such, so far little research has been done on the exact reasons for this 
situation and their effects on the Kyrgyz Republic’s development poten-
tial. To address this question, this study, based on empirical research car-
ried out from February to April 2004, analyses one particular aspect of 
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decentralisation in the Kyrgyz Republic, namely its impact on popular 
participation in the design and implementation of local economic devel-
opment policies.3 Starting from this analysis, the study derives conclusions 
and recommendations for the Kyrgyz government and other official bod-
ies, local NGOs and international donors. 
The events of spring 2005 that led to a sudden change of leadership in 
Kyrgyzstan have neither fundamentally altered the conditions for decen-
tralisation nor obviated the need to analyse deficiencies and improve the 
process wherever possible. While fears have been raised that Kyrgyzstan 
might break up along its north-south divide, a judicious policy of decen-
tralisation that does not mistake leaving communities to their own devices 
for decentralised governance may actually be the only reasonable instru-
ment to preserve the country’s unity and functional capability. For this 
reason, the study starts out from the premise that the findings produced 
during the research for this project have not lost any of their relevance. 
Rather, the recent political changes have opened a window of opportunity 
for the new Kyrgyz government to proceed with decentralisation in a more 
determined and more coherent manner than was the case in the past. 
The focus in this study on participation is not accidental. From a develop-
ment perspective, popular participation is one of the key objectives decen-
tralisation is supposed to promote. Simultaneously, the goal of participa-
tion cuts across all other dimensions of development. A higher degree of 
popular participation is a necessary precondition for decentralisation to 
unfold many of its other intended effects – such as more efficiency in 
public service delivery or more accountability and transparency of local 
government. At the same time, participation is an issue of high “political” 
relevance. As it touches upon existing patterns of power and influence, the 
idea of broader popular participation in decision-making is likely to pro-
voke resistance from many quarters. Successful resistance to more partici-
pation, however, can render any attempt at decentralisation meaningless. 
                                                          
3 Technically speaking, participation is regarded as the dependent variable of the analysis, 
the factor that is influenced by an independent variable, namely, decentralisation. Local 
economic development comes into play since participation occurs not per se but only 
with respect to a process in which actors participate in a certain way (or not at all). Lo-
cal economic development, thus, is the policy field that has been chosen to analyse par-
ticipation and the way it has been influenced by decentralisation. 
Jörn Grävingholt et al. 
18 German Development Institute 
Local economic development, in turn, is one of the main policy fields 
where positive effects of decentralisation are supposed to make themselves 
felt. The aim of creating a more conducive environment for successful 
local development is one of the main rationales making the concept of 
decentralisation so popular with international development agencies. Yet 
interestingly, most of the intellectual efforts devoted in recent years by the 
international development community to the promotion of local economic 
development have concentrated on the question of how to devise the right 
policies. The crucial problem of how decisions on policies are actually 
made, i.e. how processes (politics) and institutional context (polity) influ-
ence the choices the relevant actors make has largely been left aside. 
However, beside compelling theoretical arguments, the practice of LED 
provides good empirical reasons to assume that the politics and polity 
dimensions of local economic development are essential factors that need 
to be taken into account in this particular policy area as well.4 Conse-
quently, the impact of decentralisation on local economic development 
deserves particular attention.  
In sum, this study rests on three normative assumptions derived from theo-
retical considerations:  
1. Ideally, decentralisation increases opportunities for, and eventually 
leads to more, popular participation in local political decision-making.  
2. Effective decentralisation enables local governments to devise public 
policies in the area of local economic development that are in line 
with both local circumstances and needs.  
3. Broader participation that involves large parts of the population has a 
positive impact on the design and implementation of local economic 
development policies. 
Looking at the case of Kyrgyzstan, our conclusion is that important steps 
towards decentralisation have in fact been taken. Yet much more needs to 
be done if Kyrgyz state and society are to fully realise the potential inher-
ent in decentralisation. In particular, there are still many barriers to effec-
tive popular participation in local political decision-making. This study 
identifies the main reasons that account for these shortcomings and makes 
suggestions on how the situation could be improved. 
                                                          
4 Cf. Meyer-Stamer (2003a). 
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In any given society, political decision-making is a process that is shaped 
by both formal structures and informal arrangements. Together, formal 
structures and informal arrangements form the set of institutions that gov-
ern political interaction. From such a perspective, one that is in line with 
an important strand of scholarly research on institutional change, political 
reform is viewed as an effort to not only adopt new formal rules but also 
make them work against the backdrop of existing informal arrangements. 
To gain a better understanding of the informal institutions at work, it is 
necessary to be aware of the historical legacy that exists in a society and 
influences the way actors perceive their interests and constraints. To grasp 
the meaning and consequences of legacies, informality and resistance to 
reform, we thus combine a focus on institutions (both formal and informal) 
with a perspective on actor interests and historical development. 
The findings of this study are intended to equip both policy-makers in the 
Kyrgyz Republic and bilateral and international donors active in the coun-
try with empirical research findings on the effects that decentralisation has 
at present in one particular policy area. Moreover, at a more general level, 
we believe that some lessons can be learnt that are conducive to a better 
understanding of the political, social and cultural context in which political 
reforms are embedded in post-communist countries of the Central Asian 
region. Knowledge of this context is essential if international donor agen-
cies are to successfully support large-scale reform efforts that will eventu-
ally help to reduce poverty and conflict in the region. 
Decentralisation, participation and local economic development in the 
Kyrgyz Republic 
As has been stated above, at present popular participation at the local level 
cannot yet be said to have effectively improved in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Our research indicates that the reasons for these shortcomings do not lie 
primarily in the policy-making process at the local level itself but are 
closely linked to the design and implementation of decentralisation poli-
cies. Some of the crucial obstacles to effective decentralisation have not 
yet been removed. Most important among them are an unclear legal and 
real separation of competencies between the different levels of govern-
ment, the disproportionate power of bodies of state administration vis-à-
vis local self-government and insufficient financial resources as well as a 
lack of qualified personnel at the local level. Accordingly, one part of this 
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study is devoted to the overall framework of decentralisation in the Kyr-
gyz Republic, the transfer of responsibilities to the different levels of gov-
ernment and key  deficits of the process. 
So far, little research has been done on the efforts of local governments in 
Kyrgyzstan to promote local economic development. Our study shows that 
due to shortcomings inherent in the decentralisation process, these efforts 
are very limited indeed. While, to different degrees, individual measures 
designed to support the development of local businesses can be observed 
at different levels of local government, comprehensive approaches to local 
economic development are virtually absent. Yet despite their limited pol-
icy-making capacities, local governments are not left completely without 
instruments. Instead, our research shows that there is considerable scope 
available to eliminate all kinds of obstacles posed by local governments to 
business activities. 
All the deficits mentioned above notwithstanding, the Kyrgyz decentrali-
sation process has installed important formal channels for participation in 
local political decision-making. At present, however, stakeholders in-
volved in local politics – and in local economic development in particular 
– are making insufficient use of these instruments. While the limited 
measure of decision-making power possessed by these channels under the 
conditions given is certainly a major disincentive for active engagement, 
another important factor involved is the stakeholders’ general attitudes 
towards participation. Scepticism towards the use of local councils, as-
semblies or other platforms to promote particular policies as well as a 
‘traditional’ respect for state authorities and hierarchies among both the 
population and administrative staff pose an additional obstacle to an active 
exchange of views between government bodies and society. 
One more hypothesis addressed in this study is derived from the literature 
on political reform processes in post-Soviet countries in general. Compara-
tive experience suggests that only a limited number of actors at the local 
level enjoy increased opportunities for participation, while for many others 
little has changed at all. Consequently, there are reasons to assume that 
policies towards local economic development reflect only the views and 
interests of a certain minority, while others, and in particular the voices 
and needs of the marginalized and poor, tend to remain unheard. The em-
pirical data collected for this study do not permit any final conclusion on 
this issue since the scope of action of local governments is too limited to 
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allow judgments on procedures concerning fundamental policy decisions. 
Single-issue decisions, however, indicate that concerns about the inclu-
siveness of local decision-making procedures may well be justified. 
Where, for example, there are individual business promotion measures in 
place, information about them, and access to them, are often distributed 
very unequally. Here, again, it appears crucial to place particular emphasis 
on functioning participation in order to ensure transparency in decision-
making procedures and equal access to them. 
Research approach, methods, and structure of the study 
The research for this study employed qualitative empirical methods. Based 
on extensive reading on both the thematic issues concerned and the par-
ticular challenges facing Kyrgyzstan, a sample of local communities was 
selected for in-depth case studies. Beside the analysis of documents, semi-
structured interviews with representatives of the public and private sector, 
civil society and expert institutions were an important source of informa-
tion. A body of some one hundred interviews5 helped to shape a clearer 
picture of the opportunities and problems inherent in the Kyrgyz decen-
tralisation process. A detailed description of the methodology can be 
found in Annex B.  
Following this introduction, Chapter 0 gives an outline of the conceptual 
framework used in the analysis. The concepts of decentralisation, partici-
pation and local economic development are introduced and defined in their 
function for this study. The chapter first explores the meaning, scope and 
downsides of these concepts as well as their mutual interrelationships. 
Starting from there, Chapter 3 turns to the case of the Kyrgyz Republic and 
the decentralisation process the country has undergone thus far. Chapter 0 
presents and discusses policies and measures in the field of local economic 
development that are in place in the Kyrgyz Republic and analyses them 
with regard to the effect decentralisation has on their design and implemen-
tation. Chapter 0 then addresses the core of the research project, i.e. the role 
                                                          
5 Since many interviewees asked not to be quoted personally, all citations referring to 
interviews in this study appear in a coded form, revealing only the type of interviewee 
and the date on which the interview was held (for example, “Administration, interview 
450Int, 15/03/04”). 
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of participation in decision-making on local economic development and the 
effects of decentralisation on participation. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises our findings, draws final conclusions and 
provides recommendations for different local policy-makers and interna-
tional actors on how to (help) improve the current situation. The annex con-
tains a chronology of decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan as well as a detailed 
description of the research design, the methods employed and their theoreti-
cal substantiation. 
2 Conceptual framework: decentralisation, local 
economic development and participation 
This chapter serves to outline the concepts of decentralisation, local eco-
nomic development and participation. As the “independent variable” of 
our analysis, decentralisation is seen as a crucial factor involved in shaping 
the political and administrative framework within which citizens are sup-
posed to participate in the making of decisions on local economic devel-
opment. Participation, thus, is the “dependent variable” of our analysis, 
while local economic development is the policy field chosen to analyse 
participation and the way it has been influenced by decentralisation. 
2.1 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation efforts rank high on the political agenda of many devel-
oping countries, including the Soviet successor states. Reforms aim at 
enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of local administrations in public 
service provision by bringing decision-making processes and responsibili-
ties as close to the people as possible. 
The aspects of decentralisation presented in this section aim to provide an 
understanding of the concept of decentralisation used for the present study. 
The theoretical framework outlined here is meant to help to evaluate the 
empirical findings presented later on. 
This section outlines three crucial aspects related to decentralisation: the 
concept as such, impacts of decentralisation, and preconditions of and 
problems related to decentralisation reforms. Possible approaches, used by 
international donors to promote decentralisation, are highlighted.  
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
German Development Institue 23 
2.1.1 The concept of decentralisation 
Definitions 
Various donor publications as well as academic writings show that decen-
tralisation is a complex concept with no single or commonly accepted 
definition. However, the fundamentals associated with decentralisation are 
close to consistent from country to country and from donor to donor.6 
Decentralisation can generally be understood as “[...] the process by which 
authority, responsibility, power, resources and accountability are trans-
ferred from the central levels of government to sub-national levels [...] 
Conceptually, decentralisation relates to the role of, and the relationship 
between, central and sub-national institutions, whether they are public, 
private or civic.”7 The sub-national entities provide a number of basic 
public services and exercise basic administrative functions. 
One of the main pillars of decentralisation is local self-government. Ac-
cording to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, a document 
related to the Council of Europe, 
“local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local au-
thorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substan-
tial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the in-
terest of the local population. This right shall be exercised by [democ-
ratically elected representative bodies] entitled, within national eco-
nomic policy, to adequate financial resources of their own, of which 
they may dispose freely within the framework of their power.”8 
Subsidiarity, an underlying principle of decentralisation, implies that tasks 
should only be performed by higher-level authorities if lower levels of 
government are unable to do so properly.  
                                                          
6 UNDP / BMZ (2000, 26). 
7 UNDP (1997), cited in UNDP / BMZ (2000, 28). 
8 Council of Europe (1985, 2). 
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Categories of decentralisation and their different forms9 
Usually, four categories of decentralisation are distinguished, namely 
political, administrative, fiscal, and market decentralisation. Each of them 
has different characteristics, policy implications, and conditions for suc-
cess. It is useful to distinguish among categories of decentralisation to 
highlight its many dimensions. But still, these concepts have considerable 
overlaps. Furthermore, decentralisation efforts are strongly linked to a 
country’s size, population, history, political climate, geographic and ethnic 
diversity. The categories can thus appear in different forms and combina-
tions within countries, and even within sectors. Precise definitions are thus 
less important than ensuring a balanced and comprehensive approach. 10 
• Political decentralisation normally denotes situations where political 
power and authority have been transferred to sub-national levels. The 
most obvious manifestations of this type of decentralisation are 
elected and empowered sub-national governments ranging from vil-
lage councils to state level bodies. One aspect of political decentrali-
sation is devolution. Devolution refers to a full transfer of certain re-
sponsibilities, decision-making powers, resources and revenue genera-
tion to a local level of public authority that is autonomous and fully 
independent of the devolving authority. Devolved units usually are 
elected, independent legal entities, accountable to the electorate. 
• Administrative decentralisation focuses on delivery of a selected 
number of public services at local level. It transfers decision-making 
authority, resources and responsibilities for service delivery from the 
central to lower levels of government. Examples are local agencies 
and field offices of central government institutions. Two forms of ad-
ministrative decentralisation can be differentiated: Deconcentration 
disperses decision-making authority and responsibility from the cen-
tral government to lower levels, with the local units remaining ac-
countable to the central government. Deconcentration is often consid-
ered the weakest form of decentralisation and can be seen as a first 
step in newly decentralising governments to improve service delivery. 
Delegation, on the other hand, redistributes authority and responsibil-
ity to local units that are not necessarily branches or local offices of 
the delegating authority, but are ultimately accountable to it as far as 
                                                          
9 For this section, cf. UNDP / BMZ (2000, 30) and Litvack / Seddon (2000, 2). 
10 Litvack / Seddon (2000, 2). 
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delegated competencies are concerned. Examples are public enter-
prises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, 
special service districts, etc.  
• Fiscal decentralisation is a crucial cross-cutting category. Local gov-
ernments and private organisations must have at their disposal ade-
quate revenues to carry out decentralised functions effectively. They 
need the authority to make expenditure decisions independently. Ar-
rangements for resource allocation include concerns for interregional 
equity, availability of central and local resources as well as local fiscal 
management capacity. Fiscal decentralisation can take many forms, 
the most important of which are intergovernmental transfers of reve-
nues from central to local governments and the expansion of local 
revenues through taxes or indirect charges that remain in the local 
budget.11 Cost recovery of publicly provided services through user 
charges is another aspect of local budget management. Additional lo-
cal sources of finance can be established through authorisation of mu-
nicipal borrowing with state guarantees. Services can also be co-
financed or co-produced by users through monetary or labour contri-
butions.  
• Market decentralisation transfers public functions from government 
to voluntary, private, or non-governmental institutions. This often in-
volves contracting out partial service provision or administrative func-
tions, deregulation or full privatisation. Deregulation reduces the legal 
constraints on private participation in public service provision or al-
lows for competition among private suppliers. Privatisation can range 
from provision of goods and services by market forces only to public-
private partnerships in which government and the private sector co-
operate. 
2.1.2 The impact of decentralisation 
In many developing countries, decentralisation has become an important 
component of political reform processes. In the newly independent states 
of the former Soviet Union, such as the Kyrgyz Republic, decentralisation 
                                                          
11 In many developing countries local governments or administrative units have the legal 
authority to impose taxes, but the tax base is so weak and dependence on central gov-
ernment subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is made to exercise that authority; cf. 
Litvack / Seddon (2000, 3). 
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is closely linked to reforms of the overall government and administrative 
system, since the old central apparatus crumbled over a decade ago as a 
consequence of the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Decentralisation is not an end itself. The rationale for decentralisation rests 
on the assumption that decentralised government structures can improve 
efficiency and transparency in public management. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that empowered local units of government can be more responsive 
to citizens’ needs, thus contributing to promotion of democracy and eco-
nomic and social development.12 Successful decentralisation mainly aims 
at four intended and closely interrelated effects: participation, efficiency, 
accountability and transparency as well as mobilisation of local develop-
ment potential.  
• Participation: Decentralisation brings government closer to the peo-
ple by placing more power and resources at a closer, more familiar 
level of government.13 Consolidation of local democratic processes 
through enlarged opportunities for citizen participation can promote 
democracy nation-wide. Decentralisation also facilitates participation 
and representation of different interest groups (ethnic, religious, po-
litical, economic, and social) at the local level and thereby reduces the 
risk of social conflict.14 Additionally, it can provide opportunities for 
political participation of women, enabling a more gender-sensitive 
approach to policy formulation and implementation at the local 
level.15 To be effective, participatory mechanisms should respond to 
specific local needs and circumstances, taking into account local cus-
toms and traditions.16 Since participation is the main object of investi-
gation in this study, Chapter 2.2 presents the concept of participation, 
including its benefits and risks, in more detail. 
• Efficiency: Local governments are likely to have better information on 
citizens’ needs and/or demands. The former will thus be able to pro-
vide services more efficiently and effectively than the central gov-
ernment.17  
                                                          
12 BMZ (2002, 5f). 
13 UNDP (2003, 134) and World Bank (2001a, iv). 
14 BMZ (2002, 7). 
15 Litvack / Seddon (2000, 15) and UNDP (2003, 134). 
16 UNDP / BMZ (2000, 33). 
17 UNDP (2003, 134) and World Bank (2001a, iv). 
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• Accountability and transparency: Clear-cut accountability and divi-
sion of roles and responsibilities are key elements of decentralisation. 
But local officials must also have authority and resources correspond-
ing to their functions if they are to be able to take over the responsibil-
ity assigned to them.18 If these requirements are met, public admini-
stration becomes more transparent and can be monitored more effi-
ciently. This can help to reduce corruption and improve resource allo-
cation and distribution.19 
• Mobilisation of local development potential: Increased direct local 
responsibility provides an opportunity for local economic growth. Fa-
vourable local conditions can encourage people’s entrepreneurial ac-
tivities and create basic conditions to formalise the informal sector at 
the local level. By providing and maintaining credible frameworks for 
local economic development, local governments can promote private 
investment, and this in turn increases local revenues.20 
However, numerous risks can jeopardise the positive effects intended with 
the promotion of decentralisation. For decentralisation to achieve the 
above-mentioned effects, it is crucial to identify and analyse potential risks 
in order to implement mechanisms designed to prevent their occurrence. 
But not every risk can be prevented beforehand. The anticipated benefits 
of given measures must be weighted against the possible costs. 
Potential risks of decentralisation include the following issues:21 
• Participation may be jeopardised when clientelist structures, local 
elites or corrupt practices hinder equal participation by all stake-
holders, even though formal channels of participation may exist.  
• Ethnic divisions and even autonomy movements can be perpetuated 
by decentralisation efforts if the needs of minorities are not equally 
represented. As a result, insufficient consideration of potential win-
ners and losers in the decentralisation process can lead to social con-
flicts. 
• Inefficient service provision at the local level can arise due to unquali-
fied staff at the local level and due to unrestrained spending by local 
                                                          
18 UNDP / BMZ (2000, 32f). 
19 BMZ (2002, 6). 
20 Cf. World Bank (1997, 123); BMZ (2002, 8). 
21 BMZ (2002, 7). 
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authorities. The possible ‘decentralisation’ of corruption, when more 
powers and resources are placed at the local level, may further hinder 
efficient service provision. 
• Unequal development opportunities for regions or individual groups 
of people within regions can result from different costs of service pro-
vision despite similar tax revenue bases. A lack of commitment by 
decentralised government bodies to poverty reduction and compensa-
tory social transfer payments exacerbates this problem. 
• Macro-economic stability can be threatened by a lack of fiscal disci-
pline at sub-national levels of government. 
2.1.3 Preconditions and problems of decentralisation 
If decentralisation is to achieve beneficial impacts, it is crucial that consid-
eration be given to several preconditions without which decentralisation 
reforms may face substantial problems or even fail.  
• Effective state capacity: Decentralisation requires co-ordination be-
tween different levels of government and more regulation – not less – 
to ensure basic representation, efficiency, transparency and account-
ability. The state has to oversee, regulate and, where necessary, sanc-
tion local authorities so that all groups of citizens benefit from politi-
cal reform. Weak supervisory and co-ordination performance by gov-
ernment agencies can offer ways for local elites to pursue their private 
agendas. ‘Decentralised’ corruption can also be a consequence of 
lacking state capacity at the centre.22 
• Empowered, committed, competent local authorities: Local authorities 
need to have adequate resources and corresponding decision-making 
powers to perform their responsibilities. Furthermore, administrative 
staff at the local level and elected representatives must have the un-
derstanding and expertise they need to formulate and implement their 
own policies. Local governments must also be held accountable from 
below (by the electorate) and from above (by central government).23  
• Engaged, informed, organised citizens and civil societies: Political 
participation of civil society - beyond taking part in democratic elec-
                                                          
22 BMZ (2002, 6). 
23 UNDP (2003, 139) and BMZ (2002, 10). 
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tions - is essential to avoid risks such as decentralisation of corruption 
and increased local clientelism. A well-developed, well-informed civil 
society, which is able to collect and articulate the views of the com-
munity, is important if local authorities are to be responsive to peo-
ple’s needs.24 Equitable treatment of all sections of society (ethnic 
groups, men and women etc.) is of special relevance in this context.25 
Participation mechanisms must be sufficient to enable citizens to exert 
effective control over administration and political decision-makers.26 
Problems can occur if civil society groups lack the essential expertise 
they need to build efficient organisational structures.  
These preconditions show that decentralisation requires more than just 
certain political reforms – decentralisation also calls for establishment of a 
three-way relationship between local governments, civil society and cen-
tral government.27 
Nevertheless, many administrations in effect continue to operate on cen-
tralist lines, despite policy declarations and some initial legislation aiming 
at decentralisation. Administrations are often inefficient, their actions 
remain largely incomprehensible for the population and present very few 
opportunities for participation. Donor experience suggests that co-
operation of the international community with decentralising developing 
countries can be helpful in defining realistic objectives and expectations 
bearing on the outcome of reforms. In this context, approaches need to be 
identified that can help overcome the problems mentioned above and cre-
ate the conditions required.  
Among donor approaches to promoting and supporting decentralisation 
and local self-government, the most important are:28 
• Formation of an effective legal and institutional framework (including 
financial reform) 
• Redistribution of tasks among the public and private sector and civil 
society, in particular at the local level 
                                                          
24 UNDP (2003, 139). 
25 BMZ (2002, 9). 
26 BMZ (2002, 6). 
27 UNDP (2003, 137). 
28 BMZ (2002,  8). 
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• Institutional capacity-building to support decentralisation and local 
self-government at national, regional and, especially, at the local level 
• Organising citizens’ participation in local decision-making processes. 
In this context, already existing channels of participation and commu-
nication between government institutions and citizens can be used to 
signal citizens’ preferences and to induce governments to act in ac-
cordance with these preferences. 
To sum up, the aim of this section was to show that decentralisation is a 
complex concept. Although decentralisation efforts are strongly linked to a 
country’s characteristics (such as size, population, history, political cli-
mate and geographic and ethnic diversity), common categories, precondi-
tions and risks apply to all reform efforts in this field. 
2.2 Local economic development 
Local economic development (LED) is one important area, or policy field, 
in which decentralised governance is supposed to make itself felt most 
clearly. This section introduces the concept of local economic develop-
ment and highlights possible approaches to it so as to provide a general 
framework suitable to assessing the scope and relevance of the LED 
measures found empirically in Kyrgyzstan.  
2.2.1 The concept of local economic development 
Local economic development is defined as the process by which public, 
business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to create 
better conditions for economic growth and generation of employment. 29 
Private enterprises generally depend on favourable local business condi-
tions to achieve prosperity. Local governments have, therefore, the essen-
tial role to create a favourable environment for business development and 
job creation.  
“Practising local economic development means working directly to 
build up the economic strength of a local area to improve its economic 
future and the quality of life of its inhabitants. […] Each community has 
                                                          
29 World Bank (2003a, 1). 
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unique conditions that can help or hinder the economic development. 
These local attributes will form the seed from which a local economic 
development can be developed to improve local growth opportunities. 
To build competitiveness each community can undertake a collabora-
tive process to understand and act on its own strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats.”30 
Local economic development issues have attracted increased attention 
during the last few years. The governments of many decentralising coun-
tries are transferring responsibilities for promotion of economic develop-
ment to provincial and local governments. This process is based on the 
idea that local governments can more easily recognise and solve problems 
involved in local economic development.31  
2.2.2 Approaches to local economic development 
Local governments and communities basically have to decide what pro-
grams and projects they want to adopt to achieve their local economic 
development visions, goals and objectives. These options can vary and 
may be as relatively simple as providing a variety of services for local 
businesses or as complex as attracting foreign direct investment. In what 
ways and combinations different approaches should be used is a matter 
that depends on local circumstances.32 However, we present here some 
basic approaches concerning how local governments can promote local 
economic development: 
• Encouraging local business growth: Encouraging local business 
growth involves providing advice, support and resources to enable ex-
isting local businesses to grow. Business retention and expansion 
strategies can make use of different instruments:33 visits, surveys and 
local meetings organised by local government officials, technical as-
sistance, financial advice and assistance programmes, business-
friendly public procurement policies and the provision of sites and 
premises by local authorities  
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31 Meyer-Stamer (2003b, 1).  
32 Cf. World Bank (2001b). 
33 World Bank (2001c, 1). 
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• Encouraging new enterprises: The approach to encouraging new 
enterprises includes a variety of instruments, including provision of 
advice, technical support, information and resources to help individu-
als or groups of local people to set up their own businesses.34 Micro-
financing schemes or the establishment of business networks are typi-
cal examples for new enterprise support. 
• Promotion of inward investment: Inward investment focuses on the 
attraction of businesses from other parts of the country or even from 
abroad to invest in a local area.  
• Investment in hard infrastructure: The technical infrastructure avail-
able for businesses can have a significant impact on the retention and 
expansion of enterprises. Some of these improvements are, however, 
in the responsibility of the central government; these would include 
e.g. ports, trunk roads and airports. Other infrastructure can be pro-
vided by local governments, e.g. key roads, sewerage disposal or wa-
ter systems and commercial sites and buildings. 
• Investment in soft infrastructure: Establishment of facilities and insti-
tutions which improve the social and commercial environment for 
businesses may include: education with special focus on professional 
skills training, business advisory services, social inclusion strategies 
and crime prevention measures. 35  
• Sector and business cluster development: The aim of cluster devel-
opment is to support inter-firm collaboration and encourage people 
engaged in the same cluster to meet and exchange ideas on business 
development opportunities. Local authorities can also encourage small 
business clusters to bid in public procurements for local government 
buildings. 
2.3 Participation 
It is the aim of this study to analyse whether decentralisation in the Kyrgyz 
Republic widens arenas of participation for the local population and the 
private sector in the making of government decisions on local economic 
development. In fact, of course, decentralisation and participation have a 
mutually reinforcing relationship: on the one hand, the process of decen-
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35 Cf. World Bank (2001e). 
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tralisation can create opportunities for citizen participation; on the other, 
successful decentralisation also requires some degree of local citizen par-
ticipation as one of its preconditions.36  
This section develops a definition of citizen participation and examines 
costs and benefits of participation. The rationale for participatory devel-
opment highlights the importance of participation for effective govern-
ance. Normative criteria for assessing participatory mechanisms are devel-
oped at the end of the section.  
2.3.1 The concept of participation 
The central idea of participation is to give citizens a meaningful role in 
government decisions that affect them, be it at the central or at the local 
level. Popular input into what government does is thus exercised with the 
aim of improving service delivery and accountability to the population. 
Accountability enables citizens to hold their governments responsible for 
how government decisions affect them.37 
In accordance with the OECD/DAC guidelines on “Participatory Devel-
opment and Good Governance,”38 the German Ministry of Economic Co-
operation and Development (BMZ) has established the following defini-
tion of participatory development: 
“Participatory development is defined as a process in which people are 
actively and significantly involved in all decisions affecting their lives.” 39 
This definition emphasises several different aspects: first, participatory 
development is seen as a process. Participation is not about single events 
such as elections or public hearings; instead, it repeatedly and constantly 
involves citizens in decision-making. Secondly, active and significant 
participation gives citizens the possibility to ensure that their interests are 
heard and taken into account. As a prerequisite for this, relevant informa-
tion should be provided to the local population prior to the decision-
making process. Finally, the emphasis on participation in decisions affect-
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37 Blair (2000, 22). 
38 Cf. OECD (1997b). 
39 BMZ (1999, 2). 
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ing citizens’ lives points to the importance of participation for public pol-
icy formulation.  
Participatory mechanisms can vary along a continuum: more far-reaching 
citizen or stakeholder participation with respect to influence on and control 
over decisions is situated at one end of the continuum. At the other end, 
there are more conventional conceptions under which government agen-
cies essentially retain decision-making power and control with respect to 
key functions. The basic types of participation include: 
• Information: Information provided to citizens by government agencies 
is the weakest but basic form of participation. It represents a one-way 
relationship: government produces and delivers information for use by 
citizens. With ‘passive’ information, citizens are given access to in-
formation upon demand. ‘Active’ information refers to measures gov-
ernment explicitly takes to inform to citizens. 
• Consultation and co-operation: Consultation goes one step further: a 
two-way relationship is established between citizens and the state. In 
consultation, citizens’ views are sought on specific issues defined by 
government bodies. Citizens then provide feedback to government 
and formulate their own interests. In a co-operative process, these in-
terests are not only heard but also taken into account by decision-
makers. Although citizens are not actively included in decision-
making, consultation significantly increases acceptance of and identi-
fication with political decisions. As a precondition, consultation and co-
operation mechanisms require the provision of information to all citi-
zens. If citizens are given only limited information, special interest 
groups can capture policies by mobilising their own information cam-
paigns and can thus influence public opinion and agenda setting. 
• Active participation: Active participation is based on partnership: 
citizens actively engage in the policy-making process. They propose 
policy options and shape the policy dialogue. In some cases, the ulti-
mate responsibility for decisions still rests with government, but deci-
sions are not taken against the will of the population. In other cases, 
active participation includes actions that are designed and carried out 
in keeping with citizens’ own initiative and responsibility. Govern-
ment agencies then merely assume a supportive, facilitating role.  
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2.3.2 The impact of participation 
Participation can significantly enhance the quality of public management 
and public service delivery. Regular elections and participatory practices 
enhance the compliance of political office holders with the needs of the 
electorate and strengthen the latter’s acceptance of political authority. 
However, participation in public sector management is also faced with 
constraints. Both positive impact and constraints are summarised below. 40 
Positive impact: 
• Participation can help reduce the risks of errors in the public sector, as 
concerns and interests of citizens and mutual channels of information 
can be relied upon in policy formulation. 
• Participation provides access to the widest pool of local resources and 
initiatives and supports creative, productive citizens. 
• Participation can act as a counterbalance to government power. But 
participation also gives government the opportunity to demonstrate 
more easily the political benefit of reforms to its constituencies when 
preferences are exchanged and discussed on a regular basis. 
• Participation ensures the representation of a wide range of interests 
and thus helps to reduce societal conflicts. 
• Participation strengthens citizens’ identification with their polity. 
However, participation does not inevitably entail these positive impacts. 
Several risks and limitations may be inherent in both formal and informal 
participatory mechanisms. The positive and negative impacts of participa-
tion depend on who participates in what procedures or institutions. Fur-
thermore, the provision of participatory mechanisms depends on the politi-
cal will and determination of governments and the ruling elite. Participa-
tion therefore must be institutionalised. 
To name some constraints and limitations to participation: 
• Participatory forums can be misused by certain groups for an ex post 
legitimisation of existing power structures. Clientelism and persistent 
power structures can also hinder any popular participation from the 
very outset. 
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• Governments and elites may fear far-reaching demands of civil soci-
ety groups and hinder the establishment of participation in decision-
making. 
• Only permanent, systemically rooted voice mechanisms create trust in 
government commitment and actions. Ad hoc, issue-driven participa-
tion does not contribute to long-term political stability and account-
ability. Quite the reverse, ad hoc participation can enable specific 
lobby groups to push their own interests at the expense of the larger 
community. 
• Group participation in decision-making itself does not guarantee equal 
representation of interests. Civil society groups such as NGOs are 
built around specific issues and thus pursue special interests. They are 
not equally accountable to the entire population.41  
• Participatory mechanisms entail transaction costs such as time and 
information requirements.  
• Voters may tend to base their voting decisions on short-term experi-
ences, giving more weight to events that occur around election time.42 
Local leaders then try to attract more votes by providing public ser-
vices or investment ahead of elections. These so-called political busi-
ness cycles create incentives for periodical fiscal indiscipline and thus 
do not enhance public service provision in the long run. 
• In many societies, the preferences of the wealthy and powerful are 
well reflected in official policy formulation.43 Poor and marginalised 
groups, on the other hand, find it difficult to have their voices heard. 
Institutions of participation have to enable representation of minority 
interests as well. 
2.3.3 Rationale for participation 
The major promise of democratic decentralisation and local governance is 
that popular participation will make government at the local level more 
responsive to citizen needs and more effective in service delivery.44 At the 
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42 World Bank (2004). 
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44 Cf. Blair (2000). 
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same time, people’s share in political, economic and social development is 
enlarged by participation. This requires institutions and legal frameworks 
in the political system, public management, the economy and society to 
ensure that the needs and preferences of all groups in society are reflected 
in official policy goals and priorities. In a nutshell, decentralisation can be 
understood as a means to strengthen local participation in the management 
of public affairs on the basis of a certain set of institutional reforms.  
One primary focus of participation is empowerment: disadvantaged groups 
such as the poor, women, youth, ethnic or religious minority groups find it 
difficult to have their interests represented in decision-making. Participa-
tion can give these groups a voice. But participation also goes beyond 
empowerment: it is supposed to include all stakeholders in the policy 
process. Politicians, on the one hand, can reduce information costs if citi-
zens are able to directly bring their needs to bear in the process of policy 
formulation. On the other hand, participation enables citizens to develop 
their own initiatives. Existing local potential can in this way be used to 
contribute to more innovative and responsive policy-making. 
Box 1: Why strengthen government-citizen relations? 
Government-citizen relations should be strengthened in order to: 
• Improve the quality of policy, by allowing governments to tap wider 
sources of information, perspectives, and potential solutions in order to 
meet the challenges of policy-making under conditions of increasing com-
plexity, policy interdependence and time pressures 
• Integrate public input into the policy-making process in order to respond 
to citizen’s expectations that their voices will be heard and their views 
considered in decision-making by government 
• Respond to calls for greater government transparency and accountability; 
as public and media scrutiny of government actions increases, standards in 
public life are codified and raised 
• Strengthen public trust in government and reverse the steady erosion of 
voter turn-out in elections, falling membership in political parties and sur-
veys showing declining confidence in key public institutions 
Source:  OECD 2001, 2 
In democracies, elections usually are the primary manifestation of citizen 
voice and preferences. However, in multiethnic societies, electoral mecha-
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nisms can lead to insufficient representation of minority groups. In addi-
tion to elections, timely communication of societal preferences plays a 
crucial role in shaping state-citizen relations. Closer relations between 
state and citizens not only enhance the legitimacy of political decisions. 
By improving the quality of policy and by promoting transparency and 
accountability, state-citizen relations can lead to more responsible and 
responsive management of public institutions. Public sector management, 
defined as the ability to plan and manage public sector institutions, plays a 
decisive role in effecting socio-economic change in developing coun-
tries.45 If local and regional governments are capable of formulating poli-
cies suited to people’s needs, take timely decisions and efficiently and 
effectively provide public services, competence and legitimacy of the gov-
ernment as a whole can be improved. Universal and consensual decision-
making processes and mutual channels of communication between state and 
citizens are likely to render public sector management more effective. 
Decentralisation and participation both reinforce these mechanisms. 
Many donor approaches focus on the creation of an enabling environment 
for citizen participation. Outcome orientation, public information strate-
gies and multi-stakeholder arrangements for governance, including civil 
society groups and government representatives from all branches and 
levels, are today widely accepted as fundamental for successful and own-
ership-oriented development co-operation.46  
2.3.4 Normative criteria for participation 
If participation is to make its potentially positive effects felt and overcome 
some of the constraints described above, it is important that certain condi-
tions be met concerning the design of structures of participation. Three 
items are of critical importance here:  
• Institutionalised mechanisms of participation need to be in place. 
Channels of participation in decision-making processes should not 
mainly be ad hoc or issue-driven but should consist of formalised, 
regular mechanisms. 
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• Participation needs to be inclusive. Particular social groups can cap-
ture the policy formulation process and thus misuse existing channels 
of participation for their individual interests. Possible rural/urban or 
regional biases should be recognised and addressed. Access to par-
ticipatory mechanisms should be open, equal and transparent for all 
stakeholders. 
Possible stakeholders include: 47  
Table 1:  Stakeholders in local economic development 
Public sector Private sector Civil society 
• Local government  
• District or regional 
government 
• Elected councils 
• Sector boards and 
authorities (e.g., 
health, education, 
and transport) 
• Institutions of re-
search and higher 
education 
• Public utility com-
panies 
• Large corporations as 
well as small, me-
dium and micro-scale 
entrepreneurs 
• Trade unions 
• Chambers of com-
merce 
• Other business sup-
port groups 
• Land and real estate 
developers 
• Banks and other 
financial groups 
• News media 
• Professional asso-
citions 
• Private utilities 
• Private education 
establishments and 
think tanks 
• Community leaders 
• Neighbourhood groups 
• Community service 
organisations 
• Local educational 
institutions 
• Local religious institu-
tions 
• Other nongovern-
mental organisations, 
e.g. groups represent-
ing minorities, disabled 
or disadvantaged popu-
lations; groups arti-
culating environmental 
issues or cultural, arts 
and historical interests 
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Each of these stakeholder groups can contribute special skills and re-
sources to the policy process concerning local economic development. 
Establishing working relationships and structures that engage stakeholders 
can thus lead to stable long-term partnerships.  
However, participatory approaches to local economic development face 
some constraints regarding common goals of all stakeholders, representa-
tion of interests and policy formulation: 
Common goals: 
• Some stakeholders may pursue hidden agendas. This applies espe-
cially to large corporations that may use their voice in the local eco-
nomic development process to hinder market entry for new busi-
nesses. 
• The effort involved in collaborating in local economic development 
is costly in terms of unpaid working hours for all stakeholders in-
volved. 
• Local economic development initiatives may be misused by public 
and private agents to embezzle taxpayer money.  
• Common as well as individual stakeholder goals have to be made 
explicit if a common strategy for local economic development is to 
be formulated. 
• Stakeholder legitimacy. In many decision-making processes it is ad-
visable to ensure participation of all relevant stakeholder groups 
rather than actively seeking to involve every single citizen of a given 
territory irrespective of how detached she or he may be from the is-
sue under debate. It is important, however, to keep in mind that 
stakeholder activists may not necessarily be the only legitimate voice 
of a certain (more or less organised) group. Nor does the entirety of 
active stakeholder groups necessarily represent a given local com-
munity as a whole. Mechanisms of participation must therefore not 
be limited to insider meetings behind closed doors for recognised 
stakeholder representatives. Rather, openness and transparency 
should allow newcomers to add their voices to a cause. 
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2.4 Participation and local economic development 
The empirical part of our study assesses what channels of participation 
exist in the Kyrgyz Republic and can be used to influence policies geared 
to public promotion of local economic development. First, existing poli-
cies in the field of local economic development are identified (see Chapter 
4) and analysed. However, these policies alone have failed in many cases. 
The aspect of politics has often been neglected in this context. Yet politics 
is essential to reform processes, as formal and informal structures can pose 
an obstacle to, first, the design and, second, the implementation of condu-
cive policies.  
Promotion of local economic development aims at creating better condi-
tions for economic growth and employment generation. Private sector 
enterprises create wealth, jobs and improved living standards in local 
communities. Local economic development can thus contribute to overall 
poverty reduction. However, the prosperity of private enterprises depends 
on favourable local business conditions – and helping to create these con-
ditions is in the responsibility of local governments. Local economic de-
velopment can be said to represent a partnership between local govern-
ment, businesses and community interests.48  
One crucial step in establishing channels of co-operation between the three 
sectors is identification of stakeholders who should participate in local 
economic development strategy formulation and implementation. In this 
context, the term stakeholder includes grassroots beneficiaries in a given 
setting as well as decision-makers at all levels of government that are 
concerned with planning and decision-making, executing and evaluating 
particular policies or projects in a direct or indirect way. Thus, stake-
holders may be members of a local community, including businesspeople, 
members of local or sub-national government bodies, but also decision-
makers at the central government level or within donor agencies. Natu-
rally, all stakeholders of a particular policy intervention will pursue their 
own objectives, policies and responsibilities. These have to be taken into 
account for policy formulation. 
                                                          
48 Cf. World Bank (2003, 7). 
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Representation and participation of stakeholders: 
• Legitimacy of representatives of stakeholders may not be guaranteed, 
especially if business associations and chambers are little more than 
clubs of businesspeople. Representatives then cannot rely on their 
members to comply with commitments agreed upon.49 But function-
ing networks involve collective actors rather than individuals or sin-
gle companies. 
• As in all participatory processes, it is difficult to identify the actors 
that have to be involved in order to ensure that all interests are repre-
sented.  
• Although formal channels of participation may be in place, clientelist 
structures or corrupt practices can significantly hinder equal partici-
pation by all stakeholders.  
• Government officials and local businesspeople may have completely 
different backgrounds in terms of social class and education. This es-
pecially applies to the informal sector or micro and small businesses 
in developing countries. Communication between stakeholders may 
thus prove difficult. 
Policy formulation: 
• Successful co-operation depends on a common understanding of 
what local economic development is about and which actions pro-
duce the intended short-, medium-, and long-term effects. Continuous 
struggle over strategies and measures can lead to deadlock. 
• Changing power relations in local government as a result of recurrent 
elections or frequent changes of personnel may lead to new govern-
ment agents pursuing goals different from those of their predeces-
sors. Long-term consistency of policies may then be compromised, 
and the stakeholders of the process may be faced with a situation of 
reduced reliability and higher transaction costs. 
To sum up, it can be said that the outcome of participatory approaches to 
local economic development depends very much on the commitment and 
political will of the various stakeholders to act in the interest of public 
welfare. Although local economic development policy outcomes primarily 
                                                          
49 Meyer-Stamer (2003b, 12). 
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concern the private sector, partial interests, power relations and competing 
concepts are just as applicable here as in any other policy field.50 
3 Decentralisation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
The previous chapter has presented the theoretical concepts guiding our 
research. This chapter goes on to outline the formal setting in which de-
centralisation reforms and participation in local economic development are 
taking place in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was among the first 
countries to take steps towards building a democratic society and imple-
menting public administration reform. Having inherited a centralised po-
litical and economic system from the socialist era, decentralisation ranked 
high on the agenda from the very beginning of the new sovereign state. 
Nonetheless, despite repeated efforts to strengthen decentralisation and to 
bring power to the lower levels of the administrative system, there have 
remained numerous obstacles to decentralisation and its objectives. Many 
of the preconditions of decentralisation are not adequately given. The 
substantive political decentralisation that has already been carried out has 
not gone hand in hand with real administrative and, most importantly, 
fiscal decentralisation. Lack of regulations and clear functional distinc-
tions between the different administrative levels constrains local govern-
ments’ room for manoeuvre. This immobilisation of local self-government 
bodies is further deepened by a lack of financial autonomy and a lack of 
capable human resources. Clientelist structures as well as hierarchy-driven 
mindsets of citizens and representatives that can be ascribed to Soviet 
legacy add to an overall somewhat gloomy picture of decentralisation and 
local self-government in Kyrgyzstan. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the historical background and the 
legal basis for local self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic today. We 
then discuss some general issues of institutional reform in the post-Soviet 
context before turning to the actual institutional framework of decentral-
ised governance in Kyrgyzstan – in its administrative and its financial 
dimension alike. The analysis of the institutional framework reveals nu-
                                                          
50 Cf. Meyer-Stamer (2003a). 
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merous weaknesses of the decentralisation process that constrain the abil-
ity of local governments to pursue meaningful policies and that limit the 
scope of popular participation. These constraints to local self-government 
are summarised in the final section of this chapter. 
3.1 Historical background and legal basis for local self-
government today 
Kyrgyzstan gained independence in 1991 (for an overview of basic coun-
try data and information cf. Box 2). The “Law on Local Government in the 
Kyrgyz Republic” was the first legal document of the new republic. This 
document, which laid the grounds for decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan, was 
a step towards creating a democratic state with reduced influence of the 
centre and delegation of responsibilities to local levels.51 Over the years, 
the government introduced numerous reforms on the matter of decentrali-
sation, most of them by presidential decree. This piecemeal approach in 
some cases resulted in inconsistent, sometimes even contradictory regula-
tions, a problem that was addressed in a “National Strategy for Further 
Decentralisation” in 2002.  
Box 2:  The Kyrgyz Republic: basic information 
 
                                                          
51 Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (2002, 13). 
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Kyrgyzstan, situated in the east of Central Asia, is a small and mountainous coun-
try with a predominantly agricultural economy. Cotton, tobacco, wool and meat 
are the main agricultural products, although only tobacco and cotton are exported 
in any quantity. The Kyrgyz Republic's plentiful water resources and mountain-
ous terrain enable it to produce and export large quantities of hydroelectric en-
ergy. However, it also imports petroleum and gas. Metallurgy is an important 
industry, and the government is seeking to attract foreign investment in this field, 
mainly in gold. The main trading partners of Kyrgyzstan are Switzerland (gold) 
(19.9 %), Russia (16.5 %), China (8.5 %), and neighbouring Kazakhstan (7.6 %) 
and Uzbekistan (5.7 %). Within the European Union, Germany is the most impor-
tant trading partner. 
With the break-up of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan not only lost its major trading 
partner (over 90 % of Kyrgyz goods were traded with members of the Soviet 
Union), the country also lost its major sponsor, as 20-30 % of the Kyrgyz budget 
came from Moscow in the years prior to 1990. In 2001, Kyrgyzstan incurred the 
highest foreign debt of all countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), 111.5 % of GNP. In 2002, the Kyrgyz government and the IMF agreed on 
a Poverty Reduction Strategy and paved the way for debt rescheduling with the 
Paris Club of state creditors in March 2005. 
Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Community and the Economic 
Community of Central Asia and furthermore of some other 25 international or-
ganisations, including the United Nations and, since 1998, the WTO. Kyrgyzstan 
was the first of the CIS countries to accede to the WTO. 
The Kyrgyz Republic is the second-poorest country in the CIS, both in terms of 
per capita income and poverty incidence. According to the 2003 World Develop-
ment Indicators, the share of the population living in absolute poverty was 34.1 % 
in 2000. A 2004 joint report of IMF and World Bank estimated 53 %, defined by 
an international poverty line of  $2.15 PPP. Poverty reduction is thus among the 
most pressing reform issues for the country. In the sector of infrastructure, priva-
tisation of Kyrgyz Telecom and the electricity sector have been recently ad-
dressed. However, high incidences of corruption are hindering the country’s 
economic development. 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new Kyrgyz constitution 
was drawn up in May 1993. The executive branch is headed by the president of  
the republic and comprises the government and its local state administrations. 
From 1990 until March 2005, Kyrgyzstan was ruled by President Askar Akayev. 
In several amendments to the 1993 constitution (in 1996, 1998 and 2003) Akayev 
had expanded his powers at the expense of the legislature. Akayev had the right to
appoint the prime minister, the Cabinet of Ministers on the recommendation of 
Jörn Grävingholt et al. 
46 German Development Institute 
the prime minister, as well as the heads of oblast (provincial) and raion (district) 
administrations upon approval of the appropriate territorial representative bodies. 
In general, he increasingly followed a trend among his Central Asian counterparts 
toward an authoritarian presidential republic. 
Until 2005, the parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) consisted of two houses. In February 
2005, under a new electoral law, a new one-chamber parliament was elected. A 
few weeks later, a popular uprising triggered by the unfair conduct of the parlia-
mentary election forced president Akayev out of office. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a 
former prime minister turned chief oppositionist, took over as acting president 
and was confirmed in this office in a relatively fair presidential election less than 
four months later. Akayev’s ouster stimulated expectations that Kyrgyzstan’s 
political system might reverse its accelerating path towards undemocratic rule and 
that democracy might receive a second chance. More recent news indicates that 
less may have changed than one would have wished. The tensions between the 
north and the south of the country re-emerged as clearly as ever during the spring 
2005 events and have since then continued to play an important role in politics. 
The new leadership has invested considerable efforts in re-establishing a strong 
grip over the country’s public administration and security forces. However, 
within a year after the revolution, a state of “normalcy” has not returned into 
Kyrgyzstan’s political life. 
Selected indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  Auswärtiges Amt (2004); CIA (2004); Government of the 
 Kyrgyz Republic (2002b); IMF / World Bank (2004, 13); 
 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
 Pacific (2004). 
 
Population: 4.89 million (July 
2003 est.) 
GDP: 2002:  $1.6 billion; 
2001: $1.5 billion 
GDP growth rate: (2001) 5.3 % 
GDP composition by sector: 
agriculture: 35 %; industry: 
25 %; services: 40 % 
Inflation rate: 2.1 % 
Official unemployment rate:  
(2000): 5.6 % 
Capital City: Bishkek, situated in 
the Chui Valley at an altitude of 
700-900m above sea level 
Official languages: Kyrgyz, 
Russian 
Literacy: 97 % 
Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 52.4 %, 
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An important step toward decentralisation of state powers was the estab-
lishment of local self-government executive bodies for clusters of villages 
in 1996. So-called aiyl okmotu (village administration) executive organs, 
accompanied by aiyl keneshi (village councils), were introduced. The 
functions of these bodies are described in more detail in the next section 
within the framework of the administrative system of the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic. This reform transferred management and ownership of social facilities 
to the new village governments. Similar steps established local self-
government in cities between 1998 and 2001. This process culminated in 
2001 in the first direct elections of heads of aiyl okmotu as leaders of local 
self-government. In 2000, a new post of Minister of Local Self-
Management and Regional Development was established within the Gov-
ernment. 52 Although introduction of the post of a minister responsible for 
issues of local self-government shows significant political support for 
decentralisation affairs, it should be noted that this is a ministry without an 
apparatus of its own.  
In 2002, laws and decrees with great significance for the lower levels of 
government were adopted on matters such as the status of representatives 
of local councils, on courts of elders and on the management of municipal 
property. First and foremost, the “Law On Local Self-Government and 
Local State Administration” provides more autonomy to local govern-
ments and clarifies the status and functions of their respective organs. The 
National Strategy “Decentralisation of State Administration and Develop-
ment of Local Self-Government in the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010” was 
enacted in the same year. This comprehensive approach addresses many of 
the shortcomings of the Kyrgyz decentralisation process and includes an 
action plan with steps to be undertaken in the near future. In approving the 
National Strategy, the Kyrgyz Government has formally acknowledged the 
principles of decentralisation and defined the goals that are still to be 
                                                          
52 This position is currently held by Tolobek E. Omuraliev, who also was the director of 
the State Agency on Registration of Rights to Immovable Property (the so-called Gos-
Registr). GosRegistr today plays a significant role in issues of local self-government, as 
land registration issues define, to a large extent, business activities, and thus the tax base 
of local governments. 
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achieved.53 The four main approaches in the strategy are related to i) po-
litical and administrative decentralisation, ii) financial and economic de-
centralisation, iii) municipal service improvement and vi) social mobilisa-
tion and civil society consolidation. Some, although by no means all, of 
the steps envisaged in the National Strategy have been addressed or are 
currently in the process of being implemented.54  
According to the Kyrgyz Government, one of the most pressing problems 
is a weak legal framework that is inadequate to serve as a basis for decen-
tralisation.55 The National Strategy therefore proposes to revise existing 
legal acts and to elaborate and adopt several new ones. However, the ques-
tion is whether the numerous decrees and regulations mentioned above are 
still insufficient to regulate the decentralisation process or whether the real 
problem is their implementation. Still, the most recent and important step 
in regulating the basis of local self-government has been the promulgation, 
in September 2003, of the “Law on the Financial and Economic Basis of 
Local Self-Governments.” 
A chronology of the most important steps in the process of decentralisa-
tion is included in the annex. 
3.2 Institutional reform in the post-Soviet context 
Research on the decentralisation process in the Kyrgyz Republic has to 
consider factors that are specific to the conditions encountered in post-
Soviet transition countries. Three aspects are particularly relevant:  
• The problem of structural legacies: Successful reform today has to 
take into account the social, economic and political structures of the 
vanished Soviet system. Persistent inherited features served to con-
strain the transition of the successor states. These burdens from the 
past form an initial stock of rules, networks, organisations and insti-
                                                          
53 The National Strategy has been developed in close co-operation with UNDP. UNDP 
focuses on sub-national levels of government to support the implementation of actions 
following the National Strategy. 
54 One example is the declaration of “2004 – Year of social mobilisation and good govern-
ance.” Many activities at village level can be found in this context, above all including 
micro-credit schemes for small business development. 
55 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2002a, 6). 
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tutions that haunt reform in the post-socialist context.56 A number of 
relevant features of the Soviet system are summarised in Box 3. 
• The significance of informal rules: Informal rules in transition con-
texts represent a legacy of action-guiding perceptions and interpreta-
tions developed and established under the old system. “Formal rules 
may change overnight, but informal constraints do not. Inconsistency 
between the formal rules and the informal constraints […] results in 
tensions that typically get resolved by some restructuring of the over-
all constraints – in both directions – to produce a new equilibrium.”57 
There are positive and negative aspects of informal rules in transition 
situations. Informal rules can preserve important social functions ne-
glected by reform. However, persisting networks of social co-
operation are informal structures with the potential to undermine pre-
sent reform efforts.58 
• Incidences of path dependence: Path dependence is a metaphorical 
expression for “the constraints that past events and structures impose 
on present and future policies.”59 The conception of path dependence 
highlights two important factors for institutional change that are rele-
vant to reform processes. First, there are points along the develop-
ment path at which decisions, once taken, are costly to reverse. Deci-
sions at these so-called critical junctures rule out alternative options 
for the future. Secondly, unintended consequences of decisions may 
stem from institutional choices that have been made in specific con-
texts in the past. These choices may be preserved in current institu-
tional configurations, even though the context may have changed. 
Structural legacies, informality and path dependence play a role in many 
aspects of political reforms in the post-Soviet context, and they thus have 
to be considered for the examination of the decentralisation process in the 
Kyrgyz Republic as well. 
                                                          
56 Cf. Eggertsson (1994). 
57 North (1993, 39). 
58 Cf. Aligica (1997). 
59 Aligica (1997, 49). 
Jörn Grävingholt et al. 
50 German Development Institute 
3.3 Institutional framework 
The formal institutional framework that has emerged in Kyrgyzstan as a 
consequence of past decentralisation reforms is characterised by a particu-
lar administrative structure that has arisen out of political and administra-
tive decentralisation as well as by the implications of fiscal decentralisa-
tion for local finances, i.e. for local sources of income and the budgeting 
process. This section discusses, in turn, the two aspects of administrative 
structure and local finance. 
Box 3:  The political system of the Soviet Union 
The administrative system of the Soviet Union and its constituent republics was 
structured into village-, town-, raion-, oblast- and republic administrative levels. 
The entire political decision-making process in the Soviet state system can be 
described as a multi-subordination of the local level. It followed a strict top-down 
logic: Decisions of elected councils (soviets) could be overruled by decisions or 
decrees of super-ordinate soviets or executive committees (ispolkomy) whose 
members were actually appointed either by higher-level administrations or by the 
Communist Party. This pattern of dual subordination of elected assemblies to 
executive committees of the same level and to soviets of the next higher level 
could be observed for all layers of state subdivision.  
Armed with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union claimed to hold the ultimate solutions for social advancement. It 
exerted direct influence on both elected soviets and executive committees through 
directives and instructions, by nominating candidates for elections, by nomination 
of officials and by awarding the most significant posts to party members. Fur-
thermore, the party dominated the most important socio-economic decision-
making processes throughout all stages: the planning and budgeting of the econ-
omy. The biggest part of centrally planned production in the Soviet Union was 
realised within large-scale staple production units in agriculture 
(kolkhos/sovchos) or in big industrial complexes for industrial goods and com-
modities. Most local social and infrastructural services were provided not by local 
authorities but by state-owned enterprises under direct supervision of the central 
ministries. 
Source:  Mildner (1996) 
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3.3.1 Administrative structure 
Currently there are three layers of sub-national administration in the Kyr-
gyz Republic. 
• 7 oblasti (regions), the city of Osh, and Bishkek city (the capital) 
• 45 raiony (districts) and 10 “oblast subordinate” cities 
• 494 aiyl okmotu (rural communities or groups of villages) and 10 
“raion subordinate” cities 
Structural legacies from Soviet times can be observed in the formal politi-
cal structure of many successor states: the terms and demarcations of ad-
ministrative units at the sub-national level (oblasti, raiony, oblast-
subordinate cities, raion-subordinate towns) have been inherited by most 
post-soviet countries. In the Kyrgyz Republic, an additional layer of aiyl 
okmotu was introduced in 1996. The regional division of the country was 
also restructured after independence, with the creation of more oblasti than 
the country had before.60 
In August 2005, after he had taken office as newly elected president, Kur-
manbek Bakiev announced that the oblast layer of administration division 
was to be eliminated by 2007. 
In the highly centralised Soviet system the competencies of bodies at dif-
ferent layers were extremely limited. In the independent Kyrgyz state, 
more authority was given to the different levels. But above all, the hierar-
chy of administrative layers used to play a crucial role in inter-
governmental financial transfers: Funds were passed through oblast and 
raion state administrations down to local communities, leading to signifi-
cant financial dependence of the aiyl okmotu on the upper levels. 
Basically, two types of sub-national administrative bodies can be distin-
guished at the different levels of administration: bodies of local state ad-
ministration and bodies of local self-government. 
Local state administration bodies exist at the oblast and raion levels. They 
are headed by appointed governors (oblast) and akims (raion). Local state 
administrations receive and execute instructions from the national level. 
                                                          
60 Namely, Batken oblast and Bishkek have been added. 
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They have departments corresponding to a number of the central govern-
ment ministries.61 Thus, the hierarchy of instructions from the national 
level is reflected in the local state administrations.  
Both oblast and raion state administrations have locally elected councils 
(keneshi) that formally have the right to confirm governors and akims 
nominated by the president. In fact, however, these councils have little 
oversight over policy-making or control over the respective state admini-
strations. Their main function is to approve the budget, while they have no 
resources for an effective oversight of the budgeting process or its imple-
mentation.  
In contrast to local state administrations, bodies of local self-government 
are legally independent of the central government. They are accountable to 
the population of their respective jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 1:  Levels of government in the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
                                                          
61 Tordoff (1995, 500). 
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Formally, oblast and raion councils are considered bodies of local self-
government, alongside administrations and councils (keneshi) at the third 
tier of government – i.e. aiyl okmotu and raion-subordinate cities. In actual 
fact, it is only this third tier that comes close to what is understood interna-
tionally to be local self-government in both the functional and territorial 
sense. 
In its Russian usage, the (Kyrgyz) term aiyl okmotu describes clusters of 
several villages subsumed under the same executive and representative 
bodies. This unit has not grown historically but was created in 1996 with 
the introduction of bodies of local self-government. In the strict sense of 
the word, aiyl okmotu in Kyrgyz means village administration. 
As mentioned above, in the official Kyrgyz administrative structure, the 
keneshi of all sub-national levels of administration are considered bodies 
of local self-government.62 According to the legislation, keneshi are impor-
tant participatory bodies within the administrative system of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, as their members at all levels are directly elected in open and 
competitive elections by the population for a term of five years. Any Kyr-
gyz citizen has the right to run for election to bodies of local self-
government.63. The number of local kenesh members varies according to 
the population of the respective territory:  
• 30 to 45 members in oblasti and Bishkek,  
• 15 to 30 members in raiony and oblast-subordinate cities,  
• 11 to 21 members in raion-subordinate cities and  
• 9 to 21 members in aiyl okmotu 
Local keneshi are supposed to convene at least four times per year. More 
sessions can take place upon request. Keneshi are divided into thematic 
commissions, e.g. on the budget, on social issues, cultural or educational 
matters. In common sessions, the commissions report to all kenesh mem-
bers about their activities. 
                                                          
62 Organisational and legal foundations for the activities of local keneshi are regulated in 
Chapter 2 of the law “On Local Self-Government and Local State Administration” of 
2001. 
63 See e.g. interview 650Int 18/03/04; Interview 830Int 31/03/04. 
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The keneshi’s most basic responsibility is to address affairs of local sig-
nificance.64 Besides budget approval, one of their main tasks is to approve 
and control the implementation of social and economic development plans 
developed by the respective administrations for raion and oblast. At aiyl 
okmotu level, keneshi “[...]are the bodies dealing with the drafting and 
approval of the strategy for development of the territories. They issue 
basic legal normative documents of local communities, make decisions on 
major life-sustenance issues of local communities.”65 At this level, the 
executive bodies are subordinate to the keneshi who are directly in- 
volved in decision-making. Other issues within the competence of  
keneshi include: 
• Drafting and monitoring programmes on social protection and eco-
nomic development 
• Approving budgets and monitoring budget execution 
• Introducing local taxes 
• Regulating communal property management 
Finally, keneshi have the right to issue a vote of no confidence against 
their respective head of administration. However, only at the aiyl okmotu 
level can the head of administration be directly voted out of office by the 
assembly. At the raion and oblast levels, the ultimate decision rests with 
the president, who can decide at will whether to replace a certain head of 
local state administration or not. 
Overall, a study on local self-government commissioned by the US-funded 
Urban Institute Bishkek concludes that 
“in practice oblast and raion councils have little oversight over policy-
making and no control over the state administrations which de facto 
govern on behalf of the president.”66 
The following sections present the different levels of administration in the 
Kyrgyz Republic and their basic functions. 
                                                          
64 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2001, Art. 2). 
65 Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (2002, 53). 
66 Urban Institute Bishkek (2001, 1). 
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Oblast level 
The state administration at oblast level implements policies of the presi-
dent and the central government in the regions. The main functions of the 
oblast state administrations are: 67 
• To formulate the budget for the oblast as well as programmes for 
local social and economic development and to monitor and co-
ordinate their implementation. Both budgets and development plans 
have to be approved by oblast keneshi.  
• To distribute funds to raion level and to balance territorial accounts 
in order to mobilise additional financial resources from the state 
budget and other sources. 
• To exercise control over compliance with environmental protection 
acts by enterprises, organisations and institutions and to monitor the 
use of land and natural resources, sanitation standards and health care 
regulations. Regarding land issues, the oblast level appears to be the 
decision-maker of last resort.68 
• To maintain law and public order. 
• To borrow and to lend on a contractual basis. 
Raion level 
Raiony and oblast-subordinate cities are the organisational units below the 
oblast within local state administration. The mayors of oblast-subordinate 
cities are elected by keneshi from a pool of candidates nominated by the 
President of the Kyrgyz Republic69. As in Bishkek, there are plans to ex-
tend their autonomy and to have the mayors directly elected in the near 
future and to declare the oblast-subordinate city administrations to be bodies 
of local self-government. Like governors on oblast level, the heads of raion 
state administrations (akim) are appointed by the president. Akims exert 
significant influence and power within the administrative system: many 
people directly turn to the akim and his administration, not to the respec-
tive bodies of local self-government, to have their problems addressed.  
                                                          
67 Alymkulov / Kulatov (2001, 539–540). 
68 See e.g. interview 830Int, 31/03/04. 
69 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2001, Art. 35). 
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As mentioed above, the general responsibilities of raion state administra-
tions correspond to those of the oblast state administrations, limited to 
their particular territories. Social and economic development plans are 
drafted within the raion state administration, based on statistical informa-
tion from the lower level of aiyl okmotu. As on oblast level, these plans as 
well as the budget have to be approved by raion councils (keneshi). 
Some functions, however, are unique to raion level:70 
• To ensure social protection of the citizens and to ensure minimum 
standards, e.g. in health care. This includes unemployment registra-
tion and policies71. 
• To maintain local infrastructure.  
• To provide economic, social, cultural and legal services to the aiyl 
okmotu level 
• To provide technical and legal assistance to civil society organisa-
tions such as condominium associations or interest groups. 
One major problem of the Kyrgyz administrative system is that oblast and 
raion state administrations basically fulfil these same functions for their 
corresponding level, the oblast having the oversight over activities on 
raion level and co-ordinating service provision and programme implemen-
tation.72 The “Law on Local Self-Government and Local State Administra-
tion” of 2001 does not specify the functions of oblast or raion state ad-
ministrations, so that duplications are common and intransparent divisions 
of functions prevail.  
Very few responsibilities are unique to the oblast level of state administra-
tion, mainly regarding the transfer of finances down to the raion admini-
strations, as financial flows are organised top-down from one level to the 
next. By the same token, the top-down distribution of funds, again, down 
to aiyl okmotu is of major importance, giving the raiony significant influ-
ence and control over activities at the local level. Our research shows that 
tax inspection, sanitation regulations, land registration (“Gosregistr”) and 
architectural authorities at raion level are of great importance for eco-
nomic development at the local level. 
                                                          
70 Alymkulov / Kulatov (2001, 541). This brief overview is not exhaustive. 
71 See e.g. interview 140Int, 02/03/04. 
72 See e.g. interview 390Int, 12/03/04. 
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When asked to specify differences between oblast and raion functions, 
one interviewee in a responsible position at raion level replied: 
“We basically have the same responsibilities. The oblast is on a higher 
level. The oblast fulfils the tasks on oblast level and we fulfil them on 
raion level.” (Administration, interview 450Int, 15/03/04) 
In view of this systemic duplication of functions, current discussions 
among experts and within government about elimination of one of the two 
levels seem to indicate that this would be a substantial step towards more 
effective state organisation.73 Such a reform could help to avoid much 
bureaucracy. But within the state administrations there is much resistance 
to these suggestions because people fear for their employment and influ-
ence.74 However, it is important to note that neither oblast nor raion levels 
are mentioned in the latest version of the constitution (April 2003).75 This 
leaves room for possible reforms of the current system. 
Aiyl okmotu level 
In contrast to the oblast and raion levels, the aiyl okmotu level is the real 
level of local self-government. The administrations at this level are di-
rectly accountable to the keneshi and the population and not primarily to 
the central government. Their heads (glava) are directly elected by the 
local population for a period of four years. The heads of aiyl okmotu also 
chair the aiyl kenesh. Their position is thus clearly one of local self-
government. In the case of the Bishkek city mayor and the mayors of the 
oblast-subordinate cities, the classification is not as clear. They are neither 
mere recipients of instructions from the central government nor do they 
have as much autonomy as the administrative bodies of local self-
government. The candidates for these offices are appointed by the presi-
dent and the respective keneshi elect one of them76. However, for the near 
                                                          
73 Statements and suggestions in our interviews included the elimination of either oblast- 
or raion-level state administration, or even both, or direct election of governors or 
akims.  
74 Interview with the counterpart from the IISS, Bonn, 17 Dec. 2003. 
75 See e.g. interview 060Int, 23/02/04; Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2003). 
76 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2001, Art. 36). 
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future there are plans to have free elections for these authorities and thus 
make them exclusive bodies of local self-government.77 
Aiyl okmotu own municipal property and can use the income generated 
through that property for the realisation of their own local programmes 
and public services. 
Key functions of these administrations include:78 
• Drafting the local budget 
• Formulating draft social and economic development plans for their 
territory, to be approved by the aiyl kenesh 
• Managing municipal property and land from the Redistribution Fund, 
and exercising control over the use of agricultural land 
• Managing financial resources 
• Providing and maintaining local infrastructure, including health care, 
education facilities, communal transport and roads, sports and tour-
ism 
• Managing various issues of citizenship, such as identification and 
family status 
• Collecting taxes and duties. 
Transfer of responsibilities to the aiyl okmotu administration has been a 
significant step in the national decentralisation process. In Soviet times, 
the kolkhoz and the sovkhoz79 were responsible for delivering social ser-
vices such as health care, pensions and benefits to their employees. After 
the breakdown of the Soviet system, however, the state-owned enterprises 
were privatised or closed down. They no longer provided any services and 
people turned to the local authorities. Enabling the administrations to deal 
with these demands was one of the reasons for the central government to 
create the system of local self-government. 
                                                          
77 Urban Institute Bishkek (2001, 3). 
78 Alymkulov / Kulatov (2001, 545), Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2001); various 
interviews. 
79 Kolkhoz and sovkhoz were agrarian production units in the Soviet system. Although de 
facto both were state-owned enterprises, the term kolkhoz stands for collectively organ-
ised enterprises and the term sovkhos for state-organised enterprises. 
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Although the bodies of local self-government are supposed to be inde-
pendent within the framework of their own competences, raiony and aiyl 
okmotu are closely connected to each other in a hierarchical way. Kyr-
gyzstan’s 2001 National Human Development Report commented on this 
issue quite unequivocally:  
“The ambiguity of this issue means that state bodies continue to inter-
fere in the work of local self-government bodies on a regular basis, 
since, according to the constitution, organs of local self-government are 
accountable to state bodies in the execution of their delegated powers.”80 
In addition to the administrative and representative bodies mentioned so 
far, the 2001 “Law on Local Self-Government and Local State Admini-
stration” gave full legal recognition to a new set of local self-government 
bodies at the level below aiyl okmotu. Recognising the need for self-
government at the grassroots level, citizens received the right to establish 
so-called bodies of territorial public self-government within their town or 
village. These voluntary associations of citizens work within their defined 
territory to implement “initiatives of local significance.”81 Community 
organisations of public self-government are participatory associations 
which can obtain legal status by registration with the aiyl kenesh, to which 
they are also accountable for their activities.82 With these bodies of territo-
rial public self-government, a grassroots level body has been established 
that can be assigned certain functions by aiyl keneshi, aiyl okmotu admini-
strations and local state administrations. According to the law, they can 
also obtain their own finances, non-residential premises and material re-
sources on a contractual basis.  
Among the participatory associations that can be registered as bodies of 
territorial public self-government are various committees, women’s coun-
cils and condominium associations (Box 4) typical of local civic engage-
ment in Kyrgyzstan. These local associations and councils are supposed to 
play an important role on the village level as participatory channels deal-
ing with issues of every-day life. 
                                                          
80 UNDP (2001, 39). 
81 See Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2001, Chapter 6). 
82 Registration with the Ministry of Justice is another possibility for territorial self-
government bodies to obtain legal status. 
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Box 4:  Condominium associations 
Condominium associations are remnants of the Soviet system. They are organised 
around neighbourhoods or other territorial units and have the possibility to influ-
ence decisions that concern their particular area and living conditions. For exam-
ple, some of these associations can grant construction permits or are responsible 
for the maintenance of housing estates. The members of condominium associa-
tions are inhabitants of these respective territories. Therefore, condominium 
associations represent the inhabitants’ interests, implement improvements and 
defend residents’ rights. Members of these associations can participate in meet-
ings of keneshi if issues of their territory are on the agenda. 
One further body at the local level of the Kyrgyz administrative system 
demands special attention: the so-called kurultai. 
Kurultai are people’s assemblies at various territorial levels where inter-
ested citizens can meet members of the respective kenesh and administra-
tion representatives. Issues of local importance are discussed in a kurultai 
and possible recommendations developed. According to our interviews, 
representatives from the raion state administration more often than not 
also take part in local kurultai, sometimes even the akim. Kurultai are held 
at least once a year, but both the population and members of the keneshi 
can demand a kurultai any time the necessity to discuss urgent issues 
arises. Examples may include insufficient implementation of the develop-
ment plan, infrastructure problems, impeachment of administration mem-
bers, etc. Whether these meetings are completely open to the public de-
pends on local provisions.  
According to the legislation, these assemblies are a possibility for partici-
pants to actively take part in and influence policy- and decision-making. In 
cases involving severe problems, the community or the kenesh can con-
vene assemblies with the respective administrations. Furthermore, these 
assemblies serve as consultative meetings where the administrations pre-
sent their ideas and development strategies for the future. The population 
then has the possibility to comment on the suggestions. Kurultai are often 
organised on the local levels but there are also some that include members 
of the national government. The importance of kurultais and issues of 
participation in them are analysed in Chapter 5.1.1. 
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3.3.2 Local finance 
Fiscal decentralisation ranks very high on the agenda today. Most reform 
efforts concerning decentralisation in the past decade have failed to com-
bine delegation of functions with adequate financial resources at the lower 
levels of Kyrgyzstan’s administrative system. Therefore, a significant gap 
exists between the functions that local governments have to fulfil and the 
financial means needed to fund these tasks. Ineffective and unpredictable 
budget allocations significantly limit the ability to establish budgets as the 
main strategic instrument for planning, implementation and monitoring of 
public programs at the local level.  
The problem of inadequate budget formulation processes and of insuffi-
cient transparency in the inter-governmental finance system was addressed 
by government in the “Law on Financial and Economic Basis of Local 
Self-Government,” effective since January 2004. This law clarifies the 
fiscal relations between the state and local self-governments and estab-
lishes some degree of financial autonomy for the latter. It also clarifies, to 
some extent, arrangements for local taxes. But most importantly, the law 
limits the ability of raion state administrations to interfere in the fiscal 
affairs of local governments. 
Prior to enactment of the law, fiscal legislation only used the terms “re-
publican” and “local” (meaning all layers below the central administra-
tion), and in practice fiscal bodies were part of a rigidly hierarchical struc-
ture that was dominated by the Ministry of Finance. Thus, according to 
local experts, significant political resistance to decentralisation can be 
found within the Ministry of Finance, which fears losing oversight over 
local expenditures.83 De facto, each level of state administration has de-
termined revenues and expenditures for the next lower level. Legal provi-
sions that would provide clarity for inter-governmental finance and more 
local control over planning budgets have been widely ignored. Inter-
governmental fiscal transfers were thus subject to political pressures ex-
erted by local officials. The clarification of the fiscal relationship between 
the state and local self-governments provided by the new law is, therefore, 
a major step forward, although the extent to which this new law will con-
tribute to a more strategic and open budget policy formulation is a matter 
                                                          
83 See e.g. interview 090Int, 25/02/04. 
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that remains to be seen in future budget cycles. However, since insuffi-
cient funding at the local level seems to be one of the main impediments to 
local governance, the budgeting process and local revenues, as defined by 
the new law, will be analysed in more detail in this section. 
Local sources of income 
Generally, local budget revenues consist of own-source taxes and non-tax 
revenues on the one hand and of taxes and revenues allocated at the na-
tional levels as well as transfers and grants on the other.84 According to the 
new law, revenues in surplus of expenditures will now remain within the 
local budget, whereas previously they had to be handed back to upper 
levels or resulted in lower financial allocations. Ideally, this should pro-
vide local governments with incentives to manage resources more effi-
ciently and to effectively collect taxes and other funds.85  
Own-source taxes are taxes that can be established and collected locally. 
These revenues are protected from withdrawal to higher level budgets by 
the new law.86 Only a few of the sixteen taxes that can be adopted by aiyl 
keneshi87  appear to be significant. Most of these taxes are of marginal 
importance: A local community without any tourist infrastructure does not 
need any casino tax, even though the community has the right to impose it. 
The importance of local taxes for the funding of public services by aiyl 
okmotu administrations is thus relatively low: local taxes account for only 
around 9 % of local income.88 Furthermore, revenues from own-source 
taxes are subject to fluctuation due to local economic instability. By con-
trast, taxes most often referred to by interviewees as significant sources of 
income to local budgets included the 4 % retail tax as well as land taxes 
and the tax on means of transportation – none of which falls under the 
                                                          
84 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2003, Art. 3,1). 
85 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2003, Art. 3,4). 
86 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2003, Art. 3,2). 
87 The full list of taxes includes: hotel tax, tax on citizens who grow flowers for sale, tax 
on health resorts, tax on private service industries, tax on entities using national sym-
bols, tax on advertisements, casino tax, tax on Kyrgyz tourists, tax on garbage removal, 
parking tax, auction and lottery tax, tax on dog owners, capital gains tax. See: Tax Code 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, Chapter 32. 
88 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2004, 16).  
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exclusive competence of local self-governments.89 As far as the land tax is 
concerned, 90 % remains within the budget of aiyl okmotu and the other 
10 % goes to the raion budget. Until 2003 these figures were exactly op-
posite, with an aiyl okmotu sometimes having only 5 % of the land tax at 
its disposal.  
Non-tax revenues to local budgets include revenues from management 
and renting of communal property or land from the Redistribution Fund90 
as well as revenues generated through communal services for cost recov-
ery.91 Local self-governments can also generate capital revenues by selling 
assets or other property. They have the right to sell land, buildings, equip-
ment, inventory stock, securities, etc.92 Our study showed that income 
generated by communal property management, especially by renting land 
to farmers or small businesses, forms an important part of local budgets. 
This means on the other hand that aiyl okmotu with little land at their dis-
posal face significant difficulties in generating non-tax income and are 
dependent on allocations from the upper levels to cover even basic ex-
penses such as salaries for administration staff.93  
Taxes allocated at the national level are shared between the national 
level and local bodies (including oblast, raion and aiyl okmotu level) ac-
cording to a fixed formula of 65 % for the national and 35 % for the local 
level, while being collected locally. While the value-added tax is a 
uniquely national tax, income tax, corporate income tax, excise (on do-
mestic goods), revenues from obligatory patenting, and common taxes on 
                                                          
89 The tax rates for different types of land (irrigated, farm or non-farm land, for example) 
are fixed by raion administrations. 
90 In 1994, 75  % of land was distributed to Kyrgyz citizens, with 25  % remaining state 
property, managed locally through the Redistribution Fund by aiyl okmotu administra-
tions. However, many problems have occurred concerning land distribution – some 
people were left out or did not receive the share they were entitled to. To solve this 
problem, land redistribution nowadays is exercised according to three categories: ordi-
nary citizens living on the territory of the respective aiyl okmotu are entitled to 0.27ha 
of land, people working in public service receive 0.5ha and former members of kolkhoz 
or local dignitaries have a right to 1ha of land. 
91 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2003, Art. 5). 
92 Cf. Tulundieva (2004). 
93 See, e.g., interview 430Int, 13/03/04.  
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small businesses are shared taxes.94 Until now, the 35 % share of the local 
level was further subdivided into 23 % for the oblast level and 12 % for 
the lower bodies. The latter included the raion as well as the aiyl okmotu 
level, which made local communities dependent on what share of this 
12 % was transferred to them in reality through the raion administration 
(the share often being subject to bargaining).95 With the new law on local 
finances, bodies of local self-government at aiyl okmotu level receive a 
share of national taxes that is fixed for a period of three years. This 
amount will be a share of what has been collected locally, an incentive to 
actually collect local taxes. Although these rates may still be small in 
terms of total amounts, they represent a reliable income share for local 
budgets and could therefore significantly contribute to medium-term plan-
ning abilities of local governments.96  
Transfers and grants to local budgets from the national level include so-
called categorical grants allocated by central government to perform spe-
cific functions as defined annually in the Law of the Republican Budget. 
Their aim is to ensure funding for state-guaranteed programs at the local 
level and to bring revenues in line with expenditures for a minimal level of 
services. Categorical grants are used to cover running costs and for the 
payment of salaries in socially significant sectors such as health care as 
well as of pensions and benefits. The formulae for estimation of categori-
cal grants are still not decisively defined, but qualitative indicators were 
recently introduced to calculate them. The calculation thus includes num-
ber of pupils per school, sickness rate and number of people living in a 
local area.97 Once the formulae are effective and transparent, categorical 
grants will form a predictable stream of revenues to local budgets. Gener-
ally, the grant share of local budgets should be as small as possible. In 
reality, however, the share of categorical grants in the local budgets is 
comparatively high. In 2000 the sum of categorical grants from the state 
budget made up 45.3 percent of total local budget expenditures.98  
                                                          
94 Cf. Tulundieva (2004). 
95 See e.g. interview 420Int, 13/03/04.  
96 See e.g. interview 040Int, 23/04/04. 
97 USAID is actively assisting the Kyrgyz government to define the formulae used to 
estimate categorical grants. See also: United Nations Online Network in Public Admini-
stration and Finance (2004). 
98 Alymkulov / Kulatov (2001, 553). 
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Equalisation grants are used to co-finance the budgets of local govern-
ments. Their aim is to close the fiscal gap within a certain region between 
tax collection and non-tax revenue potentials on the one hand and finance 
needs of local communities on the other hand. Unlike categorical grants, 
equalisation grants can be used directly by the local administrations ac-
cording to their own decisions and priorities. The funds for equalisation 
grants come from the national budget. The amount of equalisation grants is 
determined without any formula. Equalisation grants are, in fact, the dif-
ference between forecast revenues and the required expenditures.99 In 
2000, equalisation transfers accounted for 9.4 percent of total local budget 
expenditures.100  
The budgeting process 
Two aspects make local budgets an important issue for the topic under 
discussion in this study: firstly, they are supposed to be elaborated with the 
participation of bodies of local self-government, namely the keneshi. Draft 
budgets are also discussed in kurultai meetings. Secondly, the size of the 
budget determines the approach to and extent of locally provided public 
services, including measures for local economic development. The new 
“Law on the Financial and Economic Basis of Local Self-Government” 
makes a significant contribution towards more independent budgeting at 
the local level. In 2004, the new procedures for the budgeting process were 
set to become effective for the first time. Until then, the budgeting process 
was mainly characterised by instructions from the Ministry of Finance and 
significant scopes for the upper levels to interfere in the formation of local 
budgets. Typically, the procedure was as follows: 
Instructions on budget formation are given by the Ministry of Finance. 
Budgets are planned bottom-up at each level, starting with the aiyl okmotu. 
Each following level introduces budget plans from the lower level into its 
own draft. Statistical information of all kinds is collected within raion and 
oblast state administrations. However, the collection of statistical informa-
tion and the formulation of budgets as well as of social and economic 
development plans seem to reflect, in many cases, still prevalent proce-
dures of the Soviet system. We found that neither budgets nor develop-
                                                          
99 Cf. Tulundieva (2004). 
100 Alymkulov / Kulatov (2001, 553). 
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ment plans reflected strategic visions for long-term planning. Rather, in 
some localities development plans contained detailed production figures 
for single companies in a manner akin to Soviet-style planning.101  
Kenesh budget commissions discuss the draft budgets in their sessions and 
in co-operation with the administration. Members of the budget commis-
sions in raion keneshi, for example, include state administration staff and 
tax inspection as well. The elaboration of local budgets, thus, could be one 
clear example of co-operation between bodies of local state administration 
and local self-government. Keneshi can propose amendments to the budget 
plans. After approval of the budget law by the Jogorku Kenesh, the na-
tional parliament, funds are distributed top-down according to budget 
plans approved in this law. To ensure balancing, upper levels of admini-
stration now have the possibility to intervene in the expenditure side of 
draft budgets of lower levels. So-called “control figures” issued by the 
Ministry of Finance define maximum expenditures for each level. Oblasti 
define minimum standards for certain expenditures (heating, electricity). 
The possibility of upper-level administrations to alter draft budgets of the 
lower levels represents a significant interference in policy-making by 
lower levels of government. As one interview partner said:  
“The law says that the budgets should be formed bottom-up. Life shows 
that it is going the other way round: The budgets are formed top-
down.” (Administration, meeting 360Meet, 11/03/04) 
3.4 Summary of constraints to local self-government  
The analysis of the Kyrgyz decentralisation process has revealed that pro-
gress has been made in several fields but that a balanced and sustainable 
new division of labour, competences and resources has yet to be found. A 
number of problems are related to the very design of the reform. Even 
more important, however, is the insufficient implementation of existing 
legislation due to unwillingness on the part of some actors and a lack of 
confidence on the part of others. Below, we summarise the most obvious 
problems: 
                                                          
101 Strategic planning, in the sense of long-term development, can mainly be found in 
communities and cities which had donor assistance available to them. 
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i) Lack of functional assignments 
• There is no clear distinction between the functions at oblast and at 
raion level. Duplications of functions are common. 
• Keneshi and local administrations are not truly independent of state 
authorities, and their actual decision-making competencies are very 
limited.  
• Existing regulations concerning the delegation and delimitation of 
competencies have not been satisfactorily implemented. 
• Furthermore, nepotism and corruption pose an additional obstacle to 
transparent and democratic structures. 
ii) Lack of finance at the local level 
• Grants and transfers to lower levels are insufficient to pay even the 
salaries of local administrative staff. At the same time, own-source 
revenues of local self-government at aiyl okmotu level are often of 
such minor importance for local budgets that they do not even suffice 
to close the gap between tasks assigned by the central government 
and the actual funds transferred for the purpose. Thus, bodies of local 
self-government have no financial autonomy. This situation limits the 
ability of the aiyl okmotu to decide on and implement their own poli-
cies and makes them wholly dependent on transfers from the upper 
levels. 
• Although grants and transfers will be calculated according to trans-
parent formulae in the near future, the problem now is that funds are 
passed top-down through all layers of administration. This implies 
the possibility that not all funds actually reach the bottom layer on 
time or in their full amounts. 
• Interview partners provided incoherent and even contradictory in-
formation on the budgeting process, even those in responsible posi-
tions at raion or aiyl okmotu level. Thus, there seems to be a lack of 
information on existing procedures. It is questionable whether and to 
what extent the procedures set out in the new law on local finances 
will be followed more rigorously in the future. 
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iii) Limited capacities at local level 
• At the aiyl okmotu level and also at raion and oblast level, staff is not 
adequately qualified to fulfil all the tasks connected to local self-
government. 
• The national decentralisation strategy provides for delegation of 
numerous functions to the local levels. Yet, far too few training 
measures for local government staff are actually available. 
• Many aiyl okmotu focus on trainings on how to apply for donor pro-
jects. This does not contribute to capacity building for administrative 
tasks. 
iv) Disproportionate power of local state administration 
• The central government has not managed to effectively reform local 
state administration since the stakeholders in the authorities are very 
influential in their respective regions and districts. In particular, there 
is strong resistance within the local state administrations to hand 
down power and to accept the possible elimination of either the 
oblast or the raion level. 
• Tasks are transferred to the aiyl okmotu level arbitrarily or according 
to informal rules, and not in keeping with the principles of subsidiarity. 
• The keneshi at raion and oblast level are close to insignificant be-
cause they have no means to control the administrations or to make 
them accountable.  
• Even though keneshi are influential at aiyl okmotu level, the corre-
sponding administrations have hardly any means to implement lo-
cally elaborated development plans due to their lack of finance. Thus, 
even though keneshi take part in decision-making, they only have 
limited influence on policies. 
• From the Soviet period, people are acquainted with top-down deci-
sion-making processes that they could not influence. Many people 
still have the expectation that decisions will be taken elsewhere, and 
they do not feel responsible for taking part in the making of public 
decisions. 
The above-listed problems are well-known to the Kyrgyz government as 
well as to international donors. Both sides have made efforts to improve 
the decentralisation process. Whereas the government plans to develop 
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new legal frameworks, some international donors are focusing on assisting 
the bodies of local self-government in coping with their new responsibili-
ties. Box 5 gives an overview of the relevant donor activities. 
Box 5:  Decentralisation programmes of international donor agencies 
In recent years, several international aid agencies have established programmes to 
support decentralisation in the Kyrgyz Republic. he most important of them are 
UNDP, Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan, USAID and the World Bank. A common 
theme in all of these programmes is the effort to assist local communities to cope 
with the tasks confronting them as a consequence of decentralisation. 
German bilateral development cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic (as with 
other countries in Central Asia) concentrates on promotion of economic reforms 
and introduction of a market economy. Decentralisation is not an explicit topic in 
the bilateral cooperation between the two governments. Of the German agencies 
active in Kyrgyzstan, only the Hanns Seidel Foundation has been running a pro-
gramme in the field of decentralisation for several years. Most recently, the Ger-
man KfW development bank has initiated procedures to co-finance the World 
Bank Village Investment Project. 
Nevertheless, many of the bilateral projects being implemented under the current 
strategy are closely connected to problems of local governance and the impact 
decentralisation has on the making of economic policy at the local level. 
UNDP 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is operating the most 
influential programme in the field of decentralisation, one that is being imple-
mented in close cooperation with the Kyrgyz government. Dating back to 1998, 
the “Decentralisation” programme has recently been combined with another 
project, “Preventive Development in the South,” to form the Political and Admin-
istrative Local Governance Programme. The programme consists of three compo-
nents: 
1. Strengthening the potential of local governments 
2. Helping the central government to create a conducive political, legal and 
economic environment for decentralisation and the development of local 
self-government 
3. Preventive development in the South of Kyrgyzstan 
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Within the first component, the programme concentrates on pilot projects in a 
limited number of local communities. In 2003, these included 30 aiyl okmotu 
selected from 10 different raiony in 6 oblasti. In the pilot communities, the main 
objective is to improve the capacities of both local self-government bodies and 
community organisations and to establish more effective cooperation between them. 
The main approach chosen is the so called “social mobilisation” strategy, an effort to 
encourage citizens and community organisations no longer to wait for the state to 
solve their problems but to become active themselves. At the same time, local 
authorities are encouraged to regularly involve these organisations in the process 
of formulating annual local development plans and to support them in other ways. 
The social mobilisation approach is backed up with instruments like human re-
source development, local information centres and a micro-credit programme. 
Under the second component, UNDP was closely involved in the formulation of 
the 2002 “National Strategy of Decentralisation.” Currently, besides continued im-
provement of national legislation, one of this component’s main aims is to dissemi-
nate examples of good practice from the local pilot projects to non-pilot regions. 
The final component, “Preventive Development in the South,” combines instru-
ments of social mobilisation with mechanisms of early warning. It helps local 
communities in the Ferghana Valley area to address potential sources of ethnic, 
social or other conflict early on and in this way to avoid outbreaks of violence. 
Soros Foundation 
Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan, a national foundation under the umbrella of philan-
thropic institutions established in many transition countries by American-
Hungarian businessman George Soros, is the most prominent non-governmental 
donor agency in Kyrgyzstan. Since 1997, Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan has im-
plemented a “Public Administration Programme.” The programme operates in the 
context of the multinational Local Government and Public Service Initiative 
launched by the Open Society Institute Budapest. The main purpose of programme 
activities is “strengthening the capacity of the local self-governance system in the 
Kyrgyz Republic.” The instruments designed to achieve this aim include capacity 
development for representatives of local governments, promoting self-help in resolv-
ing local problems, and “developing positive dialogue” between government bodies 
and civil society organisations. In 2004, the programme’s activities focussed on 
three directions: 
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1. Strategic planning of local development and local policy-making in rural and 
urban communities of Kyrgyzstan. 
2. Development of a local government in Bishkek city: strategic planning and 
local policy-making 
3. Creation of a public policy institute in Kyrgyzstan 
Soros Foundation is one of the main grant-giving agencies for local initiatives and 
local research institutes in Kyrgyzstan. 
USAID 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the most 
important bilateral donor organisation in Kyrgyzstan. USAID’s general focus is 
on strengthening democratic principles, improving public health, and fostering 
economic development. 
On behalf of USAID, the Urban Institute Bishkek – an affiliate of the US-based 
Urban Institute – is implementing the programme “Local Government Initiative in 
Kyrgyzstan.” 
Generally, the programme concentrates on improving the effectiveness of local 
government at the raiony and aiyl okmotu level. To achieve this, the programme 
seeks to bolster the capacity of administrations to deliver public services. Fur-
thermore, the programme aims at developing and reinforcing relationships be-
tween local government and citizens. Different tools have been created to imple-
ment the aims of this programme. One important instrument is Public Budget 
Hearings. 
Although the programme focuses on local government, other target groups, even 
at the national level, play an important role in its implementation. At the national 
level, the government and the parliament are provided support in fostering clear 
functional assignments, clear revenue assignments and a transfer system that 
strengthens the autonomy of local government. Local officials are given advisory 
support within the scope of this programme. Training and technical assistance are 
used to improve skills in various fields,  including management of financial issues 
and communal property. 
In addition to these specific target groups, the programme’s focus is on creating 
networks and partnerships between different actors. The development of a public-
private working group to plan and implement improvements in basic service 
delivery is one example of this comprehensive approach. 
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World Bank 
In 2003, the World Bank launched its Village Investment Project (VIP) in Kyr-
gyzstan. This project focuses on development at the aiyl okmotu level. Besides its 
overarching aim of contributing to the alleviation of rural poverty, the project 
aims to achieve three different objectives. 
1. Improvement of  governance at the local level 
2. Strengthening of the provision of essential services 
3. Support for private sector- led growth. 
In detail, the project seeks to support group-managed small and medium-sized 
enterprises, income- and employment-generating investments in village infrastruc-
ture and local authorities in achieving key development objectives at the local 
level. 
The project provides technical and financial support for community-based initia-
tives. Funds are provided in the form of small grants to aiyl okmotu, which for-
ward these grants into demand-driven community or group investments, which in 
turn generate off-farm employment and create additional income. Furthermore, 
initiatives that alleviate serious deficiencies in local infrastructure are also eligible 
to receive these grants. With a view to managing VIP grants, Local Investment 
Councils are established at the aiyl okmotu level to coordinate the activities of 
village investment committees that each participating village is required to set up. 
Another component is capacity building. In particular, the members of participat-
ing communities, local government officials and partner NGOs are target groups 
of vocational training. The emphasis lies on issues such as good governance, 
strategic planning, micro-project implementation and social mobilisation. 
On behalf of the World Bank, the Community Development and Investment 
Agency is carrying out this project in co-operation with local governments and 
local community groups. The project is designed to run until 2008 and has a 
budget of around 15 million US dollars. 
In 2004, the German KfW development bank considered co-financing the VIP 
with an additional 8 million euros. Pending approval, this engagement was ex-
pected to get underway in 2005. 
Hanns Seidel Foundation 
With a view to backing up the decentralisation process, the German Hanns Seidel 
Foundation, affiliated with the German conservative party CSU, is working in the 
field of vocational training in the Kyrgyz Republic. The focus of the foundation’s 
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engagement is short-term training for employees of all local government levels, 
which is provided in close co-operation with the Kyrgyz Academy of State Man-
agement. 
Starting in 2002, this co-operation first concentrated on developing textbooks for 
short-term training measures. The training programme started in September 2003 
and gave participants the possibility to improve their skills in issues of local man-
agement. For 2004 the goal was to train around 750 participants in three different 
modules. The topics of these modules include financial, economic, legal, and 
organisational issues of local government. In the future, strategic planning and 
social mobilisation will be included in these short-term training measures 
Sources:  Pravitel’stvo Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki / PROON (2003); Soros Foun
 dation Kyrgyzstan (2001); Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan (2004); 
 Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan (2003); USAID – Information 
 Document; World Bank (2003b); Meeting 993Meet, 02/04/04. 
“What kind of support? So far, they have been ask-
ing us for help! For money, for seeds, to help poor 
people by giving seeds for free.” 
(Businessman, interview 160Int 02/03/04) 
4 Local economic development in the Kyrgyz  
Republic – Policies and measures 
This chapter will discuss local economic development policies and meas-
ures on the basis of our field study. The summary of constraints to local 
self-government in the last section already revealed the weak position of 
aiyl okmotu in the ongoing decentralisation process in the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic. The results presented in this chapter underline that picture. Due to lack 
of financial resources and skilled specialists, aiyl okmotu have their possi-
bilities to design and implement local economic development policies. In 
contrast, the raion administration is the crucial administrative level regard-
ing measures in support of local economic development.  
We consider as local economic development all measures by local admini-
stration that affect business activities. Therefore, obstacles for businesses 
caused by local administrations are defined, figuratively, as negative local 
economic development measures. Numerous obstacles that hamper busi-
ness activities and negatively affect local economic development were 
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identified during the course of our field study. Many of the obstacles are 
connected with administrations and administrative structures. These obsta-
cles are discussed in Section 4.1. 
At the same time, many measures supposed to promote local economic 
development can be identified at the local level. These measures are dis-
cussed in Section 4.2. Examination of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ local eco-
nomic development measures leads to the question of whether and to what 
extent the ongoing decentralisation process in the Kyrgyz Republic has an 
impact on policy-making in local economic development. This question 
will be analysed in Section 4.3. 
4.1 Obstacles to business activities caused by local 
administrations 
This subchapter will discuss  observations on obstacles to business activi-
ties that are directly or indirectly connected to administrative procedures 
or structures. These obstacles vary in their effect on the local economy as 
well as with regard to the level of local government that evokes them. The 
obstacles fall into two categories: Direct administrative failures and struc-
tural problems caused by unresolved issues in the process of de-
centralisation.  
Uncertainties over land property rights 
Administrations at the local level are insufficiently able to solve problems 
of land property rights. Problems derive from deficient processes of land 
privatisation since independence that have not led to a transparent redistri-
bution of land. Furthermore, renting land from municipal holdings for 
business purposes is problematic.  
In our interviews, businesspeople and farmers told us about various prob-
lems caused by uncertainties over property rights. One problem is that 
people may hold entitlements on paper but nevertheless be left without 
land. The reason why they do not receive their land from the aiyl okmotu 
remains unclear for most of them. Sometimes the territorial distribution of 
land was effected so vaguely that it is not exactly clear which land belongs 
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to whom.102 This problem appears to be due to inexact measurements of 
land before the plots were distributed. Local authorities have hardly any 
possibilities to resolve these problems. 
Other issues of communal property management, however, can be re-
solved by local governments, or at least influenced by them.  
“We went to the aiyl okmotu because a person rented land from them 
for five years. But the next year it was given to someone else. […] There 
are many cases like this. […] The administration is the reason for these 
kinds of obstacles.” (Donor, interview 540Int, 16/03/04) 
The registration process seems to be another problem: although business-
people, farmers and people who want to start farming have a lot of ideas 
and initiatives, they cannot realise them without having gone through 
lengthy registration processes.103 
Problematic situations can also occur for large corporations like the suc-
cessor organisations of kolkhozes. These farms, still organised as collec-
tive enterprises, have to struggle to keep a reasonable territorial distribu-
tion of their farming land, since many single owners withdraw their 
patches from the farm. After a while, a patch-work area is left which 
makes efficient operations extremely difficult and cuts into existing 
economies of scale.104 
Furthermore, competences seem not to be clearly divided between aiyl 
okmotu and raion level. Even if responsibilities are strictly separated ac-
cording to the law, many businesspeople are unaware of it, or they try to 
gain influence on higher levels to achieve their goals.105 A clear distinction 
of responsibilities and a better information policy concerning competen-
cies in the field of land property laws would be desirable.  
Bribery in business interactions with administration 
The problem of bribery is widespread in Kyrgyzstan’s administrative sys-
tem. All stakeholders know about this problem, and especially business-
                                                          
102 See e.g. meeting 201Meet, 02/03/04. 
103 See e.g. meeting 201Meet, 02/03/04. 
104 See e.g. interview 160Int, 02/03/04. 
105 See e.g. interview 970Int, 02/04/04. 
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people, NGOs and international donors do not hesitate to point it out as 
one of the biggest problems in the Kyrgyz administrative system. A re-
cently published World Bank and IMF paper confirms this impression: 
The frequency of bribery is still regarded by Kyrgyz businesspeople as a 
more serious problem than in other Central Asian countries.106 In our inter-
views, even administration members pointed out the omnipresence of this 
issue.  
“It has become part of life that you have to pay bribes to accelerate the 
process in the administration.” (Raion administration, interview 490Int, 
15/03/04)  
For many businesspeople bribery associated with inspections conducted by 
the tax, fire and sanitary departments constitutes a significant problem. 
Tax inspectors in particular enjoy a dubious reputation.  
“If tax inspectors come you always have to pay bribes. […] Tax inspec-
tors come and they will always find violation and make you pay for it.” 
(Businessman, interview 980Int, 02/04/04) 
Many small enterprises complain that tax inspectors come too often to 
check their books. As a result they hamper the daily business of enter-
prises, and they often stay for several days unless and until they are paid 
off. Theoretically, there is a regulation that tax audits are to take place 
only once a year. The practice of taking bribes not only damages busi-
nesses’ ability to prosper. It also hinders the “normal” interaction between 
businesspeople and administration that is needed to work together on local 
economic development measures. 
“Peasants turned to me and asked me how to export their goods they 
produced. I asked, why they did not turn to state officials. They think, 
they will not help them. And they think, they have to pay more and give 
some bribes.” (Expert, interview 030Int, 20/02/04) 
Inadequate information about business rights 
Another obstacle closely linked to the issue of bribery is the fact that busi-
nesspeople are often not informed by the aiyl okmotu about laws and regu-
lations that concern them. Laws and court decisions are not made public 
by qualified staff. This poses an obstacle to businesspeople because they 
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are not made fully aware of their rights and are furthermore not suffi-
ciently able to defend them in cases of conflict. It also opens up room for 
discretionary behaviour in administrations. Both aspects result in uncer-
tainty for business activities.107 
Lack of specialists at aiyl okmotu level 
Most likely, the problem of inadequate information about business rights is 
associated with a lack of qualified specialists at aiyl okmotu level. Aiyl ok-
motu staff members often do not know their functions and responsibilities. 
“People working in local self-government mainly have an education in 
humanities but they should better have political and economic educa-
tion. We need to prepare specialists. […] If we will have more educated 
specialists, the work will go better and faster.” (Expert, interview 
010Int, 20/02/04) 
Due to a lack of competence, local economic development measures are 
not implemented effectively. Consequently, aiyl okmotu staff is not able to 
work in the best interest of the business community. 
“I was in a grant committee, where we revised grants for two aiyl ok-
motu. Public organisations were supporting those projects but the rep-
resentatives of aiyl okmotu were standing aside, they didn’t participate 
because they didn’t understand their interest in that.” (NGO, interview 
330Int, 04/03/04) 
A lack of capacities at the aiyl okmotu level in matters concerning strategic 
economic planning, business laws, budgeting processes and managerial 
skills poses an obstacle to businesspeople. Particularly small enterprises and 
business starters are negatively affected by this, as bigger companies can 
more easily make use of internal expertise to compensate for this deficit.  
The lack of specialists at local level is an issue related to structural deficits 
arising from an incomplete process of decentralisation. Generally, quali-
fied specialists have no incentives to work at aiyl okmotu level, because 
salaries are low and there is little room at this level to craft durable poli-
cies. Adding to this problem, aiyl okmotu staff are not properly motivated 
to take part in training measures.108 There are training measures for local 
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administration members, which are financed in part by international do-
nors. However, many staff members of local administrations have no in-
centive to take part in these seminars, because they seem to have no rele-
vance for participant careers. After attending these vocational trainings, no 
promotion or increase of salary can be expected. Therefore, those who 
participate in seminars are usually selected by their superiors in a purely 
administrative procedure, one not driven by the interests of the employees 
themselves. 
Business contributions to public infrastructure measures  
Many businesses are frequently asked to contribute to public infrastructure 
measures. This includes financial or in-kind contributions which cannot be 
borne by local budgets. In ways similar to the lack of specialists at aiyl 
okmotu level, this fact is to a large extent a structural problem attributable 
to insufficient financial decentralisation.  
“We have really bad roads in our Aiyl. They asked me to help fix it, and 
I gave my machines and helped them. And also there’s an aiyl school. I 
helped to repair it with my finances.” (Businessman, interview 770Int, 
22/03/04) 
Larger enterprises are often asked for broader donations where a certain 
sum of money or special technical equipment is needed. Small businesses 
generally contribute to social activities or events, for example giving dona-
tions for Veterans Day.109 
In their minor form as voluntary donations, those contributions may be 
seen as forms of corporate commitment to local communities. Very prob-
lematic, however, are donations which cannot be refused and therefore 
lose their good-will character. Some interviews raised doubts as to 
whether these contributions can still be termed voluntary.  
“Q: What does the administration ask from you? Can you give some 
more examples? A: Different things, e.g. to be a sponsor and give sup-
port for public holidays. Q: Are you supporting the administration? A: 
The administration has more rights, if you don’t help them, they will do 
something. E.g. the tax inspection asks for some support for their holi-
day, or the police station asks for support for their holiday. Q: So do 
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you get pressure? A: It’s not actually pressure but voluntary pressure 
(laughs).” (Businessman, interview 160Int 02/03/04) 
Whether voluntary or not, the practice of directing some parts of business 
resources into public tasks - in addition to regular taxes - detracts from the 
overall volume of productive investments. These additional “taxes” on the 
one hand entail benefits for the local community. On the other hand, they 
diminish the chances of local economic impulses initiated by new private 
investments as well as creation of additional jobs. From an economic point 
of view, practices of this kind tend to hamper a region’s overall economic 
development.  
4.2 Local economic development measures, their 
importance and the process of their creation  
This section presents the empirical findings on measures taken at raion 
and aiyl okmotu level to actively support local businesses. These measures 
vary in their relevance and effect on the local economy. Furthermore, aiyl 
okmotu and raion administrations have different possibilities to stimulate 
local economic development. This section will also present and discuss the 
range of measures available for the purpose. 
Acting as a matchmaker in the process of obtaining credit 
Helping local businesses to meet their credit requirements is an important 
measure of local governments. Where aiyl okmotu and raion administra-
tions are involved in the process of providing credits, they mostly act as a 
matchmaker between businesspeople and credit suppliers. They seek to 
work together with co-operatives, NGOs and international donors that can 
help with business financing. One step is to advise businesspeople on 
where they may find credit opportunities. Often there are local credit un-
ions or international micro-credit programmes operating nearby, although 
local businesspeople may not be aware of the fact.  
Sometimes, credit unions are also established with the support of local 
administrations. For instance, authorities may provide premises for busi-
nesses or support credit unions, shortening the registration process. Even 
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the aiyl okmotu may be involved in the initiation process, contributing 
some funds to enable a credit union to start working.110 
Small agricultural businesses are provided assistance by local administra-
tions in the form of seed or fertilisers rather than of direct funding.  
“We do not buy seeds, we take them for credit. And then in autumn 
when farmers have their harvest, they return us money and then we re-
turn it to the organisation we took the seeds from.” (Aiyl okmotu ad-
ministration, interview 870Int, 31/03/04) 
For farmers, this model of assistance has a certain attractiveness because it 
enables them to avoid the procedures required to apply for credit. Never-
theless, this model of support is subject to some conditions on the part of 
the administration. First, the aiyl okmotu must have spare money to buy 
seed. Second, the aiyl okmotu needs qualified staff to calculate the risks 
for the administration and to negotiate the terms with farmers and seed 
factory.  
Obviously, micro-credit programmes and local government assistance are 
of minor importance for larger businesses. Those enterprises generally 
have their own experts to obtain information on credit.  
Provision of premises and land for businesses 
One very widespread and effective local economic development measure 
at the local level is provision, from municipal property, of land and prem-
ises to businesses.  
For example, functional buildings not used by public administration may 
be rented to businesses. Aiyl okmotu hold most of the land that remained 
state property after privatisation. Many functional buildings are part of this 
municipal property. Therefore, aiyl okmotu are the main actors in this 
measure. 
We can observe different models for provision of premises and land. Gen-
erally, businesspeople turn to administration and ask for premises and land 
for rent. During the field study, however, the criteria according to which 
municipal property may be rented did not become clear to us.  
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To support local economic development, small businesses or farmers are 
sometimes provided premises and land free of rent. Sometimes, they are 
simply required to pay discount rent. 
“Aiyl okmotu gave a building, a former club that was empty for a long 
time, without rent for the first three months to a hairdresser and a sew-
ing business.” (Aiyl okmotu administration, meeting 201Meet, 
02/03/04) 
This measure is supportive for small and especially for start-up enter-
prises, which have to make many investments before they see any profits. 
For many start-up enterprises, exemption from rents is an important step in 
reaching the break-even point quickly and establishing their business on a 
permanent footing.  
In addition, aiyl okmotu may support businesses indirectly by providing 
premises to business-supporting NGOs or micro-credit institutions, in this 
way fostering the creation of business infrastructure. Aiyl okmotu may 
furthermore make rooms available for businesspeople or meetings of co-
operatives.  
“The aiyl okmotu gave us the premises for our NGO and also for the 
aiyl okmotu bank, the micro credit agency.” (NGO, interview 780Int, 
26/03/04) 
If decisions are reached quickly on provision of premises and land, with-
out any bureaucratic obstacles and bribery, this may be an appropriate tool 
to support the local economy. This tool depends, of course, on the exis-
tence of municipal property. Moreover, providing property for rent is a 
source of independent income for aiyl okmotu. According to the current 
law, aiyl okmotu can keep all revenues from municipal property manage-
ment for their own budgets. Therefore, those local authorities which have 
much land property are less financially dependent on upper levels than 
those which have very little land property.  
Provision of training and seminars 
There are a variety of training measures for businesspeople that can be 
observed at the local level. Topics include business financing, applying for 
grants, rights of businesspeople and technical consultancy.  
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Here, as opposed to the local economic development tool previously men-
tioned, the aiyl okmotu does not play a significant role. For seminars and 
training, the aiyl okmotu rather serves as a networker with suppliers of 
seminars such as international donors or local NGOs. The raion level has 
more capacities in terms of institutional, human and financial resources 
and therefore often initiates its own measures. 
Some organisations that provide agricultural support services are based at 
the raion level and are partly funded by the raion administration. They 
provide training measures and advisory services for small farmers, for 
example on how to grow tomatoes or sugar beet.111 
Other training possibilities are offered by international donors. GTZ and 
Helvetas provide several kinds of seminars, which are realized in co-
operation with local authorities.   
Helping to network 
To help businesspeople to collectively articulate, express and pursue their 
interests is an important local economic development measure of local 
governments. Assistance in networking can take the form of regular busi-
ness meetings with administrations, establishment of councils and depart-
ments for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in administrations, 
or support for business associations. Most of these measures are initiated 
at raion level. As in the case of the measure of providing training and 
seminars, the raion level has the capacities it needs in terms of experts for 
business support.112 
Three different types of networking were observed in the field. First, ad-
ministration calls together small and large enterprises in order to listen to 
their problems and to discuss possible solutions for them.113 Secondly, 
representatives of businesses and local authorities come together in official 
business councils. The councils are co-ordinated by the raion administra-
tion and are generally presided over by the akim.  
“The council works for lobbying interests of businessmen and protect-
ing their rights. The main goal is to strengthen the co-operation be-
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tween representatives of state power and representatives of busi-
nesses.” (Raion administration, interview 250Int, 25/03/04) 
Thirdly, local governments collaborate with business associations to 
strengthen the ability of businesses to pursue their interests. The main 
potential advantages of associations are protection of business rights and 
the possibility of engaging in lobbying. Many businesspeople complain 
about exaggerated numbers of inspections that take place and hamper their 
business. In such cases, the business association can be informed and 
asked to check with the responsible departments of local administration to 
see whether these inspections are legally correct.  
Another factor that links authorities and business associations is the draft-
ing of new laws. Business associations seek to influence the law-making 
process by providing their own proposals from a business point of view. 
Larger associations also offer legal support to their members. Neverthe-
less, these advantages mostly benefit larger businesses that can afford to 
pay the membership fees.114 
Offering direct access to officials 
One measure that may prove important to local economic development is 
for officials in local administrations to follow “open door policies” that 
enable businesspeople to gain direct and personal access to them. Busi-
nesspeople appreciate being able to come into direct contact with heads of 
administration. “Open door policies,” our research found, can take several 
forms.  
One regular and widespread form of access is consultation hours for citi-
zens. Interestingly, although all heads of the different administrations had 
relevant signs on their doors, neither administrative staff nor businesspeo-
ple mentioned this option when asked for possible channels of participa-
tion. Other institutionalised forms of access to administrations are “hot-
lines” or “question hours.” 
It is doubtful whether businesspeople make (much) use of these possibili-
ties. Many businesspeople stated that they did not really have access to 
decision-makers and that administration did not pay attention to them. It 
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can be assumed that there is an information gap between administration 
and businesspeople concerning institutionalised forms of direct access.  
Raion kenesh members sometimes emphasise their role as contact persons 
for businesses, yet very few businesspeople stated that they regularly ask 
for their assistance. At aiyl okmotu level many businesspeople and farmers 
do not even think of turning to administrations, because they have no con-
fidence that their problems will be solved by the aiyl okmotu. In Section 
4.3, this problem will be discussed in more detail.  
Devising and implementing development plans 
In talking about local economic development measures, several adminis-
trative officials stressed the importance of socio-economic development 
planning. Yet, very few businesspeople seem to recognize this as an in-
strument that effectively supports their activities. Most interview partners 
knew nothing about socio-economic development plans. Experts expressed 
rather critical views on local government development planning. Above 
all, they questioned the viability of existing plans and the drafting process.  
“They produce their socio-economic plan over night and have it ap-
proved by the kenesh, it is some sort of wish-list, not viable, like to in-
crease the GDP by 5 % or reduce the number of poor families from 460 
to 390.” (Expert, interview 060Int, 23/02/04) 
In talking about development plans, many officials reverted to the vocabu-
lary and the concepts of planned economy. The socio-economic develop-
ment plans often reveal soviet-style thinking, which seems to prevail in 
most local authorities as far as these plans are concerned.  
“Economics start with our development plans. […] Our last plan was 
over-fulfilled with 111  %.” (City Administration, interview 140Int, 
02/03/04) 
“We approve the plan and control it the whole year and we come back 
to the numbers and check whether the results match the numbers given 
quarterly.” (Raion administration, interview 170Int, 02/03/04) 
Because most of those plans are far removed from modern approaches to 
local economic development, they do not bear significant results. But there 
are also efforts to make socio-economic development plans a viable in-
strument of local economic development. However, long-term communal 
development planning that includes strategic approaches to strengthening 
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the local economy can only be observed in those aiyl okmotu that have 
received support by donor agencies for this purpose. 
Main findings  
This section has presented and discussed the most important obstacles 
facing businesspeople as well as existing local economic development 
measures at aiyl okmotu and raion level. It turns out that many business-
people have to contend with obstacles that hamper their business activities 
and are caused by local administration. In contrast, very few businesses 
benefit from local economic development measures initiated by aiyl ok-
motu or raion administration.  
The following subchapter will analyse these positive and negative issues 
that affect local economic development with respect to the different roles 
played by aiyl okmotu and raion administration in the context of the ongo-
ing decentralisation process. As already emphasized, the aiyl okmotu have 
no more than very limited capacities to actively influence local economic 
development. The raion administration is generally the key agent in these 
areas thanks to its larger financial resources and better-qualified staff. 
4.3 The impact of decentralisation on policy-making in 
local economic development 
Having described the most significant local economic development meas-
ures and obstacles to business activities at the local level, we will now 
examine these measures and obstacles from the perspective of the ongoing 
decentralisation process in Kyrgyzstan. Empirical research conducted 
among experts, businesspeople, public sector officials (local state admini-
stration and local self-government bodies) and NGO points to critical 
aspects of the decentralisation processes with regard to policy-making in 
local economic development. Capacities at the local level are not sufficient 
to effectively carry out the policies proposed in the literature (see  
Section 2.2).  
Chapter 3 has demonstrated that the processes of political, administrative 
and fiscal decentralisation are incoherent. Administrative and fiscal decen-
tralisation are lagging behind the achievements of political decentralisa-
tion. This means that democratically legitimised decision-making at the 
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local level is, on the one hand, not supported by clear assignments of tasks 
and responsibilities. On the other hand, decision-makers do not have actual 
decision-making power because of their lack of finance. This chapter 
analyses the impact that this incoherence has on local economic develop-
ment measures as well as obstacles to businesses at the local level. 
First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between the aiyl okmotu and the 
raion level. The two are in quite different positions as regards the carrying 
out of policies of local economic development. 
Policy-making at the aiyl level is faced with a number of impediments: 
elected bodies of local self-government may well have the mandate to 
design and implement local economic development policies that match 
local problems, priorities and resources. However, they have neither clear-
cut functional assignments nor the necessary budgets to do so.  
Local state administrative bodies, on the other hand, play a different role. 
At the current stage of the decentralisation process, the local state admini-
strations at the raion level have retained financial equipment, institutional 
capacities and decision-making power that may be seen as significant for 
the design and implementation of local economic development policies. 
Thus, of both administrative levels, only the raion level has the means to 
effectively support local businesses115.However, raion administration is 
further detached from the local population and lacks a political mandate. 
4.3.1 Local economic development at aiyl okmotu level 
The analysis of policy-making in local economic development at the aiyl 
okmotu level will first examine the main limitations that constrain activi-
ties. In a second step, issues are highlighted that point to opportunities 
open to decision-makers. 
Limitations 
The most important issues limiting the scope of LED competences at the 
aiyl okmotu level are related to lack of finance, ambiguous accountability 
and inadequate training. 
                                                          
115 See e.g. interview 200Int, 02/03/04. 
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At first glance, the analysis is straight and simple: without sufficient funds 
it is not possible for aiyl okmotu to design and implement meaningful 
policies of local economic development.  
“The head of aiyl okmotu is elected by the people. But when it comes to 
budget and law-making, he has no power. He is tied because he was 
elected and not appointed, and he has not many fellows. The paradox is, 
that he is elected by the people, but if he doesn’t have financial support 
somewhere behind him, he doesn’t have the power.” (Expert, interview 
120Int, 01/03/04) 
“Mayors promise anything to their citizens to get elected, but they don't 
have the resources to meet their commitments.” (Expert, interview 
100Int, 26/02/04) 
Accordingly, the aiyl okmotu are unable to fulfil their mandate to conduct 
policies of local economic development. In fact, heads of local self-
government face a situation in which they are not only unable to design 
local economic development policies but are also unable to fulfil genuine 
public tasks of service delivery, e.g. the maintenance of roads.  
“There is no money in the local budget and people are demanding im-
possible things from you, like fixing the roads without any money.” 
(Head of aiyl okmotu, interview 870Int, 31/03/04) 
As described above (4.1), lack of finance at the local level becomes a 
direct obstacle to businesses whenever they are forced to compensate for 
it: i.e. when businesses are asked to make contributions to carrying out 
public tasks.  
Due to lack of fiscal sovereignty, heads of local self-government are still 
accountable to upper levels, as an official at the oblast level reported: 
“The aiyl okmotu are elected now. They don’t listen to anybody, they 
have elected heads. They don’t listen to the akim, they don’t listen to 
anybody, right? But how can they truly not listen if tomorrow I can or 
cannot give them money!... They call us, they come here, and say: Help! 
Help! Even if 100  % elected the head of aiyl okmotu, he will still go to 
the akim and to us for help! They are dependent.” (Official at oblast 
level, interview 430Int, 13/03/04) 
This poses a problem for the political credibility of elected heads of aiyl 
okmotu: according to the idea of political decentralisation, they should be 
held accountable for their actions exclusively by their electorate.  
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In addition, heads of aiyl okmotu are not sufficiently trained, and they are 
therefore uncertain of their roles and responsibilities. Living up to their 
responsibilities in local economic development would mean designing, 
implementing, monitoring and constantly improving mid- and long-term 
policies that include strategic components and target definitions. Instead, 
measures on aiyl okmotu level confine themselves to ad hoc and issue-
driven solutions rather than forming part of comprehensive policies. This 
may serve to help select individual businesspeople, although the majority 
of them, i.e. overall economic development, will be left out in the process. 
Aware of this set of circumstances, businesspeople have very limited con-
fidence in and expectations towards the aiyl okmotu as far as their ability 
is concerned to solve problems and provide support for businesses. Lim-
ited confidence in turn leads to attitudes of non-collaboration among 
stakeholders, which makes it even more difficult to initiate local economic 
development policies. 
Opportunities 
However, despite the obstacles mentioned above, there still seems to be 
some room for manoeuvre for the aiyl okmotu. Some of the measures 
presented in Section 4.2, e.g., do not require heavy financing. This applies 
for measures such as matchmaking efforts, information work and network-
ing, e.g. to facilitate access to credits.  
Likewise, social skills, creativity and commitment to businesses on the 
part of the aiyl okmotu staff are crucial factors that can make a difference 
in local economic development. These factors do not put a strain on local 
budgets, as qualities of individuals cannot be purchased. On the other 
hand, staff qualifications, which have to be acquired, naturally feed back 
into the dire financial situation of the aiyl okmotu, since the latter cannot 
afford to employ qualified staff or pay for qualification measures. The 
personnel policy of aiyl okmotu could take account of this, e.g. by placing 
emphasis on business experience and commitment instead of formal edu-
cation in hiring staff.  
Also, there are obstacles to business activities that could be removed by 
local administration without any major financial efforts - e.g. the design of 
an appropriate information policy for businesspeople (see Section 4.1). 
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Other measures, though limited in scale, may even serve to increase reve-
nues for the aiyl okmotu budget. If aiyl okmotu manage the deployment of 
municipal property such as land and premises in a sensible way, they can 
serve a double-purpose: provision of business premises and land to busi-
nesspeople is an effective measure of local economic development. At the 
same time, aiyl okmotu can economise on their municipal property, which 
is one of their few sources of decentralised revenue.116 However, local 
economic development is in conflict here with fiscal policy: the more 
business-friendly the measure - e.g. discounts on rents - the lower the 
revenues for the aiyl okmotu. 
Some heads of aiyl okmotu have managed to compensate for their insuffi-
cient budgets by successfully applying for donor funds. Donor funding is 
sought out of economic necessity. But the fact that the aiyl okmotu thereby 
assume the role of applicants holds a potential to further undermine their 
political credibility as representatives. Instead of setting the political 
agenda of the aiyl okmotu exclusively according to needs and priorities of 
the electorate, policies have to be brought into line with donor agendas.  
There are, nonetheless, some major positive aspects of donor involvement 
in local development. Intelligent attraction and prudent management of 
external funds, e.g., can be effective tools to support the local economy. 
And while there are issues of credibility involved in donor engagement, 
donor funding can also mean a prestige-plus for the heads of aiyl okmotu, 
with the electorate honouring their positive role in attracting funds. In fact, 
the head of aiyl okmotu in one of our sample raiony included the topic 
‘attraction of funds from different donor organisations’ in his successful 
election campaign.117 
4.3.2 Local economic development at raion level 
As in the previous sub-chapter, the analysis of policy-making in local 
economic development at the raion level will consider first the main limi-
tations and then opportunities open to decision-makers. 
                                                          
116 See e.g. interview 060Int, 23/02/04. 
117 On the occasion of a meeting with him, the head of the aiyl okmotu Krasnaia Rechka 
presented his election campaign flyer. 
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Limitations 
The fact that its centrally controlled administration is at odds with the 
concept of local self-government is a general important handicap of the 
raion level. While the research conducted for this study has clearly identi-
fied the raion’s high potential in the field of local economic development, 
the existence of a strong and appointed local state administration at the 
raion level contradicts the aims of political decentralisation in the Kyrgyz 
Republic: proximity to local priorities, resources and problems and, at the 
same time, a political mandate safeguarded by sanctioning mechanisms 
open to the electorate. In contrast to this, the raion local state administra-
tion is held accountable by super-ordinate positions at the oblast- and 
national level. Lack of decision transparency and incidences of misuse of 
decision-making power (e.g. bribery in businesses’ interactions with ad-
ministration; see Section 4.1) create a certain distrust among stakeholders 
towards the raion local state administration, whose political performance 
they cannot sanction through elections. 
Compared to the aiyl okmotu, the raion is in a better bargaining position in 
the budgeting process and higher in the hierarchy of the mainly top-down 
distribution of state finances. Still, like the aiyl okmotu, the raiony are 
financially and politically dependent on the higher level of administration, 
the oblast, which limits their ability to financially back long-term local 
economic development policies.118  
And again in ways comparable to the aiyl okmotu, measures we observed 
at the raion level seemed to be rather ad hoc and issue-driven. More stra-
tegic approaches such as an institutionalised stakeholder dialogue based on 
business meetings or business associations are only just about to 
emerge.119 
Opportunities 
But empirical research among the stakeholders shows that, compared to 
the aiyl okmotu, raion administrationsare better equipped for almost all of 
the local economic development measures identified. At the current stage 
                                                          
118 See e.g. interview 030Int, 20/02/04. 
119 See e.g. interview 690Int, 19/03/04, interview 230Int, 03/03/04, interview 770Int, 
23/03/04. 
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
German Development Institue 91 
of the decentralisation process, the raion local state administration retains 
several key capacities necessary to successfully conduct local economic 
development policies. One reason for this situation is of course scale ef-
fects, i.e. it is more viable to offer training and seminars to a larger number 
of businesspeople throughout the raion. But the important role of the raion 
might also be due to structural path dependence (see Section 3.2.): actors 
and institutions at raion level were able to uphold the relatively strong 
position they held during Soviet times, despite numerous political reforms. 
It is possible to identify four key capacities relevant to policy-making in 
local economic development at the raion level: 
• Decision-making capacity: the personal resources of the akim (social 
skills, business experience, creativity and commitment to local de-
velopment), together with his strong political position and the finan-
cial equipment of the raion, can make a big difference in policies of 
local economic development. Businesspeople highly value the prob-
lem-solving capacity at raion level, provided they can access institu-
tions and key persons (e.g. the akim). 
• Institutional capacity: associations, business and farmers’ councils, 
and other organisations that have significance for local businesspeo-
ple are more often to be found at the raion level. Decision-makers at 
raion level can draw on these institutional capacities when they offer 
seminars, training and business meetings. Networking among busi-
nessmen, organisational help for credit unions, etc. can be more ef-
fectively facilitated through these institutions.  
• Retention of key positions: a number of highly significant positions 
for business activities remain assigned to the raion level of admini-
stration. Examples are the state prosecutor, tax-, sanitary- and fire in-
spections, the architecture bureau, business registration, etc. Busi-
nesspeople therefore necessarily turn to the raion administrations in 
matters crucial to formal entrepreneurship (registration, tax issues). 
• Human resources: many raion administrations employ specialists in 
fields of business promotion, SME promotion and tax issues. They 
have economic and statistics departments and sometimes training 
centres. In comparison, aiyl okmotu are far from able to employ staff 
dedicated to local economic development in this quality and quantity. 
These key capacities explain why the raion assumes responsibility for 
most of the local economic development measures identified. Conse-
quently, even if one can observe a certain distrust towards local state ad-
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ministrative agencies among stakeholders, most of them would still agree 
that it is more the raion than the aiyl okmotu that is capable of solving 
their problems. 
This confidence enables local economic development policies at raion 
level to rely on the collaboration of stakeholders. 
4.4 Local economic development: main findings 
Concluding from the analysis of local economic development policies in 
the Kyrgyz Republic, it can be said: i) The hands of the aiyl okmotu are 
tied for many reasons. ii) The lead agent in local economic development is 
therefore the raion. iii) Efforts in local economic development more often 
take the shape of single and issue-driven measures rather than comprehen-
sive and strategically designed policies. iv) Finally, the ability of admini-
strations to successfully conduct local economic development policies 
depends on the stakeholders’ readiness to collaborate. This readiness is 
found to be contingent on the credibility of local decision-makers and, as a 
consequence, on the financial backing of their decisions. This is why the 
raiony, rather than the aiyl okmotu, are able to draw on stakeholder col-
laboration in local economic development.  
i. It has been demonstrated in the previous sub-chapter that the democ-
ratically elected local governments that emerged from the decentrali-
sation process at aiyl okmotu level lack the human and, most impor-
tantly, financial resources needed to effectively conduct local eco-
nomic development policies. 
One explanation for this is that the processes of administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation have not proceeded at the same pace as political decen-
tralisation. Although the Law on Local State Administration and Local 
Self-Government provides a legal foundation for the delineation of func-
tions between local self-government and local state administration, offi-
cials at aiyl okmotu level are in fact not given full responsibility for the 
fulfilment and the budgeting of their functions. 120  
“Our power is limited and controlled. We still receive the budget from 
raion.” (Aiyl okmotu official, interview 650Int, 18/03/04).  
                                                          
120 See e.g. interview 070Int, 24/02/04. 
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The factual distribution of finances between the levels of government does 
not allow for titles in aiyl okmotu budgets that could be assigned to local 
economic development activities. Because there are no free resources in 
the aiyl okmotu budget that could be used independently – more than half 
of the aiyl okmotu do not even receive the full amount of transfers from 
the national budget needed to fulfil delegated functions – they are unable 
to finance local economic development programmes.121  
ii. Typically, most local economic development measures are under-
taken by the raion level of state administration. As outlined above, 
the capacities within its administrative departments place the raion in 
a position as the lead agent in this policy field. An official at a raion 
administration illustrates this for the aspect of human resource ca-
pacities that enable the raion to manage local economic development 
measures: 
“In our financial department we have three sub-departments. First, the 
budget department with four employees, the department of treasury and 
the department of economy with four specialists. We manage the eco-
nomic situation throughout the whole raion. Our department deals with 
three main tasks: the income part of the raion, industry and agricul-
ture.” (Raion official, interview 460Int, 15/03/04) 
iii. Local government bodies do not yet seem to approach local eco-
nomic development in comprehensive ways. Rather, most activities 
are issue-driven and address single problems at the individual busi-
ness level. In theory, the “social and economic development plans” 
that the local keneshi have to approve on a regular basis (see Section 
4.2) could be viable instruments of local economic development. In 
fact, local administrations and keneshi often do not appear to pay 
much attention to these documents. Neither do local businesspeople, 
who usually are not even aware of their existence. Lack of skills and 
training on the part of the administrations and keneshi plays an im-
portant role here. However, more long-term and strategic approaches 
to planning are beginning to gain importance in those communities 
that closely co-operate with a number of donor organisations which 
make strategic and action plans a precondition for funding in com-
munity development122. 
                                                          
121 See e.g. interview 430Int, 13/03/04. 
122 See e.g. interview 040Int, 23/02/04 and interview 060Int., 23/02/04. 
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iv. At the aiyl okmotu level, an important resource needed by policy-
makers to design and implement policies of local economic devel-
opment is scarce: the readiness of stakeholders to collaborate in local 
economic development. As a result of the incoherence of political, 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation, the raion rather than the 
aiyl okmotu is trusted to solve business people’s problems:  
“Of course I turned first to aiyl okmotu,...from them I received the per-
mission that I can do my business close to Issyk-Atinski Telecom. But 
Issyk-Atinski Telecom just didn't want to be neighbouring with me. The-
re is a law on local self-government, and according to that, for land on 
the aiyl okmotu territory we have to turn to aiyl okmotu. [But] for some 
problems sometimes the aiyl okmotu has not enough power. For argu-
able questions, we have to go to the upper level...So the raion had more 
power to influence.” (Businesswoman, interview 230Int, 20/02/04) 
Empirically, a range of attitudes among stakeholders towards the role of 
administrations in local economic development can be observed, ranging 
from “hope” through “green light” to “frustration.” From these attitudes, 
one can draw conclusions on the readiness of stakeholders to collaborate 
(see Box 6). Aspects of stakeholder trust and collaboration in local eco-
nomic development are more thoroughly discussed in the next chapter, 
which examines participation in policies of local economic development. 
Box 6:  Attitudes towards administrations among businesspeople 
Three rough types of attitude towards administrations can be distinguished among 
businesspeople: “Hope,” “Green Light” and “Frustration.” These can be exempli-
fied with reference to three businessmen in Nooken raion. All three are giving 
statements on a raion-initiated business meeting with representatives of the ad-
ministration. Two of them participated in the meeting. 
“Hope”: collaboration with administration will benefit businesspeople. 
“Not just me, but all the businessmen who attended, liked this meeting, and it 
would be good to have this kind of meetings more often. I didn’t know what to 
expect, I didn’t even know what this meeting was about, before.... 
There was one businessman who stood up and said: people are afraid to complain. 
For instance, if the police comes and takes all your money, and if you complain 
on that, it will be worse. The prosecutor then said: ‘see, now you shouldn’t be 
afraid. And if you have any problems with police or tax inspections, just come to 
my office and we’re going to see what’s been done wrong or right.’ All the busi-
nessmen were thankful for that. Q: What’s your expectations for the next meet-
ings? A: I think there will be many questions to the prosecutor. I think those who  
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didn’t come to the meeting now will come. If somebody’s protecting business-
men, they will go there they will go there […] Q: Will you turn to the prosecutor 
with problems, or have you already? A: I never did, but in future I will!” 
“Green Light”: non-interventionism is wished for. 
“We don’t have any complaints with the state administration here […]. We pay 
taxes in time, we pay taxes to the social fund. Apart from that, we don’t have a 
relation to the administration […] Since I opened my business, the administration 
has never bothered me, I never even needed their help […]It’s my private busi-
ness, and nobody has to help me, I have to work it on my own […] Q: There was 
this business meeting on Friday, where you there? A: No, I wasn’t invited. Q: 
Who was invited? A: I don’t know […] 
I think in Kyrgyzstan, nobody messes with you, if you’re trying hard and doing 
something, you just get green light for the development of your business […] I 
have a small business, I don’t need credits, so right now I don’t demand anything 
from them. […] I think that human beings should just try without needing any-
thing extra.” b  
“Frustration”: bad experience with interventions and corruption, distrust towards 
administration prevails. 
“Local powers don’t care, local administration is totally corrupt! […] We got used 
to this already! Before, we saw this only on TV, now we have it here! People 
don’t trust each other anymore […] People don’t want to mess with administration 
[…] The local city administration are my age, they’re trying to understand, but they 
are weak, they’re on the lower level of power, they can’t make any decision. 
There are good laws, but no one controls the implementation, there is no public 
control […] It’s better to pay bribes than to do it legally. Give and take bribes is 
the way! Q: About corruption, what can be done? A: I think at some point, people 
will lose their patience. More people think like that. All people will get together 
for revolution. 
[Here, we discovered that he had attended the business meeting that morning.] 
[…] But if I had said something wrong […] nobody said anything, everybody was 
afraid, the prosecutor was there. I hoped maybe there’d be some good people 
who’d shout out! […] The prosecutor invited for this meeting, it was the first 
time. They are trying to make people believe that there is justice. 
Maybe I went there to show them I don’t trust them anymore. Q: What did you 
hope to get there? A: I had the desire to speak out, if I had held a speech, I would 
have said everything! In the capitalist system, everyone is on his own […]” c 
a Businessman, interview 770Int, 23/03/04  
b Businessman, interview 750Int, 23/03/04   
c Businessman, interview 710Int, 23/03/04 
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5 Participation in local economic development 
The previous chapter has discussed the limitations and opportunities of 
local economic development. Based on these findings, this chapter analy-
ses possibilities of and limitations to participation in decision-making on 
policies in the field of local economic development.  
The decentralisation process created different channels of participation 
that are supposed to enable people to become “actively and significantly 
involved in all decisions affecting their lives”123. Section 5.1 presents these 
channels, analyses the different stakeholders’ perceptions of these possi-
bilities to participate and looks at their strengths and weaknesses. Fur-
thermore, our research indicates that there are other factors that have an 
effect on participation and that are not directly connected to decentralisa-
tion. Dominant among these factors are stakeholder attitudes that deter-
mine the way in which the new channels of participation are used (see 
Section 5.1.2). 
Before proceeding with a discussion of channels of participation, it is 
useful to recall who the relevant stakeholders are in local economic devel-
opment in Kyrgyzstan. They can be broken down into state and non-state 
actors. Among state actors, four types of stakeholders are relevant for local 
economic development: the aiyl okmotu (administration), the aiyl kenesh, 
the raion administration and the raion kenesh; non-state actors involved 
in, or concerned by, local economic development include local business-
people, business associations, local NGOs and certain donor organisations. 
Box 7 and Box 8 present brief profiles of each of these stakeholders. 
Box 7:  Stakeholder analysis – state actors 
Aiyl okmotu (administration): The aiyl okmotu could be expected to be very 
concerned with promotion of local development. Creating jobs for their electorate 
and generating local taxes would serve to substantially improve and strengthen the 
position of the elected authorities. However, the interest of the aiyl okmotu in 
promotion of local economic development differs from village to village. There are 
administrations that try to find ways to improve the economic situation of their 
territories. Some of them are quite creative, but their possibilities are limited by 
                                                          
123 BMZ (1999, 2). 
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
German Development Institue 97 
very tight local budgets. Other aiyl okmotu do not consider promotion of local 
economic development to be their duty. Either way, systematic policies cannot be 
developed at the aiyl okmotu level,. For this reason, the aiyl okmotu in most cases 
do not promote participation. A passive population will not demand the develop-
ment of efficient socio-economic programmes. 
Aiyl kenesh: According to the law, the kenesh represents the population and is 
thus accountable to the citizens. In the field of local economic development it is 
supposed to be involved in the development of socio-economic programmes and 
to take a hand in solving problems of businesspeople. However, there are many 
kenesh members who are very passive because they have the feeling that they 
have little influence. Other, active members are able to solve some issues, but 
they do not have many possibilities to do so on account of the limitations at aiyl 
okmotu level. Accordingly, the kenesh is not a reliable instrument, since people 
do not know what to expect from it. The population turns to the kenesh to have its 
everyday problems solved. However, in the field of local economic development, 
the kenesh is considered to be neither responsible nor capable. Furthermore, 
people do not hold the kenesh responsible because, on the one hand, not much is 
expected from this channel of participation. On the other hand, people are not 
experienced with the use of democratic instruments and are thus not familiar with 
their rights. 
Raion administration: Raion administrations consider promotion of local eco-
nomic development as their responsibility. At this level, most of the few existing 
measures are implemented. Although there are attempts to include the business 
community in decision-making, for example via business meetings, participation 
is limited at this level. The raion level is part of local state administration and is 
therefore accountable to the national government, whose interests it represents at the 
local level. For the raiony as part of local state administration, it is important to have 
a prospering economy on their territory to generate high revenues for the national 
budget. However, as regards popular participation in decision-making, this means 
that the population is in large measure reliant on the administration’s good-will. 
Raion kenesh: Formally, the raion kenesh is accountable to the population. Its duty 
is to represent people’s interests in the development of budgets and social and eco-
nomic development plans at raion level. However, as the raion level belongs to 
local state administration, the kenesh does not have great influence. The administra-
tion is accountable to the higher levels of government and not to the population. For 
this reason, members of raion kenesh often simply approve the plans of the admini-
stration because they cannot effectively influence and change these plans. However, 
citizens do turn to members of raion kenesh with individual issues that they con-
sider problematic, and individual kenesh members try to solve these issues. 
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5.1 Channels of participation 
Participation of large parts of the population in decision-making – one of 
the aims of decentralisation – is in general not very widespread in Kyr-
gyzstan. However, the decentralisation process has created different chan-
nels which are supposed to enable people to influence the work of local 
authorities in different ways. These formal channels are keneshi, elections, 
kurultai, and condominium associations. Furthermore, official meetings 
between administration and businesspeople also serve as a channel of 
participation.  
Nevertheless, these channels often do not function as intended, and this 
means that people’s possibilities to influence decision-making are very 
limited. And this in turn has served to boost the importance of informal 
channels such as bribery and direct personal contacts with higher officials. 
Yet, participation based on these channels is not in line with the principles 
of participation presented in Section 2.2: equal participation of all stake-
holders, transparent decision-making processes and accountability towards 
the population. 
These deficits hamper the decentralisation process because participation is 
both a goal and a precondition for decentralisation. Some of the donors 
active in decentralisation policies have, therefore, created new channels of 
participation. The World Bank’s Village Investment Project has estab-
lished “Local Investment Committees” and the Urban Institute organises 
“Public Hearings.” However, it is doubtful whether these additional chan-
nels in fact strengthen the general system of local decision-making. There 
is a danger that parallel structures may be created that would render the 
official system meaningless. 
5.1.1 Formal channels of participation 
To enable participation, it is necessary to create clear and structured possi-
bilities for citizens to take part in the political process. In Kyrgyzstan sev-
eral channels of participation have been established, as discussed in the 
following section. While these channels do have certain functions, it is 
also obvious that their influence is very limited. One reason is the fact that 
they do not function as intended. Another, even more important, reason is 
that these channels have only limited relevance because the level of gov-
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ernment which they are supposed to influence is very restricted in its deci-
sion-making power. 
Keneshi 
Keneshi at oblast, raion and aiyl okmotu level are considered part of local 
self-government (see Chapter 3). They have the function of councils or 
parliaments that control the administration. Potentially, the keneshi are the 
most important channels of participation in local economic development, 
due to the functions they have under the law. At the same time, keneshi at 
the aiyl okmotu and raion levels can also be considered stakeholders in 
local economic development in that their members have an individual and 
collective interest in the well-being of their communities (cf. Box 7). The 
keneshi are involved in the budgeting process as well as in the elaboration 
and approval of socio-economic development plans. If businesspeople 
actually turned to the respective keneshi and demanded that their interests 
be considered, they could have significant leverage.  
Box 8:  Stakeholder analysis – non-state actors 
Businesspeople: Businesspeople are the prime addressees of local economic 
development. Therefore, they could be expected to have great interest in partici-
pating in decision-making in this field. However, many businesspeople, particu-
larly owners of small businesses, have made the experience that they are power-
less and that they are not taken seriously by the authorities. Since the formal 
channels of participation do not function satisfactorily, and many owners of small 
businesses do not have important personal contacts, their opinions and needs are 
not well considered in policy-making. Owners or managers of large businesses 
have the advantage that they are of greater interest to the authorities. They have 
the contacts needed to have their issues addressed. They are therefore not neces-
sarily interested in the functioning of the formal channels of participation. 
Business associations: Business associations are still a new phenomenon in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. It is therefore still too early to state definitely the direction in 
which they are going. However, they appear to concentrate on providing their mem-
bers with information about legal regulations on the one hand and technical knowledge 
on the other. Lobbying, generally an important function of business associations, is not 
yet well developed. Some associations work in close cooperation with the administra-
tion. Many businesspeople do not consider these associations an option for them-
selves. Some people are sceptical as to the they interests that these associations 
actually represent. Others simply do not see why should pay the membership fees. 
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NGOs: The NGOs working in Kyrgyzstan can be roughly divided into two types: 
1. those that work closely together with administrations in community projects 
and 2. those that give legal advice and support to the population. Both types of 
NGO are of course reliant on the resources they need to do their work. To this 
extent, a stable economic situation is important for them. Furthermore, NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan represent not mainly minority groups but large parts of the population 
that have to cope with the difficult economic situation. One overall objective of 
NGO work is therefore improvement of the economic situation. 
1. Those NGOs that are in close relationship with administrations are often in-
volved in providing hard and soft infrastructure. Although this can also be con-
sidered to be measures of local economic development, these NGOs do not 
work explicitly in the interest of businesspeople. A cooperative relationship be-
tween NGOs and administrations may have a favourable influence on local 
policies. However, such NGOs are in danger of being co-opted by administra-
tions. Furthermore, many of these organisations rely on donor money, and they 
are thus forced to develop their activities in accordance with the offers of the 
donors, which are not necessarily in line with the demands of the people. 
2. The other type of NGO, which provides legal advice and support to the 
population, has an indirect influence on the work of administrations. These 
organizations are able to monitor authorities to a certain extent, pressuring 
the latter to adhere to the laws and to treat people accordingly. Although 
NGO work is not yet widely known among businesspeople, it does contrib-
ute to limiting arbitrariness in bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, some of 
these NGOs receive international donor support, and this increases their po-
litical weight. 
Donor organisations: Until 2005 the Kyrgyz Republic was regarded as the most 
stable country in the region and was often cited as a positive example for the 
neighbouring countries. Many donors were for this reason active in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, despite a growing sense of frustration with an increasingly authoritarian 
polity. The March 2005 “Tulip Revolution” has only helped to reinforce the inter-
national interest in Kyrgyzstan. Interest in promoting decentralisation is notably 
high, not least because this concept is currently very highly valued in the interna-
tional development community. In many areas, Kyrgyzstan relies on donor 
money, and this means that donor influence is significant. It is in the interest of 
donors to promote participation in this context. However, there is a tendency 
among donor organisations to create parallel structures rather than aiming for 
alignment with existing or newly established official structures (cf. Section 5.1.3). 
However, many interviews conducted among local businesspeople indicate 
that the latter do not consider the keneshi a very useful instrument. On many 
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issues, citizens regard the keneshi as meaningless and without power. At 
raion and oblast level they do not have much power because administration 
is accountable to the central government and not to the citizens.  
“The situation with the raion and oblast keneshi is strange, because 
they are just elected, but basically they do not decide on anything.” 
(Expert, interview 040Int, 23/02/04) 
At aiyl okmotu level the kenesh is closer to the people because deputies are 
neighbours and members of the same communities. Furthermore, the ke-
nesh is legally considered the legislative body of the aiyl okmotu. Yet, 
businesspeople do not make much use of this instrument. It is often said to 
be meaningless because the whole aiyl okmotu level is regarded as having 
little power. The administration has little room for manoeuvre and depends 
on the upper levels. For this reason, few decisions are taken in which the 
kenesh could get involved.  
“I am member of AO kenesh. I don't think that keneshi at any level play 
any role. Everything is decided at the top.” (Kenesh member, interview 
790Int, 26/03/04) 
Businesspeople try to solve most problems concerning their businesses by 
themselves or with the help of their family. The main issue for which they 
turn to the kenesh is rental of communal property. The management of 
communal property is one of the few clearly defined functions of the aiyl 
okmotu. There are some communities in which the administration of com-
munal property functions satisfactorily. These communities are a good 
example showing that the lowest level can successfully deal with matters 
of local concern if responsibilities are clearly defined. In other cases, how-
ever, as soon as legal uncertainties or quarrels have occurred, people have 
turned directly to higher levels. 
Members of aiyl and raion keneshi told us that they solve all kinds of their 
citizens’ everyday problems. Often, matters concerning damaged infra-
structure, lack of social institutions and land questions are brought forward 
to the kenesh members. Usually this takes place in meetings between indi-
vidual kenesh members and citizens, either during consultation hours or in 
informal meetings on the streets or at the kenesh member’s house. Many 
kenesh members presented themselves as very involved and open for their 
citizens’ problems. 
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“As a deputy of Ivanovka aiyl okmotu I meet the electorate, they can turn 
to me anytime, any hour of the day. E.g. in Ivanovka we had a problem 
with drinking water, citizens called me at night and asked me for help. 
And within ten days we fixed the water pipeline. So now there is water for 
[…] the population.” (Kenesh member, interview 820Int, 30/03/04) 
However, people’s opinions on the work of the keneshi are more diverse. In 
general, businesspeople reported that the aiyl kenesh is not very helpful in 
most matters concerning their business, with the exception of renting com-
munal land. Interestingly, most interviewees from the private sector did not 
consider the kenesh to be responsible for questions of local economic devel-
opment. Their expectations are usually directed towards administration staff. 
The assessment given of general kenesh performance depends very much on 
the engagement shown by the individual kenesh members. 
There are very active members of kenesh who serve the citizens as best as 
they can. They know the laws and know whom to turn to for different 
concerns. Others were very passive and did not seem to know what their 
designated functions were. They considered their position as meaningless 
and therefore saw no reason to make an effort.  
The heads of aiyl okmotu play a crucial role in the work of the kenesh. As 
chairpersons of kenesh and heads of administration, they can give impor-
tant impulses but also frustrate the other members of kenesh. Heads that 
feel more responsible to the local state administration than to their elector-
ate render the work of the kenesh difficult. We encountered the case of a 
village in which there had been four different heads of AO in the last five 
years. The respective kenesh was very discontent with its working condi-
tions, and many members had resigned. Accordingly, the inhabitants of the 
village were not happy with their kenesh. 
“Q: Can you tell me about the general role of kenesh in your AO? A: 
It’s hard to say. Actually, there are no general roles. Nobody does any-
thing. Q: When people in your village have problems, do you give them 
any advice? A: Nobody comes to me. Usually they don’t come to us. 
Usually they co-operate with the raion administration or with the or-
ganisation they started their business with.” (Kenesh member, inter-
view 320Int, 04/03/04) 
In summary, it can be stated that the keneshi are of no great relevance to 
businesspeople. The function of the keneshi is seen much more in their 
ability to resolve social problems or everyday issues in the community. 
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This perception recognizes only a very limited range of kenesh functions. 
According to the law, work on local economic development programmes 
clearly falls under the responsibility of the aiyl kenesh. As citizens are not 
informed of their rights or the duties of the keneshi, they do not undertake 
the effort needed to make the keneshi responsible for anything. Many 
(passive) kenesh deputies support this attitude by giving people the im-
pression that they have no authority or power. Other deputies seem to 
work against their electorate instead of with them, and people thus do not 
trust them. In one village the deputies avoided confronting their electorate 
and accounting for their work. As a result, people suspected the deputies 
of embezzling communal assets.124 Overall, keneshi do not play the crucial 
role of a channel of participation for citizens that they could play if they 
fully exhausted their possibilities. 
Elections 
At an average level of 66.4  % in the last local elections in 1999, voter 
turnout in Kyrgyzstan was not particularly low.125 However, in the inter-
views people did not consider elections a significant possibility to partici-
pate. Elections at the local level in particular were characterised as mean-
ingless. People argued that being elected was tantamount to being power-
less. Yet, people turn out for elections.  
“Q: So, why do you go to elections, if AO and raion does not do any-
thing for you? A: I think, we just got used to it.” (Farmer, interview 
990Int, 02/04/04) 
As was shown, the elected kenesh does not appear to fulfil its tasks as  
provided for in the law. The fact that the kenesh is elected might be ex-
pected to move people to pressure kenesh members to assume the respon-
sibilities given to them through the election. However, the opposite is the 
case. People say that because the kenesh is elected, it is powerless. Ac-
cording to this logic, those officials who have been appointed have the 
necessary connections to higher officials – i.e. to those who have ap-
pointed them – to assert themselves.126 
                                                          
124 See e.g. meeting 111Meet, 26/02/04. 
125 Radio Free Europe (1999). 
126 See e.g. interview 120Int, 01/03. 
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Even though the turnout may be relatively high, citizens do not believe in 
the power implicit in elections. They do not hold their representatives re-
sponsible and do not try to pressure them to work in the interest of their 
electorate. On the one hand, this might be associated with a general mistrust 
in the capacities of local authorities as well as with the experience from 
Soviet times, when elections were merely a farce. On the other hand, citi-
zens in fact also lack knowledge about the use of democratic instruments 
(see Section 5.2). 
Kurultai 
Potentially, the kurultai is an instrument of direct democracy, as has been 
described in Chapter 3. Delegates from all over the aiyl okmotu, raion or 
oblast come together here and are supposed to have a chance to comment 
on the work of the respective administration and on plans for the coming 
year. Furthermore, a kurultai is supposed to be a forum at which to discuss 
important problems of local relevance. In fact, however, opinions on the 
kurultai differ considerably. 
Generally, businesspeople did not perceive the kurultai as an effective 
instrument to put forward their opinion. They did not think that this was 
the place where solutions for their problems could be found. Administra-
tion and kenesh people, on the other hand, presented the kurultai as a place 
where they learned about citizens’ concerns, which they then considered 
for their work. The quotes below illustrate the opposing views of a busi-
nesswoman and a kenesh member from the same village: 
“Q: How can you influence the work of the aiyl okmotu, can you par-
ticipate in any way? Have you been at a kurultai? A: No, there are no 
possibilities of participation. I have also never been at any kurultai.” 
(Businesswoman, interview 970Int, 02/04/04) 
“During the kurultai a lot of problems can be discussed. Of course, if it 
gets to the extreme point with the dissatisfaction concerning the work of 
the aiyl okmotu, they can be impeached, but it depends on the level of 
the problem. All problems are discussed at the kurultai. The freedom of 
speech is very much exercised at the kurultai. There are many examples 
in the republic where the head of aiyl okmotu was impeached.” (Kenesh 
member, interview 220Int, 03/03/04) 
Judging from observations made by our research team directly at a kurul-
tai meeting at aiyl okmotu level (cf. Box 9) as well as from different reports 
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about other kurultai, it is fair to say that in these cases the democratic 
potential of the kurultai was by no means exhausted.  
Box 9:  Observations from a kurultai at aiyl okmotu level 
At a kurultai that was observed by members of the research team, participants did 
not seem to be aware that they had the opportunity to speak out, thinking instead 
that they were supposed only to listen to the report presented by the administra-
tion. According to the regulations, participants ought to be representatives of a 
neighbourhood or street, elected by the local inhabitants. In fact, however, one 
delegate told us that she had been told to participate by a department of social 
affairs of the local administration from which she receives financial and in-kind 
support. Obviously, there is a danger that delegates may be purposely chosen by the 
administration on the assumption that they are passive and will not raise any issues. 
The speakers at the kurultai were all chosen by the administration, and not all of 
their reports were comprehensible to the audience. After three hours and many 
speeches, the akim, who had been present throughout the meeting, spoke for 
another hour. The participants were given the chance to write down some ques-
tions and problems which the akim looked at. He selected those that he wanted to 
answer, telling others that theirs’ would be answered in written form later. The 
problems mentioned concerned single issues that complicated people’s daily lives. 
These problems often were not within the scope of the administration’s responsi-
bility. For example, the question was raised why the price of sausages was higher 
in the village than in the city. The very presence of the akim at the meeting, and 
his giving a speech, added to the confusion among people about which level of 
government is responsible for which kind of problems and demands. Issues raised 
by ordinary delegates were all brought before the akim. 
The kurultai thus mainly seemed to be an instrument in which things were word-
lessly approved rather than discussed. The overall organisation of the kurultai 
seemed to aim at discouraging people from participating, the means including 
long speeches and presentation of complicated or incomprehensible reports. The 
non-administration speakers were very moderate and not at all critical, except for 
one person. The participants seemed to endure the procedure because it was their 
duty. Yet, they were not really interested, and they were eager to go home. 
Source:  own observation – kurultai 440Meet, 15/03/04 
It appears that people are not really familiar with the functions of the ku-
rultai. Potentially, this body could be the forum at which citizens could 
pressure their local government to act more responsively on their de-
mands. This would include insisting that enough room be given to citizens 
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to raise issues related to the work of the administration. Open debates over 
relevant issues such as development plans, the formation of the local 
budget and the use of communal property would stimulate public interest 
and ownership in the kurultai. 
Condominium associations  
Condominium associations are bodies assigned the task of organising 
communal work and keeping public order in a designated area of a local 
community. At the same time, they can serve as an important mediator 
between the local administration, with which they meet once a week, and 
the residents, to whom they are personally known. However, yet again, 
businesspeople did not consider them as a possible channel to influence 
decisions of the administration concerning their problems and demands. 
Indeed, businesspeople did not mention them at all.  
According to the law, members of condominium associations should be 
elected. However, this requirement does not seem to be taken too seri-
ously. In one randomly chosen case, for example, we found that the mem-
bers of a condominium organisation were honourable citizens respected 
for their seniority who had merely been asked by the administration to take 
over the post in the association. A formal election, however, had not taken 
place. In talking about their duties, these people conveyed the impression 
that they felt more accountable to the administration than to the population. 
“Association members are explaining to the people what they are sup-
posed to do and mostly people voluntarily go and do this work. The 
committees work on questions of organisation, for example, at what 
time the [communal] work should start. There are also some people 
who do not want to work. We call them negative residents. What we can 
do is to fine them. But if they are not listening at all, we call them to the 
administration or to the court of aksakal. We can even move the people 
out of the street.” (Member of condominium association commenting 
on the organisation of communal work, interview 530Int, 16/03/04) 
This attitude might explain why businesspeople did not perceive condo-
minium associations as an instrument useful to represent their interests. 
However, it may be doubted in general whether condominium associations 
are the right instrument to lobby for businesspeople’s interests. An asso-
ciation’s responsibility includes all the inhabitants of a designated area. 
Therefore, individual interests of particular groups do not fall under the 
responsibility of the condominium associations. 
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Meetings with businesspeople  
Meetings between businesspeople and administrations were typically initi-
ated by the raion administration.127 Usually, they took place separately for 
each aiyl okmotu and were organised by the respective aiyl okmotu ad-
ministration, which invited the businesspeople. According to the admini-
strations, the idea was to listen to the people’s opinions about their busi-
ness situation and possible problems.  
Businesspeople had different interests in these meetings. In one raion, the 
person who organised the meetings was new in office and one of the busi-
nesswomen wanted to hear his ideas and get information about policies for 
the near future.128 Another businesswoman intended to go to address all her 
problems and criticize the administration’s work.129 Another businessman 
was very suspicious of these meetings and suspected that they only served 
to allow the administration to get information on businesses and their 
income, but without any real interest in business problems.130 As shown in 
Box 6, participant attitudes towards the meetings ranged from “hope” (that 
things would actually improve), a “green light” attitude (administration 
should merely stop putting obstacles in the way of businesspeople), to 
“frustration” (that things would remain just as they are). 
At one of the meetings to which we were invited, only women partici-
pated. Obviously, not all of the business community felt addressed. I.e., 
we were told that all the men were in the field working and thus could not 
be there. Either way, neither meeting as such nor its date was in line with 
people’s needs. Another aspect restricting access of interested business-
people was the fact that participants were invited personally by the ad-
ministration. Thus, it is questionable whether all relevant stakeholders 
actually have a chance to participate. 
The fact that all the meetings were initiated by the raion administration, shows 
that the raion seems to feel responsible for local economic development, even 
though the measures offered are limited. The distribution of tasks between 
                                                          
127 In our sample of case studies, this was true for all meetings that took place during the 
period of observation. See Chapters 4.2 and 4.3 for details on business meetings. 
128 See interview 770Int, 23/03/04. 
129 See interview750Int, 23/03/04. 
130 See interview 710Int, 23/03/04. 
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raion and aiyl okmotu – the raion initiated these meetings and the aiyl ok-
motu organised them – again raises questions as to the independence of the 
aiyl okmotu, which is mainly used to assist an upper level of government.  
Conclusions on formal channels of participation 
In principle, the channels of participation created through the decentralisa-
tion process have great potential. However, none of them works as in-
tended. Only very few stakeholders are familiar with the exact functions of 
these channels according to the law. Consequently, the channels function 
arbitrarily and not always to the benefit of citizens. Another important 
factor that keeps people from actively using the formal channels of par-
ticipation is the extremely limited scope of responsibilities and policy-
making possibilities of administrations at aiyl okmotu level, for which 
most of the participatory channels have been created.  
5.1.2 Informal channels of participation 
The minor relevance of formal channels of participation gives leeway to 
all kinds of informal communication. If people are unable to take part in 
decision-making or to voice their  opinions in any formal way, they look 
for alternatives to influence decisions in their favour. In the case of Kyr-
gyzstan, having the right personal contacts and paying bribes, are the most 
common approaches . 
Direct personal contacts 
Having personal contacts and good relations to higher officials and deci-
sion-makers is the most direct way to influence decisions. This makes it 
possible to avoid the detour via elected representatives, and it at the same 
time gives greater weight to individual interests. Of course, only selected 
people have such access, in our case it is mainly successful businesspeople 
that are directly in touch with the raion akim. Representatives of this 
group had no complaints about any problems and reported that all their 
concerns were resolved easily and quickly. People who enjoy this privi-
lege openly talked about their good relations and did not seem to have a 
sense of injustice. Instead, they perceived it as a privilege, one of which 
they could be proud, to know the “right people” who would help them to 
solve their problems. 
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“I don't know about some other business people, they might have some 
difficulties, but as for me I have the phone number of the akim and I can 
call him anytime or just go to his house. If I have some problems I can 
ask him for help. And I even have the phone number of the city mayor. 
So I actually don't have any difficulties.” (Businesswoman, interview 
230Int, 03/03/04) 
Although this was not mentioned by those people that use their favourable 
personal contacts, one might speculate that the favours given by the au-
thorities are returned by the businesspeople. Many businesspeople give 
material support to administrations to organise public celebrations on 
holidays or for support of the poor. Those that talked about this kind of 
support seemed to perceive it as their duty to society or administration, 
without saying that they felt forced to do it. However, it is not clear 
whether businesspeople would still have their good relations with the 
authorities if they refused to give these donations. 
Bribery 
As discussed in Section 4.1, bribery is a very common phenomenon in Kyr-
gyzstan. Businesspeople who talked about the existence of this practice 
conveyed the impression that bribery is almost accepted as a necessary evil.  
“A: There was something when we started. For 2-3 months we had to 
make a great effort to get all the papers. We had to pay a lot of money 
and they sent us here and there. But we don't have any problems with 
the tax inspection. We pay regularly and they leave us alone. Q: Did 
you have to pay any bribes to get all the papers to open the business, we 
were told this by several other business people. A: Of course, that is 
normal here.” (Businessman, interview 940Int, 01/04/04) 
Bribery poses the same problems to equal participation of large parts of 
the population as misuse of personal relations. It undermines the formal 
channels of participation and thus strengthens and reproduces the informal 
ones. Furthermore, it is not equally accessible to all citizens. The open and 
widespread use and acceptance of bribery harms the credibility of admini-
stration, creates a gap between citizens and administration and thus keeps 
people from participating – they don’t trust the authorities. 
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Conclusions on informal channels of participation 
Obviously, influence gained via personal contacts or bribery is not one of 
the channels of participation foreseen and provided for by decentralisation. 
Personal contacts and bribery must be seen as violations of the principles 
of participation, viz. that the latter must be equally accessible and open to 
everyone. However, these informal channels of participation are very 
important in Kyrgyz society, not least due to the failure of the formal 
channels of participation. The more important these informal channels 
become, the more problematic it is for the lowest administrative level to 
act and at the same time to be taken seriously. Furthermore, these informal 
channels reinforce dissatisfaction with the system, with the result that the 
overall goal of decentralisation, a system more responsive to the citizens, 
remains beyond reach. 
Problems that are solved through these informal channels are individual in 
nature and the process of finding solutions is issue-driven. This practice 
undermines real policy-making, in which participation would make sense. 
At the same time, administrations fail to develop programmes in which 
participation would be possible. This gives rise to a vicious circle in which 
people tend to resign instead of making the greatest possible use of the 
formal instruments available to them. 
5.1.3 Channels of participation created by donors 
This problematic situation has been recognised by the donor community, 
and some measures have been developed to improve the possibilities for 
people’s participation based on equal access. The Urban Institute together 
with the Soros Foundation has created the instrument of Public Hearings, 
and the World Bank has established Local Investment Councils. 
Public Budget Hearings 
Public Budget Hearings are carried out in the framework of the Strategic 
Planning initiated and supported by the Urban Institute131 and the Soros 
Foundation132 since 2002. The idea of Strategic Planning is to help com-
                                                          
131 http://www.ui.kg/about_eng.shtml. 
132 http://www.soros.org/about/foundations/kyrgyzstan. 
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munities exhaust the possibilities given to them by the law on local self-
government. In this framework, communities are provided support in 
elaborating their social and economic development plans, in developing a 
coherent budget and in informing citizens about work of their administra-
tion. The Public Hearings serve to make the budget plans known to the 
population and to have suggestions made included in them.133  
Under the law on local self-government, the kurultai are supposed to serve 
as an arena to discuss and amend the budget. As described above, this 
often does not take place. In the Public Hearings organisation staff sees to 
it that there is enough room for discussions. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
kurultai, the Public Hearings are open to any member of the community 
and not only to representatives. 
Yet, the Public Hearings are pretty similar to the kurultai, or to what the 
kurultai should be. Consequently, the question could be raised why a new 
instrument had to be created in the first place. Improving the existing one 
might have proven to be a chance to demonstrate how useful those chan-
nels of participation are that have been laid down in the law.  
Local Investment Councils 
Local Investment Councils (LICs) have been established in the context of 
the Village Investment Project (VIP) which was set up by the World Bank 
in 2003. Part of the programme is to provide technical and financial sup-
port for community-based initiatives. Funds are  made available in the 
form of small grants to aiyl okmotu which are channelled through LICs.  
At the village level, Village Investment Committees are to identify local 
problems, define own priorities and set up micro-projects in close coopera-
tion with local citizens. At the aiyl okmotu level, LICs support this effort, 
distribute grants to Village Investment Councils and coordinate the latter’s 
activities. A number of aiyl kenesh deputies and the head of the aiyl ok-
motu are also members of the LICs. The LICs prepare aiyl okmotu invest-
ment strategies which the respective kenesh has final authority to approve. 
One important component of the project is capacity building, which is 
certainly very important, particularly at the local level.134 
                                                          
133 See interview Int04, 23/02/04. 
134 See interview 090Int, 25/02/04. 
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The programme was expected to start in 2004. Accordingly, it is not yet 
possible to comment on any effects. However, here as well as for the Pub-
lic Hearings, it may be asked why existing structures are – at least in part – 
being bypassed while new ones are created.  
Conclusions on the channels of participation created by donors 
A general assessment of the donor initiatives presented here is beyond the 
scope of this study. However, a number of conclusions concerning their 
effect on local participation can be drawn on the basis of the actual design 
of activities. Both projects, Public Hearings and the Village Investment 
Project, work together with or include parts of the administration in their 
work. Nevertheless, they do create parallel structures where, according to 
the law, formal channels of participation already exist. It therefore seems 
warranted to give some thought to whether and how the existing instru-
ments could be reformed to serve the same purpose. The Public Hearings, 
for example, could be incorporated into a reformed kurultai. Similarly, the 
VIP should consider shifting towards direct local budget support as soon 
as possible. While donors like the German KfW, which co-finances the 
VIP, have expressed their intention to move in this direction at some point 
in the future, it might be worthwhile giving some thought to tools that, 
right from the beginning, strengthen the administration and the role of 
existing formal channels of participation. 
Parallel structures, by contrast, undermine the authority of elected self-
governments. Citizens can only participate in a limited number of events 
and committees. Consequently, people choose those in which chances are 
highest that they will actually be able to influence decisions. This is 
mostly the case in donor-initiated projects as these are better funded. Ac-
cordingly, there is also a danger that the formal structures will become 
even more meaningless than they already have become. 
Thus far, we have discussed in some detail the channels of participation 
with their limitations and chances. The focus has been on the way they 
function and on inherent reasons for problems which contribute to very 
limited participation levels. However, dysfunctionalities of the channels 
themselves are not the only reasons for lack of participation. Another 
important factor is the context in which participation is supposed to take 
place. This context is determined by the administrative structures. These 
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
German Development Institue 113 
contribute considerably to the fact that the population is not involved 
equally in decision-making. 
As Chapter 4 has shown, lack of finance, functional assignments, capaci-
ties and competencies at aiyl okmotu level determine the outcome of the 
promotion of local economic development. However, these deficits also 
strongly influence participation. Lack of decision-making power at the 
lowest level of government limits the room for manoeuvre of the aiyl 
okmotu. Consequently, strategic and comprehensive policy-making does 
not take place. Hence, for the citizens there are no incentives to become 
involved.  
This basic fact, the lack of importance of the aiyl okmotu, also partly ac-
counts for the persistence of the dysfunctionalities in the formal channels 
of participation. As long as participation is confined to issues of minor 
relevance, it does not make sense to improve the channels which enable 
this kind of participation. Instead, this approach tends to confirm and 
strengthen people’s sceptical attitudes towards decentralisation.  
5.2 Attitudes of stakeholders and their influence on 
participation 
A deficient decentralisation process that leaves formal channels of local 
participation without meaningful authority has been shown to be a major 
factor accounting for inadequate popular participation. The situation is 
exacerbated, however, by a second factor that can tentatively be termed 
“unfavourable attitudes.” Our interviews revealed that many stakeholders 
hold attitudes that are not favourable to active participation in local politi-
cal decision-making. This final section discusses the reasons for these 
attitudes and their consequences for the participatory behaviour of stake-
holders in local economic development, thereby concentrating on busi-
nesspeople and local authorities. 
Two interrelated aspects turned out to be particularly strong: first, an obe-
dient, though rather critical, attitude towards authority and hierarchy, and 
second, a sceptical attitude towards institutions of democracy. Both as-
pects apply for both the population and administration representatives. 
Unsurprisingly, these attitudes display characteristics that can be linked to 
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the authoritarian legacy of the Soviet Union, which continues to influence 
society and institutions in today’s Kyrgyzstan.  
Attitudes towards authority and hierarchy among local businesspeople are 
marked by ambiguity. High and, arguably, unrealistic expectations with 
regard to what official authorities should ideally do contrast with wide-
spread dissatisfaction with their performance and a generally pessimistic 
view of what authorities will likely do. Appointment of officeholders from 
above is perceived as normal, and poorly performing authority is rarely 
questioned as such, though it is deplored for its poor performance and at 
the same time feared due to its still functional power. As a consequence, 
most people are not willing to become active themselves and start up their 
own initiatives as this would entail the risk of displeasing the authorities. 
In a nutshell, popular perception of authority as legitimate rests much 
more on tradition and transfer of power from above than on performance 
and accountability to the people.  
This interpretation is also supported by a widespread scepticism towards 
institutions of democracy. Neither do people see that democratic institu-
tions do make a great difference nor do most people believe that this could 
be the case and that making use of institutions could therefore be worth the 
effort. Elections, the prime institution of formal democratic participation, 
are perceived by many to continue to be what they were in Soviet times: 
meaningless – with candidacies agreed upon by the powerful beforehand 
and voting no more than a formal duty without any real consequences for 
the people: “We are just used to it,” was a symptomatic comment explain-
ing why people went to the polls even though they did not consider their 
outcome to be relevant.135 
At the same time, officials in administrations and local councils mirror 
these attitudes with their own paternalistic mind-sets. Although many 
deplore their own helplessness, which they see as resulting from limited 
competences and insufficient resources, they still feel responsible both for 
each and every aspect of their citizens’ livelihoods and, as in Soviet times, 
for indicators of economic production as well. 
Still, the weight of historical legacies must not be overestimated. In con-
trast to the overwhelming attitude of obedience and scepticism on the one 
                                                          
135 Interview Int990, 02/04/04. 
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hand and paternalism on the other that many interviewees conveyed, some 
administrative officials as well as businesspeople reported that citizens are 
starting to get more and more involved in matters of local significance. 
According to these reports, engagement in local affairs has notably in-
creased compared to Soviet times, as people now see that they have to take 
matters into their own hands.136 In one example, citizens of a village had 
actively voted their head of aiyl okmotu out of office because they per-
ceived him as not working for the benefit of the community.137 
Examples like this one are important because they break through familiar 
patterns. Their impact, however, is likely to remain rather limited as long 
as bodies of local self-government continue to be as powerless as this 
study has found them to be and formal channels of participation continue 
to lack the competence to effectively decide on issues of major relevance 
to the population. Attitudes, like informal institutions, may not immedi-
ately adapt to modified incentives, but over the long term they do respond 
to new circumstances and reward positive experiences. In the absence of 
such positive experiences, however, pre-democratic legacies in Kyr-
gyzstan are likely to prevail in forming people’s attitudes. 
6 Conclusions and recommendations 
The findings of the previous chapters concerning both policies of local 
economic development and participation in them permit us to draw a 
number of conclusions that will be presented in this final chapter. 
The decentralisation process in Kyrgyzstan, which got underway more 
than ten years ago, has created new, promising structures. Bodies of local 
self-government have been established and channels of participation cre-
ated, and the population now is able to wield direct influence on issues of 
local concern. Nevertheless, as the example of local economic develop-
ment illustrates, much remains to be done. The key obstacle to a higher 
quality of local economic development policies and improved popular 
participation in local decision-making is the limited capacity of local self-
                                                          
136 See e. g. meeting 111Meet, 26/02/04 and interview 290Int, 04/03/04. 
137 Meeting 111Meet, 26/02/04. 
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government bodies. The main deficiencies that limit the room for manoeu-
vre of local self-governments are the following: 
• Lack of clear functional assignments to each level of government 
• Disproportionate power of local state administration 
• Insufficient financial resources at aiyl okmotu level 
• Lack of qualified personnel at the local level. 
The field of local economic development, which in this study has served to 
illustrate the impact of decentralisation on participation, is on the one hand 
characterised by a number of measures designed to promote economic 
activities at the local level. Such measures are business-friendly manage-
ment of communal property, assistance in networking, and mediation 
between businesspeople and credit unions. On the other hand, obstacles 
that tend to restrict the business community may be seen as predominant. 
These obstacles include bribery, lack of legal security and lack of the ca-
pacity needed at aiyl okmotu level to address these issues. 
The aiyl okmotu has very limited possibilities to actively design and im-
plement public policies in the field of local economic development. The 
raion administration, by contrast, is much more involved in the promotion 
of local economic development. At this level, more financial resources are 
available and staff is better educated and trained. The raion administration 
holds the key capacities needed to promote local economic development, 
and this is therefore the level to which people turn when they have prob-
lems concerning their businesses.  
Yet, participation is mainly possible at aiyl okmotu level and not at raion 
level. An appointed raion administration as the key decision-maker in 
local economic development is clearly at odds with the political goal of 
decentralisation: bringing relevant decisions closer to the people, strength-
ening downward accountability of local decision-makers to a local con-
stituency and encouraging policies that reflect the needs of the local popu-
lation.  
In addition, at both levels, aiyl okmotu and raion, policies are not designed 
strategically and comprehensively. Instead, single and issue-driven meas-
ures dominate the administrations’ engagement in local economic devel-
opment. Even with such an approach, however, more could be done by 
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local administrations by way of removing all kinds of obstacles posed to 
business activities. 
With a view to achieving the objective of increased popular participation, 
different channels were created to influence local political decision-
making of the aiyl okmotu. However, important parts of the population do 
not participate. This study has identified three main reasons for this lack of 
participation:  
• the channels are to a great extent dysfunctional;  
• stakeholder attitudes towards participation are often unfavourable;  
• and the aiyl okmotu level is perceived as irrelevant.  
At the core of all these problems lies a lack of decision-making power and 
competencies at the lowest level, even though this is the level that was 
created to involve people in the design and implementation of public  
policies. 
As a consequence, official channels of participation are perceived as 
meaningless, since they cannot be used for any real policy-making. Stake-
holders do not use the official channels of participation to their full extent 
because they see no point in it. The kenesh especially could be used more 
actively to influence local decision-making. Kenesh members themselves 
often do not take their own responsibilities seriously because they feel 
powerless. 
The fact that decisions cannot truly be influenced via these formal chan-
nels has caused informal channels to gain in importance. As the intrans-
parent decision-making processes at aiyl okmotu and raion level usually 
concern not coherent strategies but rather single issues, people try to influ-
ence these decisions individually. Making use of the “right” personal con-
tacts or paying bribes is thus a very effective way of influencing decisions 
according to one’s own interests – under one condition: provided one has 
the relevant contacts and the necessary finance. Accordingly, the objective 
of equal participation of large parts of the population has not been met. 
Instead, large parts of the population are excluded. 
The study has shown that people are very sceptical about taking part in the 
new political system via the existing formal channels. The population is 
not experienced in using democratic instruments and lacks knowledge 
about their possibilities. Equally important, people have great respect for 
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hierarchies and often do not assert themselves vis-à-vis officials. Further-
more, many people are simply not willing to take over communal respon-
sibilities. Moreover, officials do not always welcome people’s participa-
tion and prefer to keep processes intransparent for the public. 
The persistence of these attitudes may be seen as due to limited possibili-
ties of public participation in strategic and comprehensive decision-
making. Accordingly, people see their attitudes confirmed that elections 
are meaningless because things do not change anyway and that instead the 
factors that count are hierarchies and having the right connections. These 
attitudes create a vicious circle in that they do not give a fair chance to a 
system of decentralised, participatory governance. As a result, the system 
being unable to function without active participation, sceptical attitudes 
are reproduced. 
All these factors contribute to the perception of the aiyl okmotu – the ad-
ministrative level that is closest to the people and allows, in theory, for the 
highest degree of participation – as meaningless and irrelevant. Participat-
ing in decision-making processes only makes sense if decisions can actu-
ally be influenced. Currently, at the local level in Kyrgyzstan, this is only 
possible within very narrow limits. 
With a view to improving this situation, we propose the following recom-
mendations: 
Decentralisation 
• Local self-government bodies need meaningful budget revenues that 
provide them with financial resources which they can use at their 
own discretion. Full implementation of the new legislation on the fi-
nancial and economic basis of local self-government would be a first 
important step in this direction. Donor agencies could contribute sub-
stantially to resolving this issue. Information campaigns on existing 
laws and their importance would serve to raise awareness at the local 
level, especially in administrations. Furthermore, legal advice could 
be provided to encourage administrations to learn how to deal with 
the legislation and to support them against possible pressure from lo-
cal state administration. 
• Administrative practice needs to move away from the notion of 
“every level of government does everything.” Local self-government 
bodies need their own guaranteed sphere of competencies and ade-
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
German Development Institue 119 
quate administrative resources to deal with them. Only then can they 
begin to define their own sustainable strategies and act according to 
their own priorities. Of course, this is a long-term process and cannot 
be achieved at once. However, to pave the way, first steps have to be 
taken. One could be the establishment of an administrative court sys-
tem. For a strict delineation of powers to work in practice, local self-
government bodies need to be able to turn to a court if they have dis-
putes over competencies with a body of local state administration, 
and to have a fair chance to win their case.  
Local economic development 
• All levels of government as well as international donors should in-
vest in capacity building for local administrative staff in order to in-
form these staffers reliably on aiyl okmotu functions and competen-
cies. One important part of such trainings should include guidance on 
the delivery of public services, particularly on how to devise policies 
of local economic development. This aspect of public services has so 
far been neglected. On the part of the government, incentives should 
be created to induce administrative staff to take part in such training 
measures. 
• Both local self-government bodies and local state administration 
should pay more attention to local economic development measures 
that incur little or no costs. Above all, this means removing obstacles 
to business activities, making administrative procedures more trans-
parent and combating corruption. 
Participation 
• NGOs and donor agencies that attempt to strengthen popular partici-
pation should systematically involve and support formal institutions 
such as keneshi and kurultai, and in this way help to boost their repu-
tation as important channels of participation. It is essential to avoid 
creating parallel structures that circumvent the official channels be-
cause such structures weaken formal institutions. Donor money that 
is intended to support public investments at the local level should be 
channelled through local budgets controlled by local councils and 
other bodies officially provided for this task.  
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• At the same time, local citizens still lack knowledge and experience 
in using democratic institutions effectively. Local governments as 
well as NGOs should invest more effort in informing the population 
about possibilities to participate in local decision-making and train-
ing local activists in making use of these instruments.  
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Annex A: Chronology of decentralisation in the Kyrgyz 
 Republic 
1991 “Law on Local Government in the Kyrgyz Republic” 
1996 Establishment of local self-government executive bod-
ies (aiyl okmotu) 
since 
1997 
Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan carrying out a “Public 
Administration Programme” 
since 
1998 
Decentralisation Programme of UNDP; recently com-
bined with the UNDP “Preventive Development in the 
South” programme 
1999 Start of public hearings conducted by USAID 
Oct 1999 Local elections in Kyrgyzstan 
2000 Introduction of the post of “Minister of Local Self-
Government and Regional Development” within the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 
2001 Elections for head of aiyl okmotu 
Jan 2002 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Local Self-
Government and Local State Administration” signed 
into force 
Dec 2002 National Strategy “Decentralisation of State Admini-
stration and Development of Local Self-Government in 
the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010” 
2003 Foundation of the Village Development Agency within 
the Village Investment Project of the World Bank 
Sep 2003 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Financial and Eco-
nomic Basis of Local Self-Government” signed into 
force, becoming effective in Jan 2004 
2004 Declaration of the “Year of Social Mobilisation and 
Good Governance” 
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Oct 2004 Local elections for city and village keneshi (councils) 
Feb / Mar 
2005 
Two rounds of elections for the Jogorku Kenesh (na-
tional parliament); after second round, violent demon-
strations against unfair conduct of elections, starting in 
the south, gain momentum and reach Bishkek 
24 Mar 
2005 
President Askar Akayev leaves the country and is re-
placed by Kurmanbek Bakiyev 
Jul 2005 Presidential elections confirm Bakiyev as president 
Aug 2005 President Bakiyev announces that oblasti are to be 
eliminated by 2007  
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Annex B: Methodology 
1. A case for qualitative empirical research methods 
Standard measures of decentralisation fail to account for important factors 
that determine the intended effects of decentralisation (see Section 2.1). 
For instance, the measure ‘local expenditure as a share of total government 
expenditure’ suggests similar levels of decentralisation in the Russian 
Federation and in Canada138; but it can hardly be concluded from this, that 
local governments operate as independently and efficiently in the Russian 
Federation as they do in Canada. 
The intention of the present study is not to measure decentralisation but to 
evaluate its impact on participatory processes in the policy field of local 
economic development. As consideration of a complex set of political, 
social and economic dimensions is associated with this objective, purely 
quantitative research methods can be ruled out. Furthermore, in dealing 
with a transition country, dimensions of social change have to be explored. 
This is the reason why qualitative methods of empirical social research 
were given preference for the purposes of this study. 
Why are qualitative methods more satisfactory in coming to terms with 
our research topic? When the research object is processes rather than static 
facts, the researcher has to explore relations between actors and the rules 
that govern these relations (institutions) as much as the dynamics that 
cause rules and relations to change over the course of time (‘institutional 
change’). 
“In other words, the institutions and social structures affected by re-
forms […] should not be viewed only from today’s perspectives but also 
as a result and as part of a historical process.”139 
Whereas it is conceivable to capture institutional settings within singular 
enquiries – or ‘snapshots’ – the dynamics that govern institutional change 
can only be revealed by creating a ‘moving picture’: stringing together 
snapshots by interrelating them and using interpretation to give meaning to 
the relations.  
                                                          
138  World Bank (2001a,  vii). 
139  Aligica (1997, 49). 
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This implies that subjective interpretations, contextual contingency and 
reactivity, as attributes of the research objects (actors, informal rules) and 
in the research situation itself (interviews, participatory observation, etc.), 
are not only desirable but necessary preconditions for the qualitative re-
search process. 
Qualitative social science can live up to the task of exploring dynamics as 
complex as those of post-Soviet transition. “To document, to reconstruct 
analytically, and finally to comprehend the process of constitution of real-
ity is the central aim of qualitative social research.”140 
In order to come to valid and reliable conclusions, a mix of qualitative 
methods was used141. One chief research instrument was the semi-
structured interview (see below). In addition, valuable insights and infor-
mation were gained from participatory observation, informal conversa-
tions, and the media. The triangulation142 of these different kinds of data 
contributed to a comprehensive picture of the decentralisation process in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
2. Grounded Theory as style of research 
The research process was guided by an array of techniques referred to in 
the qualitative social science as Grounded Theory. This ‘style of research,’ 
developed since the 1960s, affects various phases of our research process: 
the sampling of interview partners, data generation (data gained from 
semi-structured interviews and observation methods), data analysis and 
theory generation. Here, we introduce some of the principles of Grounded 
Theory: 
Theoretical sampling is “a means, ‘whereby the analyst decides on ana-
lytic grounds what data to collect next and where to find them.’”143 In 
coding the data and establishing categories using the Constant Compara-
tive Method, the researcher may get clues as to where to look next to 
achieve what Grounded Theory terminology calls ”conceptual density.”  
                                                          
140  Lamnek (1993, 25), transl. JW. 
141 Lachenmann (1995). 
142 Flick (2000). 
143  Strauss (1987, 38). 
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Coding is the term used for the analytical process by which the raw data 
are structured in categories of analysis, and by which codes are attached to 
these categories. Coding takes three different forms: 
Open coding is the procedure by which the researcher develops prelimi-
nary categories on grounds of constant comparison and examination of 
data. Occurrences of the same phenomena are accounted for by attaching 
the same codes; attributes that constitute the phenomena are defined. Open 
coding is used as the initial means to break the data down into categories.  
Axial coding: Used to define relations between distinct categories as well 
as between category and sub-category, axial coding gives rise to a system 
of categories that represents the content of the data.  
Selective coding: The researcher concentrates on a core category and re-
relates all categories to the core category. This step involves a continuous 
refinement of categories, and the emerging concept is enriched up to a 
point at which “conceptual density” is achieved. 
The modes of coding do not necessarily follow a sequential logic; the 
researcher switches constantly from one mode to the other.  
A network of categories and defined relationships develops in the course 
of coding,. If sampling and coding procedures are done thoroughly, this 
grid lays the ground for theoretical concepts, which are ‘grounded’ in the 
data.  
Grounded Theory conceives of overall research as a circular process of 
data generation and analysis, constantly adjusting the approach to new 
findings. 
3. Categories and questions 
Table 2 presents a summary of our research interest as it developed in 
advance of our field research. It is structured in two domains (decentralisa-
tion and participation in local economic development), six categories and 
several sub-categories. The questions derived from these sub-categories 
served as the basis for the formulation of the interview guidelines (see 
Section 5 in this annex). 
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4. Case selection and selection of interview partners 
In-depth case studies formed a central part of the empirical analysis. The 
sample of local communities and regions for these case studies was se-
lected according to certain criteria. One important criterion was the North-
South divide in Kyrgyzstan. Southerners in Kyrgyzstan often perceive 
themselves as disadvantaged in terms of economic development and po-
litical representation. The North is economically more developed, and the 
capital, Bishkek, is situated there. To be able to make statements about the 
decentralisation process in general, cases had to represent both parts of the 
country. Another criterion was to cover cities as well as aiyl okmotu with a 
view to being able to account for an urban-rural divide as well. Thirdly, 
with a view to the policy field of local economic development, selected 
communities had to exhibit a minimum degree of agricultural, industrial or 
service activities that did not rule out significant LED activities from the 
outset. Pragmatic considerations, e.g. accessibility of villages, also played 
a role.  
The sample that was finally chosen included in the South the city of 
Kochkorata as well as the aiyl okmotu Masy and Dostuk, all located in 
Nooken raion, Jalalabat oblast. For the North, the city of Kant and the aiyl 
okmotu Uzun-Kyr and Krasnaia Rechka in Issyk-Ata raion, Chui oblast, 
were selected. 
Interview partners represented four different groups, all of which were 
relevant for certain aspects of the research question: 
Private sector: stakeholders in local economic development, for example 
businesspeople and business associations 
Public sector: staff at different levels of administration (oblast, raion and 
aiyl okmotu level, with an emphasis on the latter two) and in different 
positions  
Civil society: individuals, people in organisations and groups that have a 
stake in local economic development, for example local and regional non-
governmental organisations  
Experts: staff of academic institutions in Bishkek, of international donor 
organisations, non-governmental organisations and international organisa-
tions 
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5. Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews served as a crucial instrument for data gather-
ing. This interview form allows for an optimal combination of the desired 
openness and the necessary focus. Keeping the interview flexible and 
adjusting it to possible unexpected turns of the conversation helped to get 
a deeper understanding of the way that the decentralisation process works 
and how it is perceived. On the other hand, a guideline for the interviews 
was necessary to generate the relevant information with respect to the 
research interest.144  
The data generated by semi-structured interviews and participatory obser-
vation were analysed with the help of a software tool for computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis. This software helps to structure and 
organise data in a way consistent with a Grounded Theory-guided research 
style. At the same time it allows for a good overview and manageability of 
the data through code and retrieve-functions for codes, quotations and 
memos. 
Different guidelines were developed for different types of interviewees. In 
expert interviews, the focus was not on personal experiences and interpre-
tations but on gaining information and facts about the decentralisation 
process in Kyrgyzstan. It was possible in this way to formulate direct 
questions on the relevant issues and define a relatively fixed structure for 
the interviews.145 Experts could be expected to be willing to openly share 
their knowledge and to be able to understand the purpose of the questions 
put to them. 
For interviews with actors directly involved in the decentralisation process 
or local politics, more consideration had to be accorded to the operation-
alization of the research question and the interviewing technique . As 
regards operationalization, two major aspects are important. First, asking 
“if decentralisation in the Kyrgyz Republic increases participation in pub-
lic promotion of local economic development” would have been very 
confusing for most of the interviewees, and connotations with this ques-
tion would have differed considerably among them. Secondly, if personal 
interests play a role, people can become very reluctant to share their opin-
                                                          
144  Hopf (2000, 351). 
145  Meuser / Nagel (1991, 444). 
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ions. Thus, careful formulations had to be found that were clear enough to 
be easily understood and sensitive enough so as not to hurt an inter-
viewee’s feelings. In addition, with regard to the interviewing technique, 
interviews with actors directly involved had to differ considerably from 
expert interviews. People’s knowledge of the decentralisation process and 
the information they could provide were only of secondary importance. It 
was even more important to learn about their personal experiences, their 
perception of the current situation and the way they interpret these experi-
ences and perceptions. To give space for these kinds of information, inter-
views with actors involved were conducted more openly than the expert 
interviews. 
For qualitative interviews, it is essential to avoid suggestive and closed 
questions because interviewees are easily influenced and might thus give 
the answers that they expect the interviewer wants to hear. Accordingly, 
we encouraged the interviewees to tell us their thoughts on certain topics, 
formulating our request as openly but also as clearly as possible. In the 
course of the interview, we adjusted the order of topics from our guide-
lines according to the subjects that the interviewees had already touched 
upon during their narrative sequences and in accordance with the direction 
that the interview took.146 In this way, we ensured, first, that all the aspects 
we wanted to learn about were covered and that, second, we got to know 
the point of view of the actors. This approach allowed us to learn about 
relevant topics and concerns that we had not considered so far. Such “un-
expected” information gained from the relatively open form of interviews 
was then used to adjust interview guidelines. 
Developing and revising interview guidelines was a constant process dur-
ing the empirical research. In keeping with the principles of Grounded 
Theory, the research took the shape of a circular process of data generation 
and analysis. As far as the guidelines are concerned, this meant that they 
were altered throughout the research as new relevant issues arose.147  
The guidelines were developed in two main steps: first, the research inter-
est was formulated in the form of questions; second, the guidelines were 
drafted in a form that is supposed to generate a conversation in which all 
                                                          
146  Schütze (1983, 285). 
147  Cf. Glaser / Strauss (1984). 
Strengthening Participation through Decentralisation 
German Development Institue 139
the topics of interest will be covered. Below, the guidelines are displayed 
that emerged from the latest revisions. 
5.1 Interview guidelines: private sector 
— Would you please introduce yourself 
— Which kind of business, how many employees? 
Current: economic situation 
— Please tell me about the current economic situation in this area and 
about your business in particular 
— Would you please tell me more about…. 
— What do you think are reasons for these problems? 
— What kind of taxes do you have to pay? What are they used 
 for? 
— Please tell me about your ideas to improve this situation 
Relationship with administration 
— I would like to know if you can get any support (like meetings with 
businesspeople, business advice, financial support or anything like 
that) in this region 
— Does the administration of the aiyl okmotu or raion do any-
thing like that? 
— Who else is involved? 
— Are their any initiatives or interest groups, are you a member? 
— What about small farmers, street vendors or small restaurants 
(or other areas of the informal sector that are relevant in the 
respective region) (are they part of these initiatives? do they 
get any support…?) 
— Please tell me about your thoughts on the work that the aiyl ok-
motu/raion/oblast administration does for the businesspeople  
— Do they treat your concerns as soon as possible? 
— How are decisions on the measures of LED (has to be adjusted 
to former statement) taken, who is involved? 
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— What do you think are reasons for these problems? 
Participation 
— Please tell me about your possibilities to influence the work of the 
administration 
No possibilities to influence Tries to influence 
Please tell me about the reasons Please tell me about the way that 
 you try to influence their work 
5.2 Interview guidelines: public sector 
— Please introduce yourself: Position in administration, area of work 
LED 
— Please tell me about the economy in this area 
— I would like to know about plans to improve this situation 
— I would like to know about the role of your administration in 
LED 
— How do you promote businesses? 
— What are the competencies/responsibilities of 
your administration in this field? 
— Please tell me about the development plans that are elaborated 
by your administration 
— I would like to know about implementation problems of the 
plans (or other activities) 
— What is being done now in the framework of the “year of so-
cial mobilisation”? 
— Why is there not more done by the government?  
Participation 
— I would like to know about the involvement of the population in this 
process 
— Please tell me about the way in which the population can in-
fluence decisions 
— According to you, who is participating in these decisions 
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— What about condominium associations/NGO/businesspeople? 
— Please tell me about the co-operation with the keneshi 
— How often are their meetings with the kenesh? 
— Are their any other meetings with individual kenesh members 
on particular concerns? 
— What are the functions of your kenesh? 
— I would like to know about the way that the kurultai in this raion/aiyl 
okmotu work 
— Can everybody take part in them or only elected representa-
tives? 
— How are these representatives elected? 
— What do you think are the reasons that participation is so 
low/so high… 
— Imagine, people took part (more) in these decisions (on LED), 
how would that influence your work 
Current administrative structure 
— Please tell me your thoughts on the decentralisation process/admini-
strative reforms in this country 
— Please tell me about the changes this meant to your work 
— I have heard that the co-ordination of work between the dif-
ferent levels is not always easy, what are your experiences in 
that concern? 
— I would like to know what you think are the reasons for these 
problems 
— How often do you meet with the akim/head of AO/governor 
(depending on who we talk to)? 
— On whose initiative do these meetings take place 
— What are the criteria for top-down distribution of funds? 
— Are there any problems concerning finance of local activities? 
— What kind of taxes can be raised locally? 
— Are there any problems with the taxes? 
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— For kenesh-members: Can you be in more than one kenesh at a time, 
for example at aiyl and raion level 
— What exactly does your kenesh do, what are its functions? 
— How often do you meet with the head of administration, only 
formal meetings or also individual meetings? 
— Do you get any remuneration for your work in the kenesh? 
Elections: 
— When do the elections for the keneshi and the aiyl okmotu/city heads 
take place? 
5.3 Interview guidelines: civil society 
— Can you please introduce yourself 
Economic opportunities and needs 
— Please tell me about the current economic situation in this area and 
about the needs of the population 
— Would you please tell me more about… 
— What do you think are reasons for these problems? 
— Please tell me about your ideas to improve this situation 
Relationship with administration 
— I would like to know if there are any initiatives to solve these prob-
lems in this region? 
— Does the administration of the aiyl okmotu or raion do any-
thing like that? 
— Who else is involved? 
— Please tell me about your thoughts on the work of the aiyl ok-
motu/raion/oblast administration 
— Do they take your concerns seriously? 
— What do you think are reasons for these problems? 
— What do you think about their local economic development 
program? 
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— How do you think that things could be done in a better way? 
— Please tell me why this is not done by the administration 
Participation 
— Please tell me about your possibilities to influence the work of the 
administration 
No possibilities to influence Tries to influence 
Please tell me about the reasons Please tell me about the way that 
 you try to influence their work 
5.4 Interview guidelines: experts 
— Please introduce yourself 
— How do you see the ongoing decentralisation process in Kyrgyzstan? 
— What are the problems? 
— Corruption? 
— Local elites, dominant ethnic groups? 
— Unregulated structures between the different levels? 
— Lack of local finance? 
— Would you please tell us about the promotion of local development in 
this country? 
— What kind of initiatives? 
— Who has the decision power? 
— Who are the winners and losers? 
— Is there participation in LED? 
— Who participates? 
— What role do the local development plans play, who partici-
pates in their elaboration? 
— What is your general perception of participation in this country? 
— What are the problems? 
— What are the reasons for these problems? 
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— Are there dominant forces that pose an obstacle to participa-
tion, that keep people from participating? 
— What interests have had an influence on the design of the decentrali-
sation process (donors, local powers…) and is there sufficient owner-
ship within the Kyrgyz government? 
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